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Abstract 
Owing to the distributed nature of modern attacks (e.g. denial-of-service), it is 
extremely challenging to detect such malicious behaviour using traditional intrusion 
detection systems. In this thesis, we investigate the possibility of adapting an intelligent 
system to an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) by proposing a cooperative and 
intelligent detection and prevention system using machine learning approaches, and aim 
to facilitate the detection and prevention process in a distributed environment. Firstly, 
we review the state of the art of intelligent intrusion detection and prevention system 
(IIDPS), and highlight the security requirement of cooperative based-IIDPS. Adaptive 
optimization techniques such as fuzzy logic controller (FLC), reinforcement learning 
are discussed in this thesis in order to adopt Q-leaning algorithm to FLCs. We 
investigate the detection capability based on the fuzzy Q-learning (FQL) algorithm and 
evaluate it using distribute denial of service attacks (DDoS). Later, we investigate the 
game based-FQL algorithm by combining the game theoretic approach and the fuzzy Q-
learning algorithm. This thesis evaluates the proposed solution using flooding attacks in 
wireless sensor networks (i.e. a type of DDoS attack). In order to measure the 
evaluation, several performance metrics, such as frequency of convergence of the 
detection scheme, accuracy of detection, false alarm rate, defence rate and energy 
consumption, are addressed as part of detection and prevention scheme. We perform the 
aforementioned investigations using several simulation experiments. The quantitative 
results acquired from the experiments are benchmarked with corresponding results 
acquired from the cooperative attack detection scheme. Through the result comparisons, 
we demonstrate the significance of cooperative detection mechanism, for detecting 
distributed denial of service attacks in a timely and energy-efficient manner, accuracy of 
detection and defence, as well as false alarm rate. 
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Abstrak 
Disebabkan oleh serangan moden yang bersifat teragih (cth: nafi khidmat), ianya amat 
mencabar untuk mengesan tingkah laku hasad dengan menggunakan sistem pengesanan 
pencerobohan tradisional. Dalam tesis ini, kami menyiasat kebarangkalian untuk 
menyesuaikan satu sistem pintar pada satu Sistem Pengesanan Pencerobohan (IDS) 
dengan mencadangkan satu Sistem Pengesanan dan Pencengahan bersifat kerjasama 
serta pintar menggunakan kaedah pembelajaran mesin, dan bertujuan untuk 
memudahkan proses pengesanan dan pencegahan dalam persekitaran yang teragih. 
Pertama, kami mengkaji perkembangan terkini dalam sistem pengesan dan pencegahan 
pencerobohan pintar (IIDPS), dan menggariskan keperluan keselamatan bagi IIDPS 
bersifat kerjasasama. Teknik penyesuaian optimum seperti fuzzy logic controller (FLC) 
dan reinforcement learning dibincangkan dalam tesis ini bagi tujuan penyesuaian 
algoritma Q-Learning pada FLCs. Kami menyiasat keupayaan pengesanan berasaskan 
algoritma fuzzy Q-learning (FQL) dan menilainya dengan mengunakan serangan nafi 
khidmat teragih (DDoS). Seterusnya, kami menyiast algoritma game based-FQL dengan 
menggabungkan kaedah game theory dan algoritma fuzzy Q-learning. Tesis ini menilai 
cadangan penyelesaian dengan menggunakan serangan flooding (i.e. satu jenis serangan 
nafi khidmat) dalam rangkaian sensor tanpa wayar. Untuk tujuan mengukur penilaian, 
beberapa metrik prestasi, seperti kekerapan penumpuan skim pengesanan, ketepatan 
pengesanan, kadar penggera palsu, kadar pertahanan dan penggunaan tenaga, ditangani 
sebahagian daripada skim pengesanan dan pencegahan. Kami melaksanakan menilaian 
yang dinyatakan dengan mengunakan beberapa ujikaji simulasi. Segala keputusan 
kuantitatif hasil dari ujikaji-ujikasi ditanda-araskan dengan hasil keputusan yang 
diperolehi daripada skim kerjasama pengesanan serangan yang lain. Melalui 
perbandingan hasil keputusan, kami menunjukkan kepentingan mekanisme pengesanan 
kerjasama, dalam mengesan serangan nafi khidmat teragih  di dalam waktu yang tepat 
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dan penggunaan tenaga yang berkesan, ketepatan dalam mengesan dan pertahanan, dan 
juga kadar nilai penggera palsu. 
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Chapter 1 : INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
 The level of asset in Internet is positively correlated with network security. The 
hardness of ever-changing threat environment seems far from surrounded (Anuar et al., 
2012). The recent statistics for the last three years show the battle against attacks. 
According to Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) reported, in 2013 Kaspersky 
Lab products neutralized 5188740554 cyber-attacks on user computers and mobile 
devices. In terms of the mobile operating systems that are being targeted by malware, 
Android is still the number one target, attracting a whopping 98.05% of known malware 
(Kaspersky, 2013). In order to conduct all attacks over the Internet in 2013, 
cybercriminals used 10,604,273 unique hosts, which is 60.5% more than in 2012.  
In 2013, a report by Gartner (2013) reveals that a sophisticated class of 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack sent an attack command to hundreds or even 
thousands of mobile agents, which then launched flooding attacks to access multiple 
websites.  
A new report from Arbor’s World-Wide Infrastructure Report (2012) shows that 
the size of distributed denial-of-service attacks have started to plateau, while 
application-layer and multi-vector attacks continue to evolve.  
1.2 Intrusion Detection Systems 
The security analysts use different approaches to analyse the threats, such as 
antivirus software, firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). The use of an IDS 
or related system, such as an Intrusion Prevention System, is one of the most popular 
options in commercial due to their operation, openness and wide-acceptance as security 
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devices (Anuar et al., 2013). An intrusion detection system (IDS) and intrusion response 
system (IPS) operate to detect suspicious activities and respond to them.  
There are hundreds of published works related to intrusion detection (Patcha et al., 
2007), which aim to improve the efficiency and reliability of detection, prevention and 
response systems. Prevailing studies have so far focused on reducing alerts (Maggi et 
al., 2009), detecting DDoS attacks (Mirkovic et al., 2004), prioritizing incidents, 
eliminating and reducing false alarms (Steinberg et al., 2005), and increasing the self-
reliance level of incident responses (Anuar et al., 2013). Artificial intelligence (AI) 
techniques attend to automate the intrusion detection and reduce human intervention. 
Intrusion detection system in artificial intelligent is categorized into three type: 
traditional artificial intelligence (TAI) and computational intelligence (CI) and multi 
agent-based CI (MCI) techniques that operate as classifiers. 
In TAI techniques, network traffic activity is captured by single classifiers (i.e. 
fuzzy set, neural network, genetic algorithm and artificial immune system), thereafter, a 
profile representing its desired behavior is coded and finally a behavior model is 
created. Network events take place, the current profile is assigned and an anomaly score 
is computed by comparing the two behaviors. The score normally indicates the degree 
of irregularity for a specific event, such that the IDS raises a flag in the event an 
anomaly occurs when the score surpasses a certain threshold. Computational 
intelligence classifiers are meant to create an iterative process of observing patterns, 
adjusting to the mathematical form, and making predictions (Alpadin, 2010). MCI 
techniques function by applying the multi agent system to computational intelligence in 
order to enhance the performance of detection and response. On the other hand, 
cooperative multi agent system uses CI methods such as self organizing map (SOM), 
support vector machine (SVM), genetic algorithm (GA), reinforcement learning (RL) 
and game theory (GT) to determine temporal behavior and respond to any deviation.  
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The main objective of MCI consists of distributing multi agent system to each 
cluster to provide a CI mechanism that makes individual and cooperative decisions 
associated, for example, the use of this approach in Intrusion Detection Systems 
(Wooldridge, 2009). MCI has been widely employed in the domain of network security 
(W. Li et al., 2012) and cloud computing-based IDS (Doelitzscher et al., 2012). The 
main issue is to improve the accuracy of attack detection, false alarm rates as well as 
energy efficiency in the Intelligent Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IIDPS), 
upon multi agent based computational intelligent IDPS in terms of Co-IIDPS. 
1.3 Research Motivation  
There are several classical security methodologies which have focused on 
particular types of attacks to prevent the attacks. An intelligent intrusion detection and 
prevenstion can be a line of defense. It is impossible, or even infeasible, to guarantee 
perfect prevention. Not all types of attacks are known and new ones appear constantly. 
As a result, attackers can always find security holes to exploit. For confident 
environments, it makes sense to establish a line of shield: An Intelligent Intrusion 
Detection  and Prevention System (IIDPS) able to detect attacks and warn the sensors 
and the operator about it. 
Most IIDPSs have focused on local detection in network, i.e., allowing nodes to 
locally detect specific attacks which are performed in their neighborhood  
(Ponomarchuk et al., 2010). Da Silva et al. (2005) propose a similar IDS systems, where 
they are able to monitor nodes in a network and responsible to observe other neighbors. 
They listen to messages in their radio range and store in a buffer specific message fields 
that might be useful to an IDS system running within a sensor node. Wang et al. (2006) 
focus on the detection of selfish nodes to preserve their resources at the expense of 
others. Loo et al. (2006) applied the IDSs for ad hoc networks. In all the above work, 
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there is no collaboration among the sensor nodes. The only collaborative approaches we 
are aware of focus on the local detection of intrusion detection based on traditional 
artificial intelligence (Patel et al., 2013). 
More prevalent work has been done in intrusion detection for ad-hoc networks 
(Huang et al., 2013). In such networks, distributed and cooperative IDS architectures are 
also preferable. Detailed distributed designs, actual detection techniques and their 
performance have been studied in more depth. We are unaware of any work that has 
investigated the issue of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack detection and 
response in a general collaborative way for networks. Thus, the lack of cooperative and 
disributed mechansim which utilizes computational intelligence have been our 
motivation for creating a game based cooperative IDPS to overcome the problem of 
accuracy of detection, response and false alarm rate. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
This section outlines the research methodology adopted in this thesis. The phases 
of the research methods are presented. The details of the methodology are explained in 
this section as shown in Figure 1.1. The literature review and problem statement are 
discussed in Phase 1. In Phase 2, the research objective is argued. The system designs 
are proposed in Phase 3. The evaluation and analysis are discussed in Phase 4. 
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Literature Review
Problem Extraction
Phase-I
Research Objectives
Prototype Implementation
Results Gathering and Analysis
Findings Comparison
Phase-II
Phase-III
Phase-IV
 
Figure 1.1: Research Methodologies 
Phase I: Literature Review and Problem Extraction 
The focus of this thesis is to design a cooperative intelligent intrusion detection and 
prevention security schemes. Therefore, the outline is based upon the following related 
works: 
1) Initially, the existing intrusion detection schemes designed for network 
environment are categorized as (a) data security schemes or (b) application 
security schemes. 
2) Afterwards, the existing data security schemes design for IDPSs are sub-
categorized as (a) traditional intelligence (b) computational intelligence and (c) 
multi agent based computational intelligence IDPS schemes.  
3) Thereafter, the selected real data schemes are critically analysed to identify the 
computation intensive operations and security issues that need to be addressed.  
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Phase II: Research Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to propose a novel cooperative multi agent intelligent 
intrusion detection and prevention scheme to address the intrusions. In order to achieve 
this aim, several issues need to be thoroughly understood, analysed and evaluated, as 
follows: 
(a) To comprehensively investigate the domain of cooperative multi agent 
intelligent intrusion detection and response, and identify the key issues with 
respect to the effective defense against intrusions.  
(b) To design and implement a novel cooperative IIDPS framework to facilitate a 
practical evaluation of intrusion detection. 
(c) To evaluate the performance of a proposed framework in terms of accuracy of 
detection and false alarm rate by validating it using evaluation studies at 
different stages in order to demonstrate the progress of results.  
Phase III: Prototype Implementation  
1) The cooperative IDPS is developed in a network simulator.  
2) To generate an attack with a random function, which selects subject nodes from 
each cluster to attack, the selected nodes adjust their functions to send flooding 
packets to the cluster head. 
3) The game based IDS uses Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) 
protocol in the simulation, as it closely reflects WSN in practice and is also 
capable of dealing with energy consumption concerns in WSNs. The simulations 
were run for 1000s with LEACH as the routing protocol, the initial access point 
energy was 100 joules, the effective transmission range of the wireless radio for 
the access point was 100m, the sink node transmission range was 100m, and the 
common node transmission range was 50m. 
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Phase IV: Results and Comparison  
We perform simulations to analyse the proposed scheme, for performance analysis 
using algorithmic and network-level parameters. The impact of security schemes on 
distributed denial of service attack are evaluated on the basis of accuracy of detection, 
accuracy of response, false alarm rate, time complexity, number of node alive, and 
energy consumption on network device while performing intrusion detection, intrusion 
response, and anomaly clustering operations.  
1.5 Thesis outlines  
The objectives presented above relate to the general sequence of the material presented 
in this thesis, the structure of which is discussed in five chapters.  
Chapter 2 introduces a comprehensive taxonomy along with state-of-the-art 
intelligent intrusion detection and prevention systems (IIDPS), and specifically reviews 
their response capabilities in networks. The IIDPS were assessed and categorized into 
three trends: traditional artificial intelligence, computational intelligence and multi-
agent-based computational. 
Chapter 3 provides the details of the theoretical basis and the mathematical 
techniques appropriate for adaptive optimization techniques. We introduce the basic 
concepts and design of fuzzy logic controller, reinforcement learning and game theory. 
The chapter proposes an effective cooperative multi agent architecture based on 
computational intelligence methods for detection and prevention of attacks. This chapter 
highlights the advantages of such studies and discusses how they can be combined to 
produce a more effective means of detecting of intrusions.  
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Chapter 4 presents the main contribution of this thesis: a novel collaborative 
game based IDPS. In presenting the framework, this chapter begins by presenting the 
core foundation behind the framework as well as its operational characteristics. This 
chapter comprises the study by conducting multiple experiments to validate and 
evaluate the proposed game based fuzzy Q-learning IDPS framework. In addition, 
example scenarios are provided to demonstrate how the proposed framework operates, 
and how the network simulator interfaces can be used to assist security analysts in 
making a decision.  
Chapter 5 demonstrates the progress of the results and the evaluation study 
presents the experimental results in four stages. The first stage aims to validate the 
Game based fuzzy Q-learning IDPS in terms of accuracy of detection by comparing its 
results to the existing machine learning methods such as fuzzy logic controller, Q-
learning, and fuzzy Q-learning approaches.  Based upon the initial results of the first 
experiment, the second stage aims to enhance detection rate by using collaborative 
game theory- IDPS in terms of Game based fuzzy Q-learning IDPS. The third stage 
investigates the effectiveness of the proposed Game FQL-IDPS in achieving two 
different goals: first it investigates the influence of proposed method in terms of energy 
consumption over time; and secondly it investigates the effectiveness of proposed 
method in terms of energy consumption for different deployed nodes. The fourth stage 
investigates the performance of the proposed framework by measuring the time 
complexity during detection process. This chapter also gives an in-depth discussion of 
the implications of applying the proposed framework in practice, underlining the 
advantages as well as the limitations. 
Chapter 6 presents the main conclusions drawn from this thesis, highlights the 
principle achievements and limitations of the work, and makes suggestions for potential 
of further enhancements.  
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Chapter 2 : INTELLIGENT INTRUSION DETECTION AND PREVENTION 
SYSTEM 
This chapter studies the intelligent intrusion detection and prevention system 
(IIDPS) schemes in networks and cloud computing. More specially, the categorization 
of IDPS schemes in terms of traditional artificial intelligence (TAI), computational 
intelligence (CI) and multi-agent CI (single cloud, collaborative cloud) are discussed. 
We highlight the benefits of multi-agent system based CI in terms of collaborative 
based IIDPS (Co-IIDPS) to attain high accuracy of attacks. The research areas and 
directions in developing and deploying CI based Co-IIDPSs is mentioned. 
2.1 Overview 
Unlike prevalent intrusion detection and prevention system, intelligent intrusion 
detection and prevention system not only aim to foster the supportive effectiveness of 
detection, for instance, with increased accuracy of detection and decreased false alarm 
rate, but also have cooperative intelligent approaches. An intelligent actuator help 
enhance the cooperative effort of IDPS to communicate while detecting anomalies in 
areas including health, warfare and environment monitoring (Akyildiz et al., 2002). For 
example, health monitoring models adopt IDS as extraordinary parts to continuously 
capture quantitative data from an enormous number of wearable body sensor networks 
for longer periods (Hanson et al., 2009). Hybrid Sensor Network (HSN) architecture 
employs MicaZ sensors for the battlefield, which are skilled in tracking live vocal and 
magnetic weapon signals generated by enemy forces (Bokareva et al., 2006). The most 
recent publication by Kapitanova et al. (2012) demonstrates how robust fuzzy logic is in 
event detection by monitoring smoke via temperature sensors attached throughout the 
home environment; fire ignition may thus be detected, making the relevance of sensor 
applications apparent. 
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The existing application designs for wireless networks afford greater flexibility in 
establishing communications and increase system automation, though lack in security 
and privacy (N. Li et al., 2009). The core weaknesses with these sensor nodes lie in the 
limited-resource devices, i.e. power and processing units. For this reason, vulnerability 
to various security threats is notably high. Meanwhile, an adversary possesses passive 
and active abilities. It may thus implicate sensor nodes through access to secret 
information such as keys stored in the compromised node in addition to the potential to 
eavesdrop and alter (e.g. replay, forge, modify and delete) exposed nodes behaviour 
(Schaffer et al., 2012). 
In mitigating security complications, traditional security tactics like firewall and 
cryptography are alternative options to prevent external intruders. Nevertheless, they are 
impractical in completely averting network resources from increasingly sophisticated 
internal attacks (Chen et al., 2002). A different security approach incorporates Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPSs) to detect and impede intrusion by impostors. 
An Intrusion Detection System or other similar ones (e.g. Intrusion Prevention System, 
Intrusion Response System) monitor network traffic to analyse and detect attacks 
(Anuar et al., 2012). Three detection methods employed are: misuse, anomaly, and the 
hybrid model--a blend of the first two  Fuchsberger et al. (2005). A misuse-based 
system identifies known patterns by matching observed data using simple rules. For 
instance, Snort-Wireless runs its default rule settings to process all malicious events 
observed by the sensor and adopt intrusion detection techniques Lockhart et al. (2005).  
Anomaly-based detection refers to the discovery of anomalous patterns in 
measurement data that do not conform to the expected behaviour (Curiac et al., 2012). 
According to Dutkevych et al. (2007), an anomaly-based solution averts intrusion in real 
time systems by analysing protocol-based attacks and multidimensional traffic. The 
hybrid detection approach boosts the capabilities of a current Intrusion Detection and 
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Prevention System (IDPS) by joining the two intelligent methods of misuse and 
anomaly Wang et al. (2011). Aydin et al. (2009) designed a hybrid IDS by incorporating 
the Packet Header Anomaly Detection (PHAD) and Network Traffic Anomaly 
Detection (NETAD) systems, which are anomaly-based IDSs with misuse-based IDS 
Snort. The key concept behind hybrid detection is that misuse identifies known attacks 
while anomaly discovers unknown attacks. 
The traditional misuse detection approaches display high performance regarding 
correct detection of known attacks and false alarm rates but fail to detect unknown 
attacks (D. Anderson et al., 1995). Therefore, a traditional anomaly detection approach 
is considered an alternative to detect constantly changing unknown attack behaviour, 
but it may also exhibit high false positive results. 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques play a role in automating the intrusion 
detection process to diminish human intermediation. The intrusion detection process 
based upon traditional artificial intelligence (TAI) entails methods such as fuzzy set, 
neural networks, and evolutionary computing, which operate as classifiers for anomaly 
detection (Idris et al., 2005). Denning (1987), with a rule-based expert system for 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), aimed to improve detection performance. Although 
these rules apply cover-known patterns, they are unable to adapt to the attacks’ pattern 
changes (e.g. attack polymorphs). To alleviate the problem of attack modifications, 
computational intelligence (CI) is considered a high-accuracy detection method to be 
used in constructing an intelligent detection model and to automatically identify 
inconsistent activities (Kulkarni et al., 2011). Agah et al. (2004) detected attacks with 
the game theory-based reinforcement learning algorithm. The result was greater safety, 
but the energy efficiency issues remain to be addressed. 
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Despite the limited agreement on the exact procedure of constructing anomaly 
classifiers based on TAI and CI to address safety, there is a broadly accepted view that 
the sections of CI are, neuro fuzzy, genetic fuzzy and machine learning. By joining the 
autonomous multi agent with the CI or TAI methods, a number of the previously 
identified weaknesses such as accuracy of detection, false alarm rate as well as energy 
efficiency may be confronted. Toosi et al. (2007) combined the following three soft 
computing algorithms: neural network, fuzzy rules and genetic algorithm to improve the 
decision result optimization.  
According to the existing reviews for anomaly resource-based monitoring, IDPS 
systems are divided into two categories: Host-based IDPS (HIDPS) and Network Based 
IDPS (NIDPS) systems (J. A. Anderson et al., 1995; Sherif et al., 2002). NIDPS 
monitors network traffic, in particular network segments or devices, after which it 
analyses network and protocol conduct to identify suspicious activities. HIDPS observes 
all, or portions of, the dynamic behaviour and state of a computer system. Unlike 
NIDPS which dynamically inspects network packets, HIDPS detects programs’ access 
and resources. HIDPS offers the advantage of being easy to deploy without affecting 
existing infrastructures as opposed to NIDS which detects attacks at the transport 
protocol layer by quick responses. 
Through this chapter, we investigate the application of TAI, CI and MCI for 
identifying present research challenges in preparing an intelligent intrusion detection 
and prevention system (IIDPS). A survey presents the state-of-the-art in the field of 
IIDPS and highlights the central issues to be addressed. 
Table 2.1 provides the number of literature works dealing with TAI, CI and MCI 
approaches. The list of articles is provided as a general overview of TAIs, CIs and MCIs 
in terms of their characteristics and current challenges encumbering intelligent IDPS 
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development in sensor networks. The table comprises 4 horizontal sections (TAI, CI, 
and MCI) and 3 vertical divisions defining detection classifier types, the authors’ work 
titles and the works’ objectives. Embedding security mechanisms such as identifying 
possible known/unknown vulnerabilities, predicting user behaviour, analysing and 
deterring individuals from violating security policies, are adopted into the network 
protocols to facilitate the development of efficient intrusion recognition and reaction 
systems. 
Table 2.1: Total number of anomaly-based classifiers in Network based- IDPS  
Type of 
classifier 
Authors Title of paper Objectives 
T
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l 
A
rt
if
ic
ia
l 
In
te
ll
ig
en
ce
(T
A
I)
 
 
Neural 
networks 
(NN) 
Debar et al. 
(1992) 
A neural network 
component for an 
intrusion detection 
system 
Prediction known user behavior –
Design an IDS structure 
Cannady et al. 
(1998) 
Artificial neural networks 
for misuse detection 
Identifying possible known 
vulnerabilities-IDS 
Zhang et al. 
(2000) 
Intrusion detection in ad-
hoc networks 
Intrusion detection and response 
mechanisms in ad-hoc networks- 
(Developing of WIDS) 
Bivens et al. 
(2002) 
Network-based intrusion 
detection using neural 
networks 
Analyzing and deterring individuals 
from violating security policies-
(Explore network based intrusion 
detection) 
Bankovic et 
al. (2011) 
Improving security in 
WMNs with reputation 
systems and self-
organizing maps 
Detect and confine unknown attacks- 
(Design framework for intrusion 
detection in Mobile Networks) 
Li et al. 
(2012) 
The method of network 
intrusion detection based 
on the neural network 
GCBP algorithm 
Analyzing and detection of unknown 
data packets- NIDS 
 Fuzzy sets 
(FS) 
Dickerson et 
al. (2001) 
Fuzzy intrusion detection  To assess malicious activity- 
(Developing of WIDS) 
Bridges et al. 
(2000) 
Fuzzy data 
mining and genetic 
algorithms 
applied to intrusion 
detection 
Developed an architecture for 
intrusion detection 
Liang et al. 
(2005) 
Event detection in 
wireless sensor networks 
using fuzzy logic system 
Identifying possible known 
vulnerabilities-WIDS 
Abraham et 
al. (2007) 
D-SCIDS: Distributed 
soft computing intrusion 
detection system 
Evaluates and models NIDS 
Jianhui et al. 
(2008) 
A Fast Fuzzy Set 
Intrusion Detection 
Model 
Deterring Intrusion- Design IDS 
Wang et al. 
(2009) 
A Detection Method for 
Routing Attacks Based 
on Fuzzy C-means 
Analyzing and detection anomaly-
WIDS 
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Clustering  
Artificial 
Immune 
system 
(AIS) 
Jungwon et al. 
(2001) 
Towards an artificial 
immune 
system for network 
intrusion detection: 
An investigation of clona
l selection with 
a negative selection 
operator 
Investigation of IDS  
Ma et al. 
(2007) 
SAID: A Self-Adaptive 
Intrusion Detection 
System  
Designing an architecture of 
Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) 
Genetic 
algorithm 
(GA) 
Khanna et al. 
(2006) 
Self-Organization of 
Sensor Networks Using 
Genetic Algorithms 
Development of IDPS 
Sevil Sen et 
al. (2011) 
 
Evolutionary 
computation techniques 
for intrusion detection in 
mobile ad hoc networks  
Explore the use of evolutionary 
computation techniques in WIDS 
C
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
a
l 
In
te
ll
ig
en
ce
(C
I)
 
Soft 
computing 
(SC) 
Mohajerani et 
al. (2003) 
NFIDS: a neuro-fuzzy 
intrusion detection 
system 
Developed anomaly Intrusion 
Detection system 
Gomez et al. 
(2002) 
Evolving fuzzy classifiers 
for intrusion detection 
Proposes a technique of anomaly 
detection 
Chavan et al. 
(2004) 
Adaptive neuro-fuzzy 
intrusion detection 
systems 
Design an intrusion detection system 
Toosi et al. 
(2007) 
A new approach to 
intrusion detection based 
on an evolutionary soft 
computing model using 
neuro-fuzzy classifiers 
To detect and classify intrusions 
from normal behaviors based on the 
attack type in a computer network 
Abadeh et al. 
(2007) 
Intrusion detection using 
a fuzzy genetics-based 
learning algorithm 
To describe usage of fuzzy genetics 
based detect intrusion in a computer 
network 
Khan et al. 
(2012) 
Application of fuzzy 
inference systems 
to detection of faults  
Modeling of WIDS 
Machine 
learning  
(ML) 
Qiming et al. 
(2000) 
Using reinforcement 
learning for pro-active 
network fault 
management 
Developing of IDS 
Xu et al. 
(2005) 
A Reinforcement 
Learning Approach for 
HIDS Using Sequences 
of System Calls 
Prediction intrusion behavior 
Xu et al. 
(2007) 
Defending DDoS Attacks 
Using Hidden Markov 
Models and Cooperative 
RL 
Developing efficient intrusion 
detection and reaction systems 
Xu et al. 
(2010)  
Sequential anomaly 
detection based on 
temporal-difference 
learning 
Anomaly detection- designing 
method 
Andersen et 
al. (2009) 
Detecting unusual 
program behavior using 
the statistical component 
of the Next-generation 
Intrusion Detection 
Expert System (NIDES) 
To detect anomalous activity-
analysis component of NIDES to 
develop baseline profiles of 
applications 
Agah et al. Intrusion detection in Finding the most vulnerable node in 
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(2004) sensor networks: a non-
cooperative game 
approach 
a sensor network and protecting it 
Ye et al. 
(2000) 
A Markov chain model of 
temporal behavior for 
anomaly detection 
Analyzing and detection anomaly 
behavior 
Devarakonda 
et al. (2012) 
Integrated Bayes 
Network and Hidden 
Markov Model for Host 
based IDS 
Prediction intrusion behavior 
M
u
lt
i 
a
g
en
t 
b
a
se
d
 C
I 
( 
M
C
I)
 
Multi agent 
system: 
(MAS) 
Renjit et al. 
(2011) 
Multi-Agent-Based 
Anomaly Intrusion 
Detection 
Development of IDPS 
Fisch et al. 
(2012) 
Learning from others: 
Exchange of 
classification rules in 
intelligent distributed 
systems 
Proposes techniques for IDPS 
Herrero et al. 
(2009) 
MOVIH-IDS: A mobile-
visualization hybrid 
intrusion detection 
system 
Development of IDS 
León et al. 
(2011) 
Towards a Cooperative 
Intrusion Detection 
System for Cognitive 
Radio Networks 
Analyzing threats and propose 
intrusion detection modules  
Vakili et al. 
(2011) 
Coordination of 
cooperation policies in a 
peer-to-peer system using 
swarm-based RL 
Devised a self-
organized coordination mechanism 
for cooperation policy setting of 
rational peers 
Mosqueira-
Rey et al. 
(2007) 
A Misuse Detection 
Agent for Intrusion 
Detection in a Multi-
agent Architecture 
Designing a misuse detection agent 
Ramachandra
n et al. (2008) 
FORK: A novel two-
pronged strategy for an 
agent-based intrusion 
detection scheme in ad-
hoc networks 
Designing Anomaly detection 
algorithm in ad-hoc networks 
Dasgupta et 
al. (2005) 
CIDS: An agent-based 
intrusion detection 
system 
Designing administrative tool for 
intrusion detection 
Z. Zhang et al. 
(2001) 
HIDE: a hierarchical 
network intrusion 
detection system using 
statistical preprocessing 
and neural network 
classification 
Design NIDS 
Agah et al. 
(2007) 
Preventing DoS attack in 
sensor networks: a game 
theoretic approach 
Developing efficient intrusion 
detection and reaction systems 
C
ri
ti
ca
l 
r
ev
ie
w
 
Wu et al. 
(2010) 
The use of computational 
intelligence in intrusion 
detection systems: A 
review 
Review  
Kolias et al. 
(2011) 
Swarm intelligence in 
intrusion detection: A 
survey 
Systematic survey 
Garcia-
Teodoro et al. 
(2009) 
Anomaly-based network 
intrusion detection: 
Techniques, systems and 
challenges 
Critical Review 
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Tsai et al. 
(2009) 
Intrusion detection by 
machine learning: A 
review 
Review 
Davis et al. 
(2011) 
Data pre-processing for 
anomaly based 
network intrusion 
detection: A review 
Review 
Patel et al. 
(2013) 
An Intrusion Detection 
and Prevention System in 
Cloud Computing: A 
Systematic Review 
Systematic review 
 
Through this thesis, the trends of TAI, CI, and MCI used in IDPS are studied. 
Analysis is based on two key aspects concerning the evaluation and comparison of the 
alternative IIDPS approaches’ performances: i.e., the efficiency of the detection process 
and false alarm rates (i.e. false positives and negatives). The significance of the 
performance, and especially at this point, the efficiency aspect must be emphasized. As 
an example, Potyrailo et al. (2012) researched  about the influence of wireless chemical 
sensors based on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in the high detection of 
chemical agents. They claim that any failure in real time diagnosis may lead to harmful 
events. Wang et al. (2012) achieved a false positive ratio of less than 10% with small 
packet of buffers to identify the compromised node in wireless networks. 
2.1.1 Data Set  
Due to the extraordinary hazard of practical operational networks and systems of 
real environments, performing real time testing is very difficult and complicated. 
Therefore, most researchers validate the ideas by testing in experimental simulated 
environments depicting the real environment. There are many datasets that can be used 
for the detection of abnormal behaviour. For example, in the KDD’99 dataset, certain 
possible problems were likely to occur, such as, an enormous number of duplicate 
records have been detected (KDD, 1999).  
To examine the possibility of dropped packets by traffic collectors (i.e. TCP 
dumping) during heavy traffic, there exists different datasets such as NSL-KDD (2009) 
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which were selected to mitigate the difficulties incurred by KDD’99 datasets. NSL-
KDD is significant in that it contains fewer redundant, duplicate records in the training 
and test phases of learning-based detection. In this manner, the evaluation process of the 
learning system will not have to be dependent on frequent records. Table 2.2 shows the 
classification of the datasets based on network traffic. 
Table 2.2: Classification of the Datasets for NIDS and WIDS 
Name of 
dataset 
Type of dataset Description of Application domains 
KDD’99 
(KDD, 1999) 
Network IDS This database contains a standard set of data to be audited, 
which includes a wide variety of intrusions simulated in a 
military network environment. 
NSL-KDD 
(2009) 
Network IDS NSL-KDD is a data set suggested to solve some of the inherent 
problems of the KDD'99 data set. 
Intel Berkeley 
Research lab 
("Intel 
Berkeley 
Research lab," 
2004) 
Wireless Sensors 
IDS 
Data was collected using the TinyDB in-network query 
processing system, built on the TinyOS platform. 
CRAWDAD 
data sets 
(dataset, 2006) 
1. Sensor network 
dataset for enhancing 
CSMA MAC 
protocol. 
2.Syslog, SNMP, and 
tcpdump data 
3. Dataset of sensor 
data collected by the 
CenceMe system. 
1. This dataset contains packet transmission traces collected 
from an experimental wireless sensor network testbed, where E 
(Enhanced)-CSMA MAC protocol is implemented using 
TinyOS on Mica2 motes. 
2. This dataset includes syslog, SNMP, and tcpdump data for 5 
years or more, for over 450 access points and several thousand 
users at Dartmouth College. 
3. CenceMe uses the output of the phones' sensors and external 
data (if such is available) to infer human presence and activity 
information. This dataset contains movements and inferred 
activities of participants using CenceMe on their mobile 
phones. 
According to them, most ML-based NIDSs employ a base line (i.e. a KDD data 
set and a SVM classifier) for detection of algorithm comparison. Davis et al. (2011) 
provided a table-based review of the traffic patterns and pre-processing methods utilized 
by anomaly-based NIDSs.  (Patel et al., 2013) presented a comprehensive taxonomy of 
IDPS into cloud computing, and stipulated a list of requirements for a cloud-based 
intrusion detection and prevention system (CIDPS). Autonomic computing, ontology, 
risk management and fuzzy theory form an ideal design to meet the requirements. None, 
however, have listed or compared the detection performance of Multi agent-based CI 
(MCI) methods based on IDPS. 
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2.2 State-of-the-art TAI, CI and MCI in IDPS 
Countless studies have suggested means of increasing performance without 
affecting IDPS quality. Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques serve to automate the 
intrusion detection process and reduce human intervention. The process of detecting 
intrusion is founded on the AI technique by applying methods such as the traditional 
artificial intelligence (TAI) and computational intelligence (CI) techniques that operate 
as classifiers. This thesis presents, in detail, the state-of-the-art of TAI, CI and Multi 
agent-based CI (MCI) systems in the field of IDPS, and additionally highlights the vital 
concerns/drawbacks to be addressed.  
2.2.1 Traditional Artificial Intelligence (TAI) 
In TAI techniques, network traffic activity is captured by single classifiers (i.e. 
fuzzy set, neural network, genetic algorithm and artificial immune system), thereafter, a 
profile representing its desired behaviour is coded and finally a behaviour model is 
created. Network events take place, the current profile is assigned and an anomaly score 
is computed by comparing the two behaviours. The score normally indicates the degree 
of irregularity for a specific event, such that the IDS raises a flag in the event an 
anomaly occurs when the score surpasses a certain threshold. 
Fuzzy set-oriented IDPSs correspond to an audit data related to a set of rules 
which identifies different attributes from the training data as a fuzzy rule base (FRB) 
(Dickerson et al., 2001). FRB is beneficial in instances of misuse but is impractical 
when dealing with unknown behaviour. To alleviate the drawbacks of unknown 
behaviour detection, hybrid fuzzy classifiers that consider dynamic fuzzy rule tuning 
were recommended for a later stage to augment detection rate by dynamically adjusting 
the rules ((Bridges et al., 2000), (Liang et al., 2005), (Abraham et al., 2007), (Lin et al., 
2008), and (Tong et al., 2009)). 
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The most remarkable advantages of hybrid fuzzy classifier-based IDPSs are 
robustness and flexibility. Among the most noticeable, disadvantages is the challenge of 
using a fuzzy set in large scale wireless computing (i.e. excessive resource 
consumption) and the additional complications imposed on alarm correlation. To 
moderate the alarm correlation, Kaptanova et al. (2012) suggested a hybrid fuzzy 
classifier that monitors a temperature value. The fuzzy logic controller performs robust 
detection, but consumes vast computing resources when performing fuzzy alarm 
correlation. Thus, to avoid the pronounced resource consumption, a neural network may 
adopt fuzzy rules by updating the weight of the neurons. 
With the intention of minimizing the misclassification of error function, the MLP, 
SOM and SVM neural networks were implemented to the anomaly-based IDPSs. Neural 
networks are prominently characterized by their flexibility and adaptability to generate 
fuzzy rules through performing weight tuning to represent the effective hidden units. 
This detection approach is frequently employed to detect individual possible misuse 
(Cannady, 1998; Debar, 1992), to determine which network traffic data clusters contain 
attacks (Alan Bivens, 2002), to identify deviations from normal behaviour Bankovic et 
al. (2011), and to judge whether a network visit is normal or not (Y. Li et al., 2012). 
A common negative characteristic shared by the proposed variants, from multi-
layer feed forward neural networks to self-organizing maps and supporting vector 
machines (Fisch et al., 2012), is that no expositive structure is provided explaining why 
a particular detection decision has been made.  
A genetic algorithm permits a population of many individuals to infer under 
distinguished selection rules to a state that maximizes the “fitness function” (i.e. 
minimizes the cost function), by evolving its operators such as selection, cross over, and 
mutation. GA contributes another type of anomaly-based IDPS, which is adept at 
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utilizing communication energy (Khanna et al., 2009) and applying a grammatical 
evolution (GE) technique with BNF grammar to identify route disruption attacks in 
mobile ad-hoc networks (Phillips et al., 2010). 
The main advantage of this subtype of TAI-oriented IDPS is the capability of a 
flexible and robust global search method that converges to a global minimum (i.e. a 
solution from multiple directions), with no prior knowledge of the system’s behaviour. 
Its main disadvantage is the enormous resource consumption involved. If the population 
is large then the mutation is too great and the system never converges towards a suitable 
solution. Due to this iteration, an immense amount of resources are consumed.  
The observed theory and functions of AIS immunization were inspired by the 
natural immune system principles; this system’s models were then employed in a wide 
and intricate range of subjects. Clonal selection and negative selection comprise 
essential shares of this system. The clonal and negative selection functions have a large 
influence on the security of wireless networks (Hofmeyr et al., 2000). 
AIS techniques have been extensively used in negative and clonal selection. They 
are normally applied as mobile memory detectors to generate several diverse detectors 
by approximation to achieve lightweight NIDS (Jungwon et al., 2001). Ma et al. (2007) 
organized WSN as a body, adversaries as pathogens and multi agents as lymphocytes 
that defend against attacks. In all cases, self-adaptability is facilitated by upgrading the 
agents’ characteristics via the creation of new antibodies. Energy efficiency is attained 
by deploying decision agents in the base station with sufficient resources and strong 
computational skills. 
AIS functions provide the configurability of driving the gene library evolution by 
using the clone selection. Also, AIS requires both additional memory and time when 
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being transferred to generate a vast detector set number. The main disadvantage is its 
high resource consumption. 
2.2.2 Computational Intelligence (CI) 
Computational intelligence (CI) classifiers rely on a soft computing (SC) or 
machine learning (ML) model that allows for the patterns analysed to be categorized. A 
distinct characteristic of these schemes is the prerequisite for labelled data to train the 
behavioural model, a procedure that places severe demands on the resources. ML based 
on SC classifiers is meant to create an iterative process of observing patterns, adjusting 
to the mathematical form, and making predictions (Alpadin, 2010). 
SC classifiers were designed to modify the classification performance of TAI 
methods by incorporating a multifold learning algorithm (Zadeh, 1994). SC classifiers 
distinguish two main approaches: Neuro Fuzzy (NF) and Genetic Fuzzy (GF) models. 
NF and GF are a combination of a fuzzy set with NN and GA, which are utilized to 
adjust the structure and parameters of a fuzzy system by neural network and genetic 
algorithm operators, respectively. The goal is an optimal, continuous membership 
function that identifies anomalous behaviour with supervised monitoring abilities, high 
detection rate and low false alarm rate (Buckley et al., 1994; Fullér, 2000). 
Neuro fuzzy is a combination of a fuzzy set and adaptive neural network that 
tunes the fuzzy membership function using neural networks. Neuro-fuzzy techniques 
are found in the milieu of NIDS, generally applied to IDS problems (Gomez et al., 
2002). The multi-layer perceptron learns the fuzzy rule, after which this neural network 
performs a fuzzy interface process to identify attacks (Chavan et al., 2004; Mohajerani 
et al., 2003). 
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In some ways associated to anomaly-based IDS methods, a revised Neuro-fuzzy 
classifier with a GA was proposed to modify the fuzzy engine for detection (Toosi et al., 
2007). At the same time, IDS employs the fuzzy genetic learning method to construct a 
primary population by using the fuzzy rule. The antecedent fuzzy part provides a 
uniform crossover for a pair of fuzzy rules, following which the antecedent fuzzy set 
randomly supersedes the fuzzy set with a mutation probability. Lastly, the fuzzy genetic 
method terminates the fuzzy classifier execution through a total number of generations 
(Abadeh et al., 2007). More recently, Khan et al. (2012) developed a fault detection 
strategy in WSN. In this system, a Recurrent Takagi-Sugeno-Kang FIS (RFIS) strategy 
decided whether or not to declare the node malicious. 
In all SC techniques fuzzy logic is optimized to enhance the detection accuracy. 
The number of false positives is reduced and only the true positive intrusion events from 
the raw audit data are increased. It is still challenging though to tune the fuzzy rules 
based on IDS into WSN to lessen the false positives and boost detection rate.  
In the expansion of IDPS, the ultimate aim is to obtain a high level of accuracy in 
the various intruder detection schemes. Several ML-based designs have been applied to 
IDPS. Some of the most important ones are cited below, and their main strengths and 
weaknesses are identified. 
Reinforcement learning (RL) appears to be a greatly significant method of 
wireless network security due to its capability to autonomously learn new attacks via 
online, unsupervised learning, as well as modify new policies without complex 
mathematical approaches (Barto., 1998). RL has been proven to be effective, especially 
in real time detection and when no prior system behaviour information is assumed. 
RL constitutes another form of computational intelligence-based techniques, 
capable of forecasting online network fault detection by Partly Observable Markov 
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Decision Procedure (POMDP), a practice which transforms a reward function into 
Markov chains (Li et al., 2014). Hence, to execute the learning prediction, a TD 
learning algorithm was employed. A value function forecasting model was constructed 
upon completion of the learning phase. 
In a non-cooperative game theory model, the system uses a Q-learning algorithm 
for any adversary recognition in sensor networks (A. Agah et al., 2004). Temporal 
difference sequential anomaly detection (TD-SAD) aided by the Markov reward model 
is used to determine data labelling and improve its detection model performance (X. Xu, 
2010). The multilayer RL framework assisted by HMM was proposed to solve real-time 
detection in a complex state space (Andersen et al., 2009). 
The primary disadvantage of reinforcement learning is the abundance of resources 
consumed, in other words, the lack of memory to sustain the agent’s data. The agent’s 
memory is stored in a look-up table, or the Q-table. The values fill the Q-table with the 
maximum positive rewards possible when executing an action from the current state to 
the next-state space. Consequently, the high values in the Q-table expend all these 
resources. RL, when compared with other soft computing methods (i.e. neuro fuzzy and 
genetic fuzzy), is highly dependent on state space. 
The Bayes Network principle provides a distribution possibility to encode 
statistical relationships among any single quantity. BN is based on Bayes' theorem 
(alternatively, Bayes' law), which imparts a means to apply quantitative reasoning. This 
model is normally used for IDS in combination with HMM and MDP, a procedure that 
yields several advantages (Ahmadabadi et al., 2001). Anomaly detection has the ability 
to represent a norm profile of temporal behaviour by shifting the observation window to 
view the last N audit event continuously and detect intrusion behaviour during window 
observation (Ye, 2000).  
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BN-based HMM techniques have been utilized in IDS, typically applied to 
compute the statistical feature of normal behaviours incoming from the IP source (Xin 
Xu et al., 2007). In a dynamic-based IDS, BN and HMM were recommended to identify 
intrusion. They reduced the KDD data set by choosing five attribute numbers for the 
training mode in TCP connection. Then, the dynamic Bayesian network was initialized 
with the Baum-Welch algorithm to classify normal and attack data (Devarakonda et al., 
2012). 
As pointed out (Patcha et al., 2007), a serious disadvantage of using BNs is that 
the accuracy of this method is dependent on certain assumptions characteristically based 
on the behavioural model of the target system; deviating from these assumptions 
decreases accuracy. Selecting an accurate model is the first step towards solving the 
problem, as a result, considerably higher computational effort is required. 
In most ML techniques, reinforcement learning (RL) utilizes HMMs and BNs to 
improve the detection operation. The main effort therefore goes to optimizing RL 
through the Fuzzy Logic Controller (FLC). 
2.2.3 Multi Agent-based Computational Intelligence (MCI) 
MCI techniques function by applying the multi agent system (MAS) to 
computational intelligence (CI) in order to enhance the performance of detection and 
response. On the other hand, cooperative MAS uses CI methods such as SOM, SVM, 
GA, RL and Game Theory to determine temporal behaviour and respond to any 
deviation. The main objective of MCI consists of distributing MAS to each cluster to 
provide a CI mechanism that makes individual and cooperative decisions associated to 
IDPS (Wooldridge, 2009). MCI has been widely employed in the domain of network 
security, especially in WIDS (W. Li et al., 2012) and cloud computing-based IDS 
(Doelitzscher et al., 2012). 
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MCI approaches correspond to hierarchical multi-agent architecture for intrusion 
detection, and modify statistical models like SRI’s NIDES statistical algorithm. The 
advantage is access to a distributed, three-layer intrusion detection. As such, each 
module negotiates with other agents from the lower to higher tiers, seeking to overcome 
detection complexity (Z. Zhang et al., 2001). 
With regards to cognitive sensors, a model was proposed in two phases, namely, 
which local agents use support vector machines in the training mode and which local 
agents use mobile agents in the decision mode to classify suspicious behaviour (León et 
al., 2011). Some methods suggest a multi-agent system where each local agent collects 
data through a mobile agent. The local agent then examines the integrity of the system 
by a SVM classifier at the time an attacker enters the system. Also, in the 
communication mode the mobile agent verifies activity; if there is no suspicious 
activity, the message is forwarded to a neighbouring node. The decision making 
component of detection is based on the Bayes theory, in which, if the probability of 
normal activity is smaller than the assumed abnormality threshold, the current activity is 
categorized as abnormal (Renjit et al., 2011). 
MCI-based algorithms are intended to classify audit data according to a set of 
fuzzy associated rules. First, a Java agent-based snort collects packets with a packet 
sniffer and then creates an input data for the rule engine. Subsequently, the rule engine 
forwards the pattern matching algorithm to a multi-agent system. The audit data is then 
classified accordingly (Mosqueira-Rey et al., 2007). Intrusion detection utilizes MAS 
along with the Fuzzy Classifier System (FCS) and Knowledge Base to detect abnormal 
activities (Dasgupta et al., 2005). 
With respect to the communication mechanisms, Vakili et al. (2011) developed a 
cooperation policy setting process. Interacting peers’ agents regard each other’s 
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reliability or reputation as an impact factor influencing the value of information 
received from the other, and hence their learning mechanisms. A broadcasting 
mechanism was proposed for knowledge acquisition in dynamic environments based on 
probabilistic modelling which was improved through other cooperative communication 
(Fisch et al., 2012). 
In some domains of WSN-based IDPS, a two-tier, MAS-based Ad-hoc intrusion 
detection mechanism was proposed. The first tier runs an auctioning-based mechanism 
for node task allocation. The second tier consists of the classification algorithm that uses 
a variation of an Ant Colony Optimization to identify the anomaly level (Ramachandran 
et al., 2008). The collaborative work of the tactical squad of agents has led to concurrent 
detections of multiple sinkhole threats from different routes in the ad-hoc network 
(Stafrace et al., 2010). Specifications of collaborative IDPS were developed by 
employing MAS characteristics. For instance, the inclusion of deliberative (CBR-BDI) 
agents -- a combination of CBR agents’ life cycles (i.e. retrieval, reuse, revision and 
retention stages) seems appropriate for packet-based detection (Herrero et al., 2009). 
For this purpose, a CBR life cycle with a cooperative version of Maximum Likelihood 
Hebbian Learning (MLHL) is reflected upon.  
Multi agent-based IDPS, in terms of CI (MCI) and non-CI methods, have emerged 
in commercial products. In recent years, a number of pioneering systems from MCI-
based IDPS, i.e. C-Sniper System, have been practically adopted by US forces. Such a 
system automatically detects and neutralizes enemy snipers (DARPA, 2012). In brief, 
this thesis attempts to highlight the possible beneficial impact of MCIs using Fuzzy 
Logic and Reinforcement Learning, as well as to point out potential pitfalls of not 
integrating MCI into Co-IDPS.  Figure 2.1 indicates a chronological list of TAI, CI and 
MCI-based IDPS events with respect to the relevant technologies. 
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Figure 2.1: Chronological order of [TAI], [CI] and [MCI] based IIDPS 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the chronology of those artificial intelligent techniques 
which focus on TAI (i.e. fuzzy set, neural network and evolutionary algorithm), CI (i.e. 
soft computing and machine learning) and MCI. The figure summarizes the MCI 
techniques into two clouds: collaborative and single clouds. A collaborative cloud is a 
Multi Agent System (MAS) making use of TAI methods and in most cases comprises 
CI approaches. For example, reinforcement methods utilize neural networks and a fuzzy 
set (Renjit et al., 2011). A single cloud is a multi-agent-based detection mode that does 
not use CI and TAI. As proposed in (Ramachandran et al., 2008), a MAS follows an 
auction and reputation mechanism for performing the task allocation in intrusion 
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detection. The two cloud types were compared with the TAI and CI methods. The 
summary implicates that detection and the response system based on the two MAS-
based clouds perform extremely well. 
2.3 Detection rates performance method and criteria for evaluation  
The effectiveness of an IIDPS is assessed on how capable the detection method is 
to make correct predictions. According to the real nature of a given event compared to 
an IIDPS prediction, four possible outcomes are shown in Table 2.3. The outcomes are 
known as the IIDPS reaction matrix. True negatives (TN) as well as true positives (TP) 
correspond to a correct IDS operation; that is, events are successfully labelled as normal 
and attack, respectively. False positives (FP) refer to normal events predicted as attacks, 
while false negatives (FN) are attacks incorrectly predicted as normal events ("Intel 
Berkeley Research lab," 2004). 
Table 2.3: Possible status for an IIDPS reaction 
 
Predicted 
Normal Attack 
Actual Normal True Negative(TN) False Negative(FN) 
Attack False Positive(FP) True Positive(TP) 
A high FP rate that seriously affects the system’s performance can be detected, and an 
elevated FN rate leaves the system vulnerable to intrusions. Both FP and FN rates ought 
to be minimized, together with maximizing TP and TN rates. Based on Eqs. (2.1) to 
(2.6) and the IIDPS reaction matrix, a possible status for an IIDPS reaction is shown. It 
applies the following measures to quantify IDS performance (Blasco et al., 2010): 
True negative rate (TNR) = 
𝐓𝐍
𝐓𝐍+𝐅𝐏
=
𝐧𝐨.  𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐞 𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐫𝐭𝐬
𝐧𝐨.𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐫𝐭𝐬
                                       (2.1) 
True positive rate (TPR) or Sensitivity or Recall (R) = 
TP
TP+FN
=
no.  detected attacks
no.  observables attack
     
(2.2) 
False positive rate (FPR): 
FP
TN+FP
= 1 −
TN
TN+FP
                                                     (2.3) 
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False negative rate (FNR): 
FN
TP+FN
                                                                         (2.4) 
Accuracy= 
TN+TP
TN+TP+FN+FP
                                                                              (2.5) 
Precision= 
TP
TP+FP
                                                                                                 (2.6) 
Most of the systems employed in the current research works used the same 
evaluation metrics such as the Detection Rate and False Alarm Rate. Some researchers 
have addressed the problems of IDS by proposing new DR and FAR. Table 2.4 shows 
the proposed evaluation metrics by researchers. 
Table 2.4: Evaluation metrics proposed by authors 
Authors, Paper Accuracy of 
Intrusion 
False alarm rate Description 
Intrusion detection 
through learning 
behaviour  
(Balajinath et al., 
2001) 
Accuracy = [1 −
n
N
] 100, FAR = [
n
N
] 100 Where n is the count of 
command samples that are in 
total command set S after current 
command, N the initial size of 
total command set. 
Design and 
performance 
evaluation of a 
lightweight wireless 
early warning 
intrusion detection 
prototype. 
(Fragkiadakis et al., 
2012) 
Score=b*(c−d) Where d= √FAR2 + (1 − DP)2  
is the distance of a trade-off 
point (for a specific threshold h) 
from the optimum point (DP = 1 
and FAR = 0), and b,c ∈ R+. 
Optimization of load 
balancing using fuzzy 
Q-Learning for next 
generation wireless 
networks 
(Muñoz et al., 2013) 
U = [CBR + (1 − CBR) · CDR] · .100 Where U is a metric that 
aggregates both key performance 
indicators to provide an 
estimation of the user 
dissatisfaction. Such indicators, 
CBR and CDR, consider the total 
number of blocked and dropped 
calls in the network, 
respectively. 
Shielding wireless 
sensor network using 
Markovian intrusion 
detection system with 
attack pattern mining  
(Huang et al., 2013) 
 
U = ρ ∗ SP − β ∗ FN − θ ∗ FP Where U is a utility, SP 
Represents true positive rate of 
attack patterns. There are attacks 
and defences, FN Represents 
false negative of attack patterns, 
FP Represents false positive of 
attack patterns, ρ Represents the 
weight of successful prediction, 
β Represents the weight of failed 
prediction, and θ Represents the 
weight of failed prediction. 
Measuring Intrusion 
Detection Capability: 
An Information-
Theoretic Approach 
(Gu et al., 2006) 
𝐶𝐼𝐷 =
𝐼(𝑋; 𝑌)
𝐻(𝑋)
 
 
Let X be the random variable 
representing the IDS input and Y 
the random variable representing 
the IDS output.  
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Traditionally, intrusion detection and prevention approaches are studied from 
two major views, namely anomaly and misuse detection though no considerable 
difference in characteristics exists between them. Liao et al.  (Huang et al., 
2013)proposed a subdivision of detection approaches into five subcategories, including 
statistics-based, pattern-based, rule-based, state-based and heuristic concepts, but the 
properties of intelligent detection approaches are not defined. Due to the lack of a more 
detailed view of detection and prevention approaches using multi agent system-based 
computational intelligence, this thesis presents a classification of three subclasses with 
an in-depth perspective on the characteristics: traditional artificial intelligence-based, 
computational intelligence-based, and multi agent-based CI. Accordingly, we have 
carefully assembled the current intrusion detection approaches, especially those found 
in wireless networks (Table 2.5). 
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Table 2.5: Classifications and comparisons of various intrusion detection approaches 
  Detection approach methodology 
a 
 Technology type 
b
 Detection of 
attack 
c
 
performance 
d
 Type of 
source 
e
 
characteristics 
AD MD H/N/W K/U/B H/M/L P1/P2/N  Flexibility and 
adaptability 
T
ra
d
it
io
n
a
l 
A
rt
if
ic
ia
l 
In
te
ll
ig
en
ce
 
Neural network 
N
o
. 
o
f 
ar
ti
cl
es
:(
6
) 
Debar et al. 
(1992) 
  √ Host-based (H) Known attacks 
(K) 
Low (L) Public 
dataset(P1) 
Cannady et al. 
(1998) 
  √ Network-based (N) Known attacks 
(K) 
Low (L) Public 
dataset(P1) 
Zhang et al. 
(2000) 
√   Wireless -based (W) Known attacks 
(K) 
Moderate (M) Private 
dataset(P2) 
Bivens et al. 
(2002) 
√   Network-based (N) Known attacks 
(K) 
Moderate (M) Private 
dataset(P2) 
Bankovic et al. 
(2011) 
√   Wireless -based (W) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
Moderate (M) Public 
dataset(P1) 
(Yan Li, 2012) √   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
Moderate (M) Public 
dataset(P1) 
Fuzzy Sets 
N
o
. 
o
f 
ar
ti
cl
es
:(
6
) 
(Dickerson et al., 
2001) 
  √ Network-based (N) Known attacks 
(K) 
Low (L) Public 
dataset(P1) 
Robustness and 
flexibilities 
Bridges et al. 
(2000) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
Moderate (M) Private 
dataset(P2) 
(Liang et al., 
2005) 
√   Wireless -based (W) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
Moderate (M) Private 
dataset(P2) 
(Abraham et al., 
2007) 
√   Network-based (N) Both known and 
unknown attacks 
(B) 
Moderate (M) Private 
dataset(P2) 
(Jianhui et al., 
2008) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
Moderate (M) Private 
dataset(P2) 
(Tong et al., 
2009) 
√   Wireless -based (W) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) Private 
dataset(P2) 
Artificial 
Immune 
system  
A
rt
ic
le
s(
2
) (Jungwon et al., 
2001) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
Moderate (M) Public 
dataset(P1) 
Flexible and 
robust in global 
search methods (Ma et al., 2007) √   Wireless -based (W) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) Public 
dataset(P1) 
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Genetic 
algorithm 
A
rt
ic
le
s(
2
) (Gu et al., 2006)  √   Wireless -based (W) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
Moderate (M) Public 
dataset(P1) 
Flexible and 
robust in global 
search methods (Sevil Sen, 2011) √   Wireless -based (W) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) Public 
dataset(P1) 
Total articles: (16) 
C
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
a
l 
In
te
ll
ig
en
ce
 
Soft computing 
(SC) 
N
o
 .
ar
ti
cl
es
(6
) 
(Mohajerani et 
al., 2003) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
Moderate (M) Public 
dataset(P1) 
Lower false 
positive rate, high 
accuracy (Gomez et al., 
2002) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
Moderate (M) Public 
dataset(P1) 
(Chavan et al., 
2004) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
Moderate (M) Public 
dataset(P1) 
(Toosi et al., 
2007) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) Public 
dataset(P1) 
(Abadeh et al., 
2007) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) Public 
dataset(P1) 
(Khan et al., 
2012) 
√   Wireless -based (W) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) Public 
dataset(P1) 
Machine 
learning 
N
o
 a
rt
ic
le
s(
8
) 
(Qiming et al., 
2000) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
Moderate (M) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
High accuracy, 
Self-learning, 
Fault tolerant (Xin Xu et al., 
2005) 
√   Host-based (H) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
Moderate (M) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
(Xin Xu et al., 
2007) 
√   Network-based (N) Known attacks 
(K) 
Moderate (M) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
(X. Xu, 2010)  √   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
Moderate (M) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
(Andersen et al., 
2009) 
√   Wireless -based (W) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
(A. Agah et al., 
2004) 
√   Wireless -based (W) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
Ye et al. (Ye, 
2000) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
(Devarakonda et 
al., 2012) 
√    Unknown attacks 
(U) 
Moderate (M) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
Total articles: (14) 
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M
u
lt
i 
a
g
en
t 
b
a
se
d
 C
I(
M
C
I)
 
Multi agent 
system used CI 
(MAS) 
N
o
 .
ar
ti
cl
es
(1
0
) 
(Renjit et al., 
2011) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
Distributed, high 
overall security, 
cooperative (Fisch et al., 
2012) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
(Herrero et al., 
2009) 
√   Wireless -based (W) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
(León et al., 
2011) 
√   Wireless -based (W) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
(Vakili et al., 
2011) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
(Mosqueira-Rey 
et al., 2007) 
  √ Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
(Ramachandran 
et al., 2008) 
√   Wireless -based (W) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
(Dasgupta et al., 
2005) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
(Z. Zhang et al., 
2001) 
√   Network-based (N) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
(Afrand Agah et 
al., 2007) 
√   Wireless -based (W) Unknown attacks 
(U) 
High (H) unspecified 
dataset(N) 
Total articles: (10) 
a.         Detection methodology: anomaly-based detection (AD), misuse-base detection (MD) 
b.         Technology type: host-based (H), network-based (N), wireless -based (W) 
c.         Detection of attacks: known attacks (K), unknown attacks (U), both known and unknown attacks (B) 
d.         Performance: high (H), moderate (M), low (L) 
e.         Type of source: Public dataset(P1), Private dataset(P2), unspecified dataset(N) 
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Table 2.5 indicates the types and subtypes of intrusion detection. The detection 
methodology is categorized into anomaly and misuse-based. It contains a host-based, 
network-based and wireless -based intrusion detection and prevention systems. The type 
of attack detection is classified into known, unknown, and both kinds of detection. The 
performance indicates detection efficiency, while the level of performance is evaluated 
by degrees of high, moderate and low. The sources comprise of a public dataset (e.g. 
KDD99), a private dataset (e.g. NSL-KDD) and an unspecified dataset, as extracted 
from previous attacks. The available data is utilized to differentiate intrusion behaviour 
from suspicious activities. The methodology of anomaly-based MAS and CI compared 
with TAI satisfies the detection, particularly in unknown attacks. Detection efficiency in 
the multi agent-based computational intelligence (MCI) method portrays superior 
performance. The most significant aspects of the MCI-based IDPS mentioned are high 
accuracy, self-learning, and robustness. 
Figure 2.2 depicts the number of manuscripts investigated over a 14 year period 
from 1998 to 2012. The amount of manuscripts regarding TAI detection methods 
reached a peak in 2002, declined gradually by 2006, then remained stable until now. It 
is not easy to apply those TAIs which mitigate IIDPS vulnerabilities, thus a new 
generation of intelligent attacks can arise. Nevertheless, CI and MCI have received 
increasing consideration recently. 
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Figure 2.2:  Year wise distribution of articles for the various types of classifier layouts 
From Figure 2.2 it can be observed that while traditional artificial intelligence, 
computational intelligence and multi agent based computational intelligence were fairly 
static from 2007 to 2009, however, CI has become more popular than TAI by the year 
2012 because CI in terms of MCI shows better performance of intrusion detection and 
false alarm rate.  
2.3.1 Traditional Artificial Intelligence 
The emergent anomaly detection applications have brought about a new trend of 
IDPS-focused research which concentrates on ways of managing alarms. Table 2.6 lists 
the most recent research attempting to deal with intrusion detection and prevention 
problems based on Traditional Artificial Intelligence approaches.  
Table 2.6: Classification of Traditional Artificial Intelligence-based IDPS 
Reference 
Method Objective Performance Technology 
category 
Type of 
attacks 
Zhang et al. 
(Z. Zhang 
et al., 2001) 
Combining data 
mining with fuzzy 
rule 
To identify 
misused 
behavior in a 
network 
Up to 50% 
increase  in DR 
Hybrid 
fuzzy(FRB) 
 
Individual 
Bridges et 
al. (2000) 
Fuzzy association 
rule 
To learn a 
normal pattern 
Reduced FAR 
by 20% 
Individual 
Liang et al. 
(2005) 
A fuzzy Logic 
approach 
To identify 
the abnormal 
Increased the d 
Detection rate to 
 
0
1
2
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4
5
1
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8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
N
u
m
b
e
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o
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m
e
th
o
d
s 
Year 
Traditional Artificial
Intelligence
Computational Intelligence
Multi agent based
Computational Intelligence
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combined with 
double sliding 
window detection 
behavior in 
sensor 
networks 
99.97% and 
reached to 
0.05% FAR 
Abraham et 
al. (2007) 
Fuzzy classifier 
uses a decision 
tree 
To detect 
attribute 
anomalies  
Averaged  90% 
in DR 
Public 
Lin et al. 
(2008) 
The data mining 
uses PTBA 
algorithm to 
extract rule mining 
To classify 
network 
traffic 
behavior 
More than 90% 
increase  in 
Detection rate 
(DR) 
Public 
Kapitanova 
et al. (2012) 
Combining rules 
with similar 
consequences and 
removing 
negligible rules.  
To modify the 
precision of 
event 
detection 
False positive 
rate 0% 
compares with 
0.13% decision 
tree and 1.56% 
Naïve bayes 
theory. 
 
Tong et al. 
(2009) 
Fuzzy C-mean 
clustering 
algorithm 
calculates the 
distance between 
connection record 
all the actual 
cluster through a 
non-linear 
function  
To distinguish 
the normal 
cluster and 
abnormal 
Detection rate 
of 96% can be 
reached, if false 
positive rate is  
controlled to  
less than 1.5% 
Fuzzy C-
mean(FCM) 
Individual 
Cannady et 
al. (1998) 
Multilayered feed-
forward comprise 
MLP 
To detect 
misuse 
instances such 
as SYNFlood 
Increased DR 
by 60% 
Multilayered feed-
forward (MFF) 
Individual 
Debar et al. 
(1992) 
Modular intrusion 
detection based on 
neural networks 
and expert systems  
Prediction 
error rate 
Average 30%, 
increasing DR 
Support Vector 
Machine(SVM) 
Individual 
Bivens et 
al. (2002) 
SOM was utilized 
as a clustering 
method for MLP 
neural networks 
Attack 
detection. 
Up to 98% 
increase  in 
DR,but with a 
small reduction 
of FAR 
Self- organizing 
Map(SOM) and 
Multi- layer 
perceptron(MLP) 
Public 
Bankovic et 
al. (2011) 
 Using Euclidean 
distance 
throughout the 
reputation self-
organizing map 
algorithm.  
To detect 
deviations 
from normal 
behavior. 
More than 80% 
detection rate  
SOM Individual 
Khanna et 
al. (2009) 
Four fitness 
functions used: 1. 
Monitoring node 
integrity fitness 
(MIF) 2. Battery 
Fitness (MBF) 
3.Coverage fitness 
(MFC) 4. 
Cumulative trust 
fitness (CTF) 
To maximize 
the 
performance 
of IDS 
Decrease the 
FAR,but with a 
small increase  
in DR(60%) 
Genetic 
Algorithm(GA) 
Individual 
Sen et al. 
(2010) 
Genetic 
programming 
applied a 
grammatical 
evolution (GE) 
technique that uses 
To identify 
the route 
disruption 
attacks in 
mobile ad-hoc 
networks  
More than 
99.41% increase  
in DR and 
reduced false 
positive by 
1.23% 
Genetic 
Algorithm(GA) 
Individual 
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BNF grammar  
Jungwon et 
al. (2001) 
The gene library 
evolution by using 
clone selection 
(Co-Evolution) 
To identify 
misuse 
No test Artificial Immune 
System 
 Ma et al. 
(2007) 
Inspired by 
immune system 
used WSN as a 
body, adversary as 
a pathogens and 
multi agents as 
lymphocytes 
To defend 
against  
attacks 
No test Artificial Immune 
System 
  
Generally, TAI techniques for IDPS are categorized into three technologies. The 
fuzzy set-based WIDSs consist of a fuzzy rule- based (FRB) and Fuzzy C-mean (FCM); 
the neural network-based IDPS comprises a Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP), Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) and a Self-Organizing Map (SOM). Finally, the evolutionary 
algorithm is made of a genetic algorithm (GA) and an artificial immune system (N. Li et 
al.). 
The majority of researchers working with TAI have provided some solution to 
appraise the performance of IDPS for anomaly techniques (refer to Table 2.3) since 
anomaly techniques based on hybrid TAI (i.e. using fuzzy data mining) generate more 
accuracy than single TAI techniques (i.e. self-fuzzy), as per Figure 2.3. The hybrid TAI 
approach, such as combining the data mining techniques with fuzzy set for instance, 
optimizes the system’s visibility and performance. Moreover, the false alarm correlation 
and detection rate becomes more complicated. This is why it is necessary to attract 
researchers’ awareness to attempt and provide solutions to IDPS management in the 
recently utilized hybrid TAI detection methods. 
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Figure 2.3: Comparison of TAI methods in terms of detection rate and false alarm rate 
TAI methodologies imply that SVM and fuzzy rule-based (FRB) are increasing 
the performance of detection rate (DR) and false alarm rate (FAR) in the network 
environment. On the contrary, FCM, SOM, MLP, GP and AIS do not consider IDPS 
due to their inability to provide adaptability at a time when adversary behaviour is 
changing dramatically. 
2.3.2 Computational Intelligence 
Two strategies, namely machine learning (ML) and soft computing (SC), are 
utilized for designing intelligent intrusion detection. The objective of this literature is to 
introduce SC and ML in terms of Computational Intelligence-based IDPS. 
The most recent examined works applicable to CI-based IDPS are ordered in 
terms of soft computing (SC) and machine learning (ML) taxonomy. The methods 
applied are very similar to each other. For instance, the neural network-based fuzzy 
solution replaces fuzzy-based neural network classifier to tune the fuzzy rule to achieve 
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more accurate detection. The most important features that are different between the CI 
and TAI methods are prevention capability and response. Currently conducted research 
and proposed solutions with respect to CI techniques are still a long way from an ideal 
IDPS. They not only lack the desired collaborative IIDPS characteristics, but also fail to 
reach into wireless network territory. In all circumstances, CI techniques provide high 
accuracy, self-learning, and are fault tolerant, but they are not capable of taking into 
consideration all the features addressed in IDPS such as energy efficiency, detection 
rate and false alarm rate. These inefficiencies are evidence of the lack of distributed and 
cooperative knowledge of the proper requirements identified prior to initiating any 
development. 
Table 2.7: Classification of computational intelligence in IDPS 
Reference Method Objective Performance Technology 
category  
Mohajerani et 
al. (2003) 
Decision making 
based on fuzzy and 
neural networks 
Traffic 
monitoring 
Normal pattern detection 
accuracy, 6% greater than 
attack detection accuracy. 
Meanwhile, the false 
alarm rate is around 9.4%  
Neuro fuzzy 
Gomez et al. 
(2002) 
Classification 
process using fuzzy 
and genetic 
Intrusion 
detection  
The FAR reduced to 5% 
with a correct detection 
rate of 98.5% 
Genetic fuzzy 
Chavan et al. 
(2004) 
Using rule based 
decision tree and 
neural network for 
classification 
To encounter 
vulnerabilities 
present in snort 
and classify 
anomaly 
behavior.  
No test Neuro fuzzy 
Toosi et al. 
(2007) 
A revised neuro-
fuzzy classifier with 
a GA  
To modify the 
fuzzy engine for 
detection 
Up to 95% increase in 
DR,but the incorrect 
detection rate is 1.9% 
Neuro fuzzy 
Abadeh et al. 
(2007) 
System provides the 
crossover and 
mutation by using 
fuzzy rules.  
Intrusion 
detection  
Up to 99.08% increase in 
DR, but with a small 
reduction of false alarm 
(3.85%)  
Fuzzy genetic  
Khan et al. 
(2012) 
The initial FIS is 
trained by using 
neural network  
Intrusion 
detection  
No test Neuro-fuzzy 
Qiming et al. 
(2000) 
Partly observable 
Marko decision 
procedure 
transforms a reward 
function into 
Markov chains 
To proactive 
network fault 
detection.  
No test Reinforcement 
learning(RL 
Xu et al. 
(2007) 
Cooperative RL uses 
HMM to compute 
the statistical feature 
of normal behaviors 
 DDoS detection 97% correct detection rate 
obtained with zero FAR 
HMM-RL 
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incoming from the 
IP source. 
Xu et al. 
(2005) 
Xu et al. 
(2010) 
Temporal difference 
sequential anomaly 
detection (TD-SAD) 
aided by the Markov 
reward model 
To figure out 
data labeling 
and improve 
detection model 
performance.  
More than 98% detection 
rate and very low false 
alarm rate  
Reinforcement 
learning and 
MDP 
Andersen et 
al. (2009) 
A multilayer RL 
framework uses 
Hidden Markov 
Model 
To actualize the 
detection of 
DDoS attacks 
No test Reinforcement 
learning and 
HMM 
Agah et al. 
(2004) 
A non-zero-sum 
game theoretic uses 
Q-learning algorithm 
to establish the Nash 
equilibrium.  
For adversary 
recognition in 
sensor networks.  
Average 50% in DR Reinforcement 
learning and 
game theory 
Ye et al. (Ye, 
2000) 
Moving the 
observation window 
by using Markov 
chain model 
To represent a 
norm profile of 
temporal 
behavior 
Detection rate increased 
(100%) and false alarm 
rate decreased (0%). 
Markov chain 
model  
Devarakonda 
et al. (2012) 
Dynamic Bayesian 
network was 
initialized using the 
Baum-Welch 
algorithm to 
reinforce probability 
of the partial 
observation 
sequence  
To identify 
intrusion 
The high-count attack 
value (0.624) is greater 
than low-count attack 
(0.228) 
Bayesian 
network and 
hidden Markov  
The performance evaluations imply that Reinforcement Learning and Neuro 
Fuzzy are the most perceived in CI classifiers based on IDPS. As shown in Figure 2.4, 
RL facilitates a high level of accuracy for the detection process. Alternatively, the 
process of detection may attain superior accuracy upon autonomic agent decision 
making. 
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of CI methods in terms of detection rate and false alarm rate 
2.3.3 Multi agent system-based Computational Intelligence 
In line with the progress made on launching MAS, numerous Intelligent 
Intrusion Recognition systems apply this sort of cooperative classifier into 
computational intelligence. Table 2.8 illustrates the percentage of all research articles 
implementing multi agent system techniques to the CI-based WIDS methods. The 
results indicate that MASs are becoming increasingly perceived for SC&ML classifier 
design. 
Table 2.8: Classification of multi agent computational intelligence-based IDPS 
Reference Method Objective Performance Technology category  
Zhang et al. 
(2001) 
Using distributed 
three-layer intrusion  
NIDS Average 70% in 
DR and 9% FAR 
MAS-NN 
Mohajerani et 
al. (2003) 
Decision making 
based on fuzzy and 
neural networks. 
Traffic 
monitoring 
Normal pattern 
detection accuracy, 
6% greater than 
attack detection 
accuracy. 
Meanwhile, the 
false alarm rate is 
around 9.4%  
Neuro fuzzy 
Dasgupta et al. 
(2005) 
Data mining uses 
MAS 
To detect 
abnormal 
behavior  
No test MAS along with Fuzzy 
Classifier System (FCS) 
and Knowledge Base 
(KB) 
Agah et al. Cooperative game To detect   
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(2007) theory attack 
Mosqueria-Rey 
et al. (2007) 
Rule engine uses the 
pattern matching 
algorithm  
To packet 
sniffer 
No test MAS-FRB 
Ramachandran 
et al. (2008) 
Two tires perform: an 
auctioning based 
mechanism for task 
allocation of nodes. 
The classification 
algorithm using a 
variation of Ant 
colony optimization  
To identify 
the level of 
anomalous 
Increased the 
correct attack 
detection to 79% 
and reach to 4% 
false positive 
MAS-Swarm 
Intelligence 
Herrero et al. 
(2009) 
Combines CBR life 
cycle (i.e. retrieval, 
reuse, revision and 
retention stage) with a 
cooperative version of 
Maximum Likelihood 
Hebbian Learning 
(MLHL).  
Wireless 
based IDPS 
No test MAS-probabilistic 
modeling  
Stafrace et al. 
(2010) 
Agent based adhoc-
network  
To 
concurrent 
detections of 
multiple 
sinkholes 
threat  
Obtained 86% 
correct detection 
rate and 5% false 
positive  
MAS-Collaborative 
Renjit et al. 
(2011) 
Using mobile agent  IDPS No test MAS-SVM-SOM-BN 
Leon et al. 
(2011) 
A Multi agent system 
utilized supports a 
vector machine in 
training mode 
To classify 
suspicious 
behavior  
No test MAS-SVM 
Vakili et al. 
(2011) 
A reputation 
assignment 
mechanism in the 
developed 
cooperation policy 
setting process 
IDPS No test MAS-RL 
Fisch et al. 
(2012) 
A broadcasting 
mechanism 
communication uses 
knowledge 
acquisition 
Co-IDPS No test MAS-probabilistic 
modeling  
Devarakonda 
et al. (2012) 
Dynamic Bayesian 
network was 
initialized using the 
Baum-Welch 
algorithm to reinforce 
probability of the 
partial observation 
sequence  
To identify 
intrusion 
The high-count 
attack value 
(0.624) is greater 
than low-count 
attack (0.228) 
Bayesian network and 
hidden Markov  
Figure 2.5 demonstrates the correct detection rate achieved by MCI, which 
steadily increases as the false alarm rate dramatically decreases. Without a doubt, MCI 
approaches may potentially reach enhanced flexibility, making them even more popular 
in the near future. 
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of Multi agent based CI methods in terms of detection rate and false alarm rate 
Basically, at the moment, the majority of researchers are designing multi agent-
based IIDPSs without integrating computational intelligence methods. In other words, 
CIs make use of MAS in terms of collaborative-based CI to optimize the functions of 
MAS. 
2.3.4 Comparative discussion of detection rate evaluation 
Because the environment, dataset, focus, scale, etc., in each experiment are 
totally different from scheme to scheme, detection accuracy and false alarm rate may 
not reflect the realistic performance. Therefore, these detection technique categories are 
vertically examined without the two factors. Table 2.9 shows the panoramic comparison 
of evaluations on the TAI, CI and MCI techniques.  
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Table 2.9: Panoramic comparison of evaluations on popular detection techniques. 
Techniques ACC FAR Remark 
TAI FCM (Tong et al., 2009) 
SOM (2011) 
GP (Phillips et al., 2010) 
≈ 96% 
≥ 80% 
≥ 99.41% 
≈1.5% 
≈1.23% 
No Test 
Simple and fast rule based techniques, 
performance is limited. Basically based on 
traditional artificial intelligence, good 
performance but complex. 
CI NF(Toosi et al., 2007) 
GF (Abadeh et al., 2007) 
MDP (X. Xu, 2010) 
≈ 95% 
≈ 99.08% 
≈ 98% 
≈1.9% 
≈3.85% 
≈1.2% 
Basically based on Machine learning, 
balanced performance and complexity, 
high false alarm rate 
MCI RL (Vakili et al., 2011) ≥ 98% ≈0.98% Good performance, based on 
computational intelligence, low false alarm 
rate 
TAI and CI schemes own the strongest detection generality, as long as adequate 
attributes are in use. Their formidable capabilities of dealing with multiple-dimensional 
data fully support this to be realistic but what comes along with this capability is the 
high complexity. Fortunately, computational intelligence based detection  in terms of 
using Multi agent may be implemented with the help of WSN’s distributed architecture, 
which eventually cuts the complexity down as much as do those relatively advanced 
TAI techniques-based schemes. This kind of schemes is also characterized by the great 
flexibility, as it never depends on any prior-knowledge. The vertical evaluation on the 
three technique categories is illustrated in Table 2.10, where TAI stands for traditional 
AI, CI stands for computational intelligence, and MCI stands for multi agent based CI. 
Table 2.10: Vertical evaluation of technique categories 
Tech. category Generality Speed Distributed Prior knowledge 
TAI Low  Normal   Not Assumption experience 
CI Normal t High Possible  Assumption 
MCI High Normal Necessary Not 
TAI: Traditional Artificial Intelligence; CI: computational intelligence; MCI: multi agent based computational 
intelligence 
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The computation complexity and memory use of TAI methods, such as rule-
based detection schemes are lowest, indicating the fastest detection speed. However, 
they have to suffer from the weakest detection generality, since they are not equipped 
with the ability to dispose of multi-dimensional data. Inserting the new rules that cover 
more detection attributes into the rule set is the only way to push the detection 
generality up, which results in a linear increase of the complexity. The establishment of 
these schemes often demand some prior-knowledge regarding anomaly detection, either 
assumptions or experiences. The performance of traditional artificial intelligence 
techniques essentially stands in the middle. These schemes are enabled to be deployed 
in any WSN. Learning technique, such as reinforcement learning, is allowed to tackle 
multi-dimensional data, but the complexity would climb up dramatically. For this 
reason, multi agent system adapts to mitigate the problem of complexity by providing 
distributed sharing strategy.  
Results of security evaluation metrics are compared through curves shown in 
Figure 2.6 and 2.7 respectively. The x-axis specifies the percentage of anomalous attack 
which refers to the ratio of the number of anomalous attack to the total number of 
measurements collected at the sensors. The y-axis specifies the security evaluation 
metric such as the accuracy of detection and false alarm rate. 
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Figure 2.6: General comparison of detection rate 
As seen in Figure 2.6, most of the studied algorithms successfully detect the 
anomalous attacks with a very close performance ratio up to 25% of increase in the 
anomalous data. Some of them, such as the fuzzy rule base and the self-organizing map 
rapidly deteriorate as the percentage of anomalous increase, while the superiority of the 
support vector machine intrusion detection technique, Fuzzy C-Mean clustering and 
Multi-agent based Reinforcement learning IDS, respectively, can be clearly observed 
for detection rate. They show better performance of detecting intrusions at 60% as 
shown in Figure 2.6.  
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Figure 2.7: General comparison of false alarm rate 
 
Regarding the false alarm rate, the comparison of the curves of the anomaly 
percentages is shown in Figure 2.7. Intrusion detection methods based on SVM 
classification, FCM clustering, and Multi agent refined reinforcement learning 
techniques have low false alarm rates as the percentage of anomaly increases. 
2.4 Intelligent Intrusion Detection and Prevention System (IIDPS) 
Intelligent techniques play a role in automating the intrusion detection process 
and to reduce human intervention. The process of intelligent detection applies advanced 
communication protocols based on artificial intelligence (AI) techniques such as fuzzy 
set, neural networks, and evolutionary computing, that operate as classifiers for anomaly 
detection to ensure detection accuracy along with stability (Idris et al., 2005). Denning 
(1987) used a rule-based expert system for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) to 
improve detection performances. Although the rules may cover known patterns, they are 
unable to adapt in cases where attack patterns modify (e.g. attack polymorphs). In order 
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to provide high accuracy detection in anomaly detection, computational intelligence 
(CI) can serve in the construction of a model detection system by automatically iterating 
training and testing data. From our point of view, intelligent intrusion detection and 
prevention architecture for wireless networks contains four modules: (a) Matching 
stage, (b) Feature selection (c) Normalization, and (d) Decision (Figure 2.8). 
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Figure 2.8: Intelligent Intrusion Detection and Prevention architecture for networks 
In the general model of IIDPS, signature matching engine in terms of SNORT 
audit records from traffic data. The gain of matching the process includes two kinds of 
attacks: the single connection attack or known attacks detected at packet level and the 
unknown attacks. The process of detecting unknown attacks include training and testing 
algorithm and a corresponding model gets built through the feature selection module. 
The training and testing data are sampled first from the attack dataset. In addition, the 
feature selection method proposed is adopted to filter some unimportant and noise 
features to decrease the data dimension. The data are normalized through the 
normalization step, which are used to train the computational intelligence engine to 
make a model. The normalization module generates the signature of the matching 
module for inspection. In addition, the decision module is judged against the observed 
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traffic. If the deviation found exceeds (or is below in the case of abnormality models) a 
given alarm threshold, the detection stage is triggered.  
IIDPSs are assessed on their capability to protect securely in large scale 
networks; nevertheless, utilization in a variety of networks and the complexity of the 
architecture (e.g. mobility, no central points, constrained bandwidth of wireless links, 
and limited resources) pose countless difficulties  (Huang et al., 2013) .Some of the 
challenges remaining include questions as to how to reinforce the intrusion detections 
and response elements to deal with intrusion in parallel, in addition to the coordination 
and management of multiple nodes. Trust systems, like wireless network filtering 
facilities, focus on low-delay processing time, and high throughput performance. 
Many of the preceding technical studies related to Intelligent Intrusion Detection 
and Prevention (IIDPS) methods were summarized and refined here (Abraham et al., 
2007; Alan Bivens, 2002; 2011; Devarakonda et al., 2012; Ma et al., 2007; Renjit et al., 
2011; Sevil Sen, 2011; Toosi et al., 2007) to bring a new perspective of IIDPS 
classification and the development for Cooperative-based IIDPS. Figure 2.9 lays out a 
tree plan classification of the anomaly-based IDPS detection techniques, and Table 2.11 
outlines the advantages and disadvantages of detection in addition to the subtypes of 
detection-based IDPS. In the branch of IIDPS, the detection and prevention architecture 
uses Traditional Artificial Intelligence (TAI), which collects and analyses the 
information from single monitored classifiers (fuzzy sets, neural networks, genetic 
algorithms and artificial immune systems) in light of the availability of prior knowledge 
data. computational intelligence (CI) collects data from multiple monitored classifiers 
(neuro fuzzy, genetic fuzzy, Reinforcement Learning, Hidden Markov Model and Naïve 
Bayes) to detect entire, distributed and cooperative attacks, or “hybrids” of both, in 
terms of soft computing and machine learning approaches. Finally, Multi agent-based 
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CI (MCI) techniques are based on the establishment of a Multi agent model into soft 
computing and machine learning that allows the patterns analysed to be categorized. 
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Figure 2.9: Tree plan classification of the anomaly-based IIDPS detection techniques 
Table 2.11: Fundamentals of the anomaly-based IIDPS techniques 
Main Types  α. Pros ; β. Cons Type of Detection  Subtypes of detection  
TAI: 
Availability of 
prior 
knowledge 
data 
α. Robustness, flexibility and 
scalability 
β. Difficult setting for parameters 
and metric; time-consuming 
availability for high-quality data 
 Fuzzy Set: 
Approximation and 
uncertainty 
Artificial neural 
network: 
Human brain 
foundations 
Evolutionary 
computing: 
Biology inspired. 
Fuzzy Rule Base, Fuzzy 
C-Mean 
Multi-Layer Perceptron, 
Self-Organizing Map, 
Support Vector 
Machine 
Genetic algorithm: 
Intrinsically parallel 
Artificial Immune 
system: 
Ability to converge very 
quickly 
CI: 
Categorization 
of patterns 
α. Flexibility and adaptability 
β. High resource and time 
consuming in training and testing 
stage 
Soft computing: 
real-life situations 
Machine learning: 
A learner is to 
generalize from its 
experience 
Neuro fuzzy, Genetic 
fuzzy: Universal 
approximate 
Hidden Markov Model: 
Autoregressive 
Bayes Naïve: 
Probabilistic 
relationships among 
variables 
Markov Decision 
Process: Stochastic 
Markov theory 
Reinforcement 
Learning: Dynamic 
approach applied to 
stochastic problem 
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Game Theory: 
Modelling wide variety 
of situation  
MCI: 
Cooperative 
pattern 
recognition  
α. Robustness. Flexibility, 
adaptability and scalability. 
MAS based 
computational 
intelligence:  
Categorization of 
patterns 
and Cooperative 
attempts  
Clustering and outlier 
detection(Cooperative 
classification) 
 
Table 2.11 provides the fundamentals for TAI, CI and MCI-based anomaly-
IIDPS techniques, as well as the principal subtypes of detection. What is obvious from 
Table 2.11 is that the recent studies related to MCI-based IDPS concentrate on 
robustness, flexibility, adaptability and low resource consumption. For example, the 
highly accurate detection technique is one of the most favourable research areas 
regardless of other consequent challenges such as false alarm rate and response time. 
This chapter expands on the MCI based on collaborative techniques to help the 
Collaborative Intrusion Detection and Prevention (CIDPS) manager assimilate and 
synthesize false alarm rates into a well-managed set that applies to the whole 
networking environment under fully distributed collaborative management control.  
2.5 Discussion 
This thesis introduced three classes of IIDPS detection methodologies, 
approaches and technologies. Each technique has its advantages and limitations. The 
TAI-based IDPS is straightforward to implement and very effective in inspecting known 
attacks. Still, the approach hardly identifies unknown attacks, attacks concealed by 
evasion techniques and several variants of known attacks. A number of fuzzy rule-based 
approaches to detect unknown attacks were also proposed. Such techniques may 
unnecessarily result in issues with excessive computing time consumption and rapid 
updating of the knowledge base, hindering attack effectiveness.  
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A more accurate and simplified approach is still required to increase efficiency 
and effectiveness. Computational intelligence-based approaches such as Reinforcement 
Learning (RL) algorithm have the merit of possessing no prior knowledge of attacks. 
They do not work well in real-time applications due to the high computational 
complexity. A multi agent-based CI (MCI) not only mitigates high computational 
complexity such as time consumption and updating knowledge, but also enhances 
detection performance.  
Table 2.12 tabulates the most recent multi-agent-based CI works applicable to 
IDPS. These are classified in terms of management structure, advantages and 
disadvantages. MCI-based IDPSs and the three concepts of management, namely 
FRLM, KM, and MA may be of assistance in designing an efficient system that satisfies 
Collaborative-IIDPS (Co-IIDPS) performance. 
Table 2.12: Proposed Co-IIDPSs in terms of MCI methods classified according to our taxonomy 
Reference Technology 
layout 
Audit source 
location 
Management 
structure 
Advantage Disadvantage 
Zhang et al. 
(2001) 
ad-hoc 
networks 
Public Collaborative 
(MAS-CI)  
 
Overcoming 
detection 
complexity by using 
distrusted agents 
N/A 
Mohajerani et 
al. (2003) 
NIDS Private Individual 
(single) 
N/A The MLP neural 
network does 
not provide 
feedback. 
Dagupta et al. 
(2005) 
NIDS Public Collaborative 
(MAS-CI)  
The advantage of 
having an individual 
agent for each 
functional module is 
to make future 
modifications easy 
N/A 
Agah et al. 
(2007) 
CIDPS  Private Collaborative 
(MAS-CI)  
Using repeated 
decision policy 
significantly 
improve the chance 
of anomalous 
recognition  
N/A 
Mosqueira-
Rey et al. 
(2007) 
NIDS Private Individual 
(single) 
N/A N/A 
Ramachandran 
et al. (2008) 
ad-hoc  Public/Private Individual 
(single) 
N/A N/A 
Herrero et al. 
(2009) 
NIDS Private Individual 
(single) 
1. Scalability by 
adding new agents 
dynamically 
The absence of 
a mechanism 
that 
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anytime, 2.Failure 
tolerance by backup 
methods when 
working instances 
fail (proactive 
behaviour) 
automatically 
responds, with 
the final 
decision made 
by the 
administrator. 
Stafrace et al. 
(2010) 
Wireless 
Ad-hoc  
Public Individual 
(single) 
The collaborative 
work of the tactical 
squad of agents has 
led to concurrent 
detections of 
multiple threat  
N/A 
Renjit et al. 
(2011) 
 
Wireless 
sensor  
N/A Collaborative 
(MAS-CI)  
N/A N/A 
Leon et al. 
(2011) 
 
Cognitive 
Radio  
Private Collaborative 
(MAS-CI)  
Flexibility N/A 
Vakili et al. 
(2011) 
CIDS Private Collaborative 
(MAS-CI)  
Reliability as an 
impact factor hence 
learning mechanism 
N/A 
Fisch et al. 
(2012) 
CIDS Public Individual Broadcasting 
mechanism 
communication 
improved 
cooperative 
detection 
N/A 
Devarakonda 
et al. (2012) 
HIDS Public Collaborative N/A NA 
Patel et al. 
(2012) 
CIDPS Public Collaborative N/A  N/A 
 
The features employed are very similar to each other. The most important 
varying features are management capabilities in the system structure. The collaborative 
management using the multi agent system-based computational intelligence portrays the 
ability to mitigate detection problems. In other words, the individual or single 
capabilities in terms of self-cooperative techniques (without using CI methods) consider 
all the features addressed in their systems. These inefficiencies are evidence of the lack 
of cooperative knowledge regarding suitable CI methods to identify intrusion prior to 
initiating any development. 
All new solutions for developing multi agent-based CI methods consider the 
requirements (detection and false alarm rate) as being able to overcome Co-IIDPS 
complexities and meet the real operational goals of networks. As illustrated in Table 
2.13 and as per our analysis, the proposed MCI-based Co-IIDPS mentioned in the 
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references meet two well-known requirements, and it is thus realistic to place them in 
actual network environments. The heterogeneous essence of network necessitates using 
MCI and individual techniques for Co-IIDPS to meet the stated requirements.  
Table 2.13: The developed Co-IIDPSs (MCI) which met our proposed performance requirements 
References requirements True Positive False Positive False Negative 
Zhang et al. (2001) NMP MR MR 
Mohajerani et al. (2003) MR MR MR 
Dasgupta et al. (2005) MR MR MR 
Agah et al. (2007) MR N/A N/A 
Mosqueria-Rey et al. (2007) N/A N/A N/A 
Ramachandran et al. (2008) MR MR MR 
Herrero et al. (2009) N/A N/A N/A 
Stafrace et al. (2010) MR MR MR 
Renjit et al. (2011) MR MR MR 
Leon et al. (2011) P NMP NMP 
Vakili et al. (2011) P NMP NMP 
Fisch et al. (2012) P NMP NMP 
Devarakonda et al. (2012) MR NMP NMP 
Xu et al. (2010) MR MR MR 
P = Partially             NMP = not meet performance         MR = meet requirement or performance               
N/A = Not applicable 
 
Incorporating a multi- agent system (MAS) to computational intelligence (MCI) 
in terms of Co-IIDPS allows monitoring intrusion activity. Fuzzy system (FS) with 
reinforcement learning (RL) in terms of fuzzy reinforcement learning manager (FRLM) 
has merged into Co-IIDPS, resulting in high true positive and low false alarm rates. The 
policy aspect of MAS-based FRLM applies a negotiation method to improve the 
detection accuracy. The developed Co-IIDPS around MAS-based FRLM satisfies the 
detection performance.  
2.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, firstly, a comprehensive taxonomy along with state-of-the-art 
intrusion detection and prevention systems was presented. The scope was to capture 
researchers’ attention into attempting to discover potential solutions to augment IDPS in 
order to minimize the impact of attacks on networks.  
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Secondly, the concept of intelligent intrusion detection and prevention system 
has been analysed in detail, showing the importance of this paradigm to enhance IDPS 
performance and reduce operational costs. In addition, within this broad concept, the 
main IIDPS were assessed and categorized into three trends: traditional artificial 
intelligence, computational intelligence and multi- agent-based computational 
intelligence.  
Thirdly, this chapter shows the ability of multi agent based CI methods in terms 
of collaborative IIDPS. The conclusion is that further efforts are needed to find more 
effective solutions, especially those based on game theoretic-computational intelligence 
methods in terms of adaptive optimization techniques with cooperative approaches. 
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Chapter 3 : ADAPTIVE OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUES 
The first part of this chapter summarizes the principles of Fuzzy Logic, which is 
the theoretical foundation on which the techniques proposed in this thesis are based. The 
analysis focuses on FLCs which can effectively take a linguistic control technique that 
relies on expert knowledge and change it into an automatic control technique. The 
second part of the chapter is devoted to several techniques that are especially suitable 
for optimizing FLCs. Special attention is drawn to RL, which, in this thesis, is the 
method selected amongst the previously described techniques. The third part of the 
chapter encapsulates the principles of the Game Theory, which is the mathematical 
basis on which techniques proposed in this thesis are based. Special consideration is 
given to fuzzy reinforcement learning that adopts the Game Theory. In addition, a 
collaborative IIDPS based on fuzzy Q-learning is proposed.  
3.1  Overview 
In recent years, intrusion detection and prevention systems have become very 
important. To cope with security attacks on infrastructure over the last decade, security 
organizations have paid special attention to cost savings, with the concept of IDPS 
being of relevant interest (Pathan, 2014). From this perspective, self-optimization 
typically comprises network parameter tuning. Nonetheless, the set of network 
parameters that can be optimized in a network is extremely large, as there are countless 
IDPS algorithms running on it and their parameters need to be optimized. In addition, 
even if the optimization process is only done on a few relevant parameters, the 
connection among parameter settings and network performance is not clear-cut. For this 
reason, IDPS parameter optimization should be performed intelligently. As a result, the 
IDPS would be able to amend its parameters in terms of intelligence-based IDPS 
(IIDPS) in order to achieve optimum performance with no human work. However, 
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countless parameters can be changed remotely in the IIDPS system. From the operator’s 
standpoint, adjusting IIDPS parameters that do not require time scheduling is the 
preferred alternative. 
3.2  Fuzzy Logic 
This section presents the theoretical basis of the computational intelligence 
methodology known as Fuzzy Logic. This discipline was initiated by Lotfi A. Zadeh 
(1965) , professor at the University of California, Berkeley. 
Fuzzy Logic emerged as an important tool for system control and complex 
industrial processes, as well as for home and entertainment electronics, diagnostic 
systems and other expert systems. Currently, a multitude of applications based on Fuzzy 
Logic are applied in many different areas, for instance control systems, robotics, 
medicine, pattern recognition, computer vision, information and knowledge 
management systems, earthquake prediction, scheduling optimization, etc. As an 
alternative to Classical Logic, Fuzzy Logic introduces a degree of imprecision when 
items are evaluated (Precup et al., 2011). In real life, there is an abundance of 
knowledge that is ambiguous and imprecise, and human reasoning usually handles this 
kind of information. In this sense, Fuzzy Logic was designed specifically to imitate 
human behaviour. Additional benefits of Fuzzy Logic include simplicity and flexibility. 
In particular, this methodology can deal with problems with imprecise and incomplete 
data, and it can easily model non-linear functions of arbitrary complexity. 
On the one hand, classical sets arise from the need for humans to classify objects 
and concepts. Such sets can be described as well-defined sets of elements or a 
membership function μ that can take a value of 0 or 1 from a universe of discourse for 
all elements that can belong (or not) to the concerned set. Formally, let X be the 
universe of discourse and x the elements contained in X. In addition, suppose A is a set 
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that contains some elements in the universe of discourse X. Then, the element x belongs 
or does not belong to set A, as characterized by the following function: 
𝜇
𝐴(𝑥)={
1   𝑖𝑓  𝑥  ∈ 𝐴
0  𝑖𝑓  𝑥  ∉ 𝐴
 
                 (3.1)
 where 𝜇𝐴(𝑥) is the membership function corresponding to set A. Conversely, the 
necessity to work with fuzzy sets comes from the existence of concepts with no clear 
boundaries in their definition. Classical set theories categorize elements into crisp sets 
with well-defined boundaries between values. By contrast, fuzzy set theories classify 
elements into continuous sets based on an underlying theory that depends on the degree 
of membership. This means that membership functions are given a value ranging from 0 
to 1 with undefined, gradual transitions between values. Formally, suppose B is a fuzzy 
set that contains elements in the universe of discourse X. Then such fuzzy set is 
characterized by the following membership mapping function: 
μB(x):X→[0,1]                                                              (3.2) 
For all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, 𝜇𝐵(𝑥) indicates how strongly Element X is connected to Fuzzy Set 
B. Although the membership function for a particular fuzzy set can be of any shape or 
type, an appropriate membership function is typically determined by experts in the field. 
In this sense, some membership functions, e.g. triangular, trapezoidal and Gaussian, are 
of special interest for designers. 
As for crisp sets in Classical Logic, relations and operators can also be defined 
for fuzzy sets in Fuzzy Logic. In particular, these relations are the equality, 
containment, complement, intersection and union of fuzzy sets. Among these relations, 
the intersection of fuzzy sets plays a key role in designing rules for fuzzy controllers, as 
described in the next section. The intersection of sets A and B defines elements that 
occur in both sets. Operators that employ intersections are called t-norms. T-norms 
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results in sets that encompass all elements found in either Set A or Set B and also 
consider the degree of membership related to the t-norm. The most popular t-norms are 
defined as follows: 
Min-operator.  
𝜇𝐴∩𝐵 (𝑥) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜇𝐴(𝑥), 𝜇𝐵(𝑥)}, ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑋.     (3.3) 
Product operator.  
𝜇𝐴∩𝐵 (𝑥) =  𝜇𝐴(𝑥)𝜇𝐵(𝑥), ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑋.      (3.4) 
As previously stated, Fuzzy Logic imitates human behaviour. One way of doing 
this is through using the notion of linguistic variables. A linguistic variable has a value 
of a word or sentence, allowing for computation with words rather than numbers. Such 
linguistic variable can be a word, linguistic label or an adjective. For example, let us 
consider the height of people in a country. In this case, the variable ‘height’ is a 
linguistic variable. A possible value for the numeric variable ‘height’ can be tall or 
short, meaning that a fuzzy set is associated with a linguistic term or value. In addition, 
certain adverbs can also be combined with adjectives to modify fuzzy values, e.g. very 
tall would refer to an individual who is noticeably taller than his peers. In other words, 
linguistic variables can serve to create numerical or logical statements from natural 
languages, facilitating handling human reasoning at the computational level. In this 
thesis, an attack data source can be defined as a 5-tuple ADS={Pt,Dp,Tr,Bs,Co}, or 
inputs of proposed algorithms according to the vulnerability scanning information, 
where Pt denotes the type of protocol (TCP=1, UDP=2); Dp is the destination port; Tr is 
the variance of time difference between two connections during a specific time window; 
Bs is the length of the packet from source to destination; and Co denotes the number of 
connections to the same host as the current connection in the past two seconds.  
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An important feature of Fuzzy Logic is that it provides a framework for handling 
rules (for control or decision making) that have earlier been expressed in an imprecise 
form. In this context, linguistic variables are embedded in an FLC’s rules, facilitating 
the representation of human control expertise. More specifically, FLCs are composed of 
several IF-THEN rules that are easy to create. The succeeding section presents a short 
overview of FLCs, focusing on the components of such controllers and some types of 
fuzzy controllers for detecting features of distributed denial-of-service attacks. 
3.2.1 Fuzzy Logic Controller Design 
FLC design is one of the most important application areas of Fuzzy Logic 
(Engelbrecht, 2007). The main benefit of FLCs is that controlling a system (also called a 
plant) can be done using sentences rather than equations. This means that a control 
strategy can be described in terms of linguistic rules, in a more similar way to human 
language, instead of using for instance, differential equations. Since their start in 1975, 
many FLCs have been created for consumer products such as air conditioners, laundry 
appliances, audio visual equipment and industrial applications including hydro-electric 
generators, subways, and robotic controls.  Over time, FLCs have proven they can 
provide better results than conventional control algorithms. FLCs are especially useful 
for complex processes that are beyond the scope of traditional quantitative methods, or 
when information is unreliable (Lee, 1990). 
Designing an FLC includes defining the fuzzification and defuzzification 
processes, developing fuzzy control rules and generating a database. Figure 3.1 
illustrates a generic FLC comprising four fundamental elements.  The first element is 
the fuzzifier, which takes input data and changes it into linguistic variables that can also 
form labels for the fuzzy sets. Secondly, the knowledge base is a database and collection 
of linguistic statements based on expert knowledge, which is usually expressed in the 
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form of IF-THEN rules. Thirdly, the inference engine performs inference to compute a 
fuzzy output. Finally, the defuzzifier, which is the opposite of the fuzzifier, provides a 
non-fuzzy control action from an inferred fuzzy control action. The remaining 
paragraphs of this section describe each of these blocks in greater detail. 
Knowledge Base
Inference 
Engine
Fuzzification 
Interface
Defuzzification 
Interface
Input
(Crisp)
output
(Crisp)
(Fuzzy) (Fuzzy)
 
Figure 3.1: Block diagram of an FLC 
 
Fuzzification process 
The fuzzification interface begins by measuring the input variables’ values. 
Next, a scale map is created that converts all these values into corresponding values 
from the universe of discourse. Afterwards, the non-fuzzy input values for the fuzzy 
representations are revealed.  
In practice, the membership functions that correspond to each fuzzy set as 
determined in the input space are used to complete these tasks. More specifically, the 
fuzzification process is the assignment of membership values (one for each fuzzy value 
of the linguistic variable) to a numerical input value. For instance, let us consider the 
linguistic variable “time response,” which can take fuzzy values of low, medium and 
high. Each input variable’s sharp (crisp) value needs to first be fuzzified into linguistic 
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values prior to the fuzzy decision processes with the rule base. Formally, X denotes the 
universe of discourse for the three fuzzy sets. Hence, the fuzzification process receives 
the element  𝑎 ∈ 𝑋, and produces the membership degrees 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑎), 𝜇𝑙𝑜𝑤(𝑎) 𝜇𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚(𝑎) 
and 𝜇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝑎). The characteristic function of a fuzzy set is assigned values between 0 and 
1, which represent the degree of membership of an element in a given set. Table 3.1 
displays the linguistic terms and their fuzzy numbers used for evaluating the attack data 
source for time response, buffer size, and count. Figure 3.2 indicates the membership 
functions for time response. 
Table 3.1: Fuzzy rating for the occurrence of attack traffic 
Linguistic 
variables 
Fuzzy number 
Tr Bs Co 
Low (L) (-inf,-inf,0,40) (-inf,0,2,3) (-
inf,0,1,1.5) 
Medium (M) (20,40,80,100) (2,3,5,6) (1,1.5,2,2.5) 
High (H) (80,120,inf,inf) (5,6,8,inf) (2,2.5,3,inf) 
 
Figure 3.2: The membership functions of linguistic variables for attack data source Tr 
Knowledge base 
The FLC knowledge base comprises a database and a set of rules. The database 
permits fuzzy rules to be characterized and the fuzzy data to be manipulated. The set of 
rules provides the dynamic behaviour of the FLC through a set of linguistic rules 
derived from expert knowledge. 
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To begin with, the database is subjective because it is created from experience 
and judgments. The following aspects are related to database construction in an FLC: 
 Discretization. Also referred to as quantization, its function is to convert a 
continuous universe into a discrete universe that contains a definite number of 
segments or quantization levels. In this case, membership values are assigned to 
generic elements found in the new discrete universe to identify a fuzzy set. In 
addition, there is a trade-off when selecting the number of quantization levels. 
On the one hand, it should be sufficiently large to provide appropriate 
granularity but on the other hand, it should be sufficiently small to save memory. 
In this sense, the corresponding mapping that transforms measured variables into 
values in the discretized universe can be linear, non-linear or both. 
 
Fuzzification 
Process
Time response 
(Tr)
Non-Fuzzy Input
(Tr): 30 ms
Low (-inf, -inf, 0,40)
Med (20,40,80,100)
High (80,120,inf,inf)
µ(Tr)
 
Figure 3.3: Example of fuzzification process 
 Normalization. A universe of discourse is normalized when a discretization 
process is used to map a finite number of segments to their corresponding 
segments in the normalized universe. The mapping can be linear, non-linear or 
both. 
 Partition of input and output spaces. A fuzzy partition determines how many 
fuzzy sets need to be defined and how granular the FLC control will be. This 
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depends on the characteristics of the system being controlled and the quality 
required for the control process. 
 Completeness. The concept of completeness is related to the fact that the FLC 
generates an appropriate action for every state in the system. Typically, 
completeness regards design experience and engineering knowledge. 
 Membership functions. A membership function determines the grade of the 
membership assigned to each fuzzy set. Decisions about these assignments are 
established using subjective criteria. For example, membership functions for 
input variables that are sensitive to noise are typically large enough to decrease 
that sensitivity. Membership functions are customarily expressed as bell, 
triangular or trapezoid-shaped functions.  
Secondly, the rule base is built using IF-THEN syntax to create control 
strategies as shown in Eq. (3.5): 
IF (a set of conditions are satisfied) THEN (a set of consequences can be inferred),                   (3.5) 
where the antecedent forms the first part of the conditional statement and the 
consequent if the second part. An antecedent is further defined as a condition of a 
domain. A consequent is a control action found in the system. The antecedents and 
consequents for a rule can contain more than one linguistic variable.  
Defining how an FLC will be characterized depends on selecting the state 
variable form the antecedent and control variables found in the consequent. An instance 
of a rule is “if pressure is very high, then open the valve.” One of the benefits of using 
these rules is that they characterize human behaviour and can be used to analyse 
decisions since they supply a framework. In this sense, according to several researchers 
domain knowledge can easily be communicated using fuzzy control rules. To formulate 
these fuzzy rules, operators and experts in this field were queried using a carefully 
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organized questionnaire.  This explains the fact that FLCs are implemented using fuzzy 
IF-THEN rules. 
Inference engine 
Once the input variable values have been converted to fuzzy values through the 
fuzzification process, the inference engine identifies which rules are triggered and 
calculates the fuzzy values of the output variables. In other words, this process connects 
the rule base to the fuzzified inputs to develop the fuzzified output for a rule. To do this, 
each output set must be assigned a degree of membership that is part of the consequents 
in the fuzzy rules. This is calculated using the degree of membership found in the input 
sets in addition to the affiliation between input sets. These connections are established 
using a logic operator, which takes sets from the antecedent and combines them. Then, 
the output fuzzy sets from the consequent are added to create one general membership 
function that will act as the output for the rule. 
To explain the inference process, assume that A and B are two input fuzzy sets 
in the universe of discourse. The X2 universe of discourse includes a fuzzy set with X1 
and C. Let us also consider that the following rule is defined: 
𝐼𝐹 (𝐴 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵 𝑖𝑠 𝑏) 𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑁 (𝐶 𝑖𝑠 𝑐)      (3.6) 
The 𝜇𝐴(𝑎) and  𝜇𝐵(𝑏) values are available to the inference engine because a 
fuzzification process was used in their development. Thus, the inference process starts 
by taking a rule base and calculating the degree of truth for each rule. The degree of 
truth specifies the triggering strength of a particular rule. It is calculated by combining 
the antecedent sets using specific operators, among which the min-operator and product 
operator for the intersection relation as previously stated. In this example, assuming the 
min-operator, the degree of truth _k for rule k is calculated as: 
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𝛼𝑘 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜇𝐴(𝑎), 𝜇𝐵(𝑏)}.       (3.7) 
The following step in the inference process is to determine a single fuzzy value 
for each output 𝑐𝑖 ∈ 𝐶 that has been activated. In general, the final fuzzy value 
corresponding to the output, 𝑐𝑖 , denoted as  𝛽𝑖, is computed using the max-operator as 
follows: 
𝛽𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥∀𝑘{𝛼𝑘𝑖}        (3.8) 
where 𝛼𝑘𝑖 is the degree of truth of rule k, which activated output 𝑐𝑖. 
The final result of the inference engine is a set of fuzzified output values. In this 
case, the rules that are not activated have a degree of truth equal to zero. In addition, 
rules can include a weighting factor in the range [0, 1] to represent the degree of 
confidence in that rule. Such factors derived from expert knowledge are applied when 
the fuzzy rules are aggregated to produce a non-fuzzy value in the defuzzification 
process. 
Defuzzification process 
This method establishes a relationship between fuzzy control action spaces, the 
outputs from the universe of discourse, and crisp, non-fuzzy control action spaces. In 
the consequent, a set’s degree of membership is represented by a rule’s degree of truth.  
Given the degree of truth from a set of activated fuzzy rules, the defuzzification process 
creates non-function scalar values from the output of fuzzy rules. To calculate such 
scalar values, two different approaches can be used. Mamdani et al. (1975) developed a 
fuzzy rule that was the foundation for the first approach, where the rules lead to a 
consequent that is another fuzzy variable [see (3.6) as an example]. The second 
approach is known as the Takagi-Sugeno approach and it uses rules with consequents 
that are polynomial functions of the inputs (Takagi et al., 1985). 
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The Mamdani approach: 
  
In this method, there are several ways to find a scalar value that represents what 
actions will be taken.  
• Maximum-Minimum Approach: In this approach, rules with the highest degree of 
truth are selected. Then the membership functions of the activated consequents are 
determined. Finally, the centroid for the area covered by the membership function is 
found. The FLC’s output is the centroid’s horizontal coordinate. 
• Averaging Approach:  The averaging approach uses the average of the degrees of 
truth for all activated rules. After the average is calculated, the membership functions 
are limited to this average. Next, the horizontal coordinate of the centroid for the area is 
determined and used as the FLC output.  
• Root-sum-square method. The membership functions are rated such that the apex for 
each function is that same as the maximum and the peak of each function is equal to the 
maximum degree of truth value associated with that particular function. As in the 
averaging approach, the horizontal coordinate of the centroid for the area is calculated 
to form the FLC output.  
• Clipped Centre of Gravity Method: In this method, the membership functions are 
shortened, or “clipped” so they are equal to the degree of truth for the corresponding 
rule. The next step is to find the horizontal coordinate of the centroid for the area, which 
will also be used as FLC output.  
Calculating the centroid for a trapezoidal area depends of whether the domain of 
the membership functions is continuous or discrete. A finite amount of values,  𝑛𝑥 , are 
found in a discrete domain and the following equation is used to calculate the 
defuzzification process results: 
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𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 =
∑  𝑥𝑖𝜇𝐶( 𝑥𝑖)
 𝑛𝑥
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜇𝐶( 𝑥𝑖)
 𝑛𝑥
𝑖=1
           (3.9) 
where 𝑥𝑖 is each possible value. In the case of a continuous domain, the output is 
given by the following expression: 
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 =
∫ 𝑥𝜇(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥𝑥∈𝑋
∫ 𝜇(𝑥) 𝑑𝑥𝑥∈𝑋
            (3.10) 
where X is the universe of discourse. 
Takagi-Sugeno approach: 
A typical rule for this approach adheres to the following generic expression 
(Takagi et al., 1985): 
IF (𝑋1 is 𝐴1 and . . . and 𝑋𝑛 is 𝐴𝑛) THEN (Y =  𝑃0  +  𝑃1𝑋1+ . . . + 𝑃𝑛𝑋𝑛).      (3.11) 
where 𝑋1,..., 𝑋𝑛 represent the  fuzzy input variables and Ai indicates one of the fuzzy 
sets for the linguistic variable 𝑋i; Y denotes the output variable; and 𝑃0,..., 𝑃𝑛 are the 
parameters. Thus, the main difference between the Takagi-Sugeno and Mamdani 
approaches is that in one of them, the consequent of the rule is a mathematical function 
instead of a fuzzy consequent. Furthermore, the Takagi-Sugeno has been extended to 
non-linear functions. When a set is composed of a set of activated rules and associated 
degrees of truth, calculating the resulting crisp value as a weighted average of the rule 
outputs can be done with the following equation: 
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 =
∑  𝛼𝑖.𝑓(𝑋1,….,𝑋n)
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑  𝛼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
           (3.12) 
where N represents the number of rules and 𝑓(𝑋1, … . , 𝑋n) signifies a few of the 
mathematical input functions.  
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The main benefits of the Takagi-Sugeno approach are that a more dynamic 
control is provided, FLCs are computationally more efficient and best suited for 
mathematical analysis, and it works well with optimization and adaptive techniques. For 
these reasons, the FLCs proposed in this thesis are based on the Takagi-Sugeno 
approach.  
To conclude this section, an illustrative example of FLC operation is provided. 
The FLC is based on the Takagi-Sugeno approach explained previously. Suppose that 
the controller is described by the following two rules: 
IF (x is A1 and y is B1) THEN (z is f1(x, y) = K1)           (3.13) 
IF (x is A2 and y is B2) THEN (z is f2(x, y) = K2)       (3.14) 
 
from which the following elements can be identified:  
• Variables x and y represent the universe of discourse X and Y, respectively. 
• Two fuzzy sets, A1 and A2, are defined for variable x. 
• Two fuzzy sets, B1 and B2, are defined for variable y. 
• There is one output variable, z. 
• Two constant functions, 𝑓1 and𝑓2 , are defined for variable z. 
The membership functions defined for each fuzzy set of input variables are shown 
in Figure 3.4. 
 Then, the basic FLC operation is as follows: 
 Step 1. The fuzzification process calculates the membership value for each 
fuzzy set by applying the associated membership function as shown in Figure 
3.5 (a). 
 Step 2. The inference engine computes the degree of truth for each fuzzy rule 
through the combination of fuzzified inputs using the min-operator, as shown in 
Figure 3.5 (b). The expressions used to calculate the degree of truth are: 
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𝛼1 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜇𝐴1(𝑥0), 𝜇𝐵1(𝑦0)}                       (3.15) 
& 
𝛼2 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜇𝐴2(𝑥0), 𝜇𝐵2(𝑦0)}                       (3.16) 
 
 Step 3. Finally, the defuzzification process calculates the non-fuzzy output as a 
weighted average of the rule constant outputs. The equation to produce the 
output value is: 
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 =
𝛼1.𝑘1+𝛼2.𝑘2
𝛼1+𝛼2
                        (3.17) 
 
X
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B2
y
 
Figure 3.4: Membership functions of the input fuzzy sets as example 
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Figure 3.5: Basic FLC operation example 
 
Optimization of the self-tuning process 
An important area in algorithmic development to cope with complex problems is 
the design of so-called intelligent algorithms. In this context, the development of models 
based on biological and natural intelligence has played a key role in the last years. 
Artificial neural networks, reinforcement learning, evolutionary computation, and 
swarm intelligence are all examples of such algorithms. More recently, several of these 
approaches have been combined with each other or with traditional methods to solve 
challenging and complex issues. Moreover, these algorithms are part of the field of 
machine learning employed in several different areas of research, including many social 
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sciences and computer science. In principle, any of these approaches should be capable 
of yielding results in a relatively short time. 
In this thesis, the proposed auto-tuning algorithms are based on FLC design. 
Since detecting DDoS attacks in networks can be considered complex due to the 
presence of a large multitude of diverse and interacting elements, defining the controller 
usually becomes a challenging task for IIDPS. In addition, as DDoS attacks in networks 
involve unpredictable and highly variable context factors, which can also vary on 
different time scales, the FLC needs to be reconfigured throughout adjusting the 
detector engine parameters in order to identify those traffic variations. 
Thus, to cope with the dynamic variations, the lack of knowledge or, simply, to 
refine the behaviour of the controller, different strategies have been analysed in this 
thesis, namely two reinforcement learning algorithms (i.e., Sarsa and Q-learning). The 
objective of these mathematical techniques is to optimize the behaviour of the FLC 
through a learning process. In this section, after providing a general overview of RL 
techniques, a more detailed overview is devoted to the Q-learning algorithm and how 
FLC optimizes with Q-learning, which is of particular interest in scenarios such as 
wireless networks in which learning from interaction becomes essential for detecting 
DDoS attacks. In this section, an optimized IIDPS is proposed, which utilizes the fuzzy 
Q-learning algorithm with weighted strategy sharing in terms of multi-agent system-
based IIDPS. The analysis particularly stresses on the cooperative game theory-based 
fuzzy Q-Learning algorithm, which is a promising approach in the context of 
cooperative IIDPS in this thesis.  
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3.3 Reinforcement Learning 
In a particular environment, an agent can be encouraged to engage in a specific 
action that will lead to maximizing a cumulative reward. This type of machine learning 
is known as RL. Its two defining characteristics are a trial and error search and actions 
with consequences that can affect immediate and future rewards (Sutton et al., 1998). 
RL differs from other learning approaches, such as supervised learning that is 
typically used in Neural Networks. In the latter case, learning is done by using 
previously collected examples or sets of training data, which are not appropriate for 
interactive learning. In addition, it is difficult to find a training data set that adequately 
represents all of the situations in which an agent would be required to act. Thus, in those 
instances, an agent that can learn from its own experience remains the only answer. 
Beyond the agent and environment, the following elements can be identified in RL:  
 Policy: the policy defines how the agent must act at a given time. In other 
words, it connects perceived states from the environment and actions to be taken 
as a result of those states. 
 Reward Function: the reward function describes the goal of an RL problem. 
More specifically, it is a map between each perceived state and a scalar or 
reward that sets out the value of being in that state. However, the objective of 
the agent is to maximize the total reward rather than the immediate reward. The 
reward function signifies immediate value. 
 Value Function: the value function specifies what is good over the long term. In 
particular, the value function is a map between each perceived state and the 
rewards that an agent can expect to accumulate over time beginning with a 
particular state. 
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 Model of the Environment (optional): the model of the environment illustrates 
how the environment behaves. RL is capable of learning by trial-and-error while 
at the same time learning a model of the environment. 
To illustrate these concepts, a basic scheme of an RL problem is shown in Figure 3.6 
where a general environment responds at time t + 1 to an action taken at time t. 
A key concept in RL is the trade-off between exploration and exploitation. 
When an agent is required to act, it will select an action that has yielded rewards in the 
past. However, in the absence of former results, the only way to discover what actions 
will be profitable is to try actions that have not been previously selected. In other words, 
the trade-off between exploration and exploitation rests on an agent’s ability to take 
advantage of current knowledge but remain open to other, untried actions. In this sense, 
the agent’s primary goal is to maximize the rewards achieved over the long term, that is, 
the sum of the rewards obtained from all situations or states that will be visited in the 
future: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑟𝑡+2 + 𝛾
2𝑟𝑡+3 + ⋯ . = ∑ 𝛾
𝑘𝑟𝑡+𝑘+1,
∞
𝑘=0                             (3.20) 
where 𝑟 represents the consequence of an action that leads to a numerical reward for 
each time step and Y denotes the discount rate given to indicate how important a future 
reward will be. 
The Markov property 
As indicated previously, the function of a state influences how an agent will 
make decisions. In this context, important environmental properties and state signals, 
otherwise known as the Markov Property, can be found. The state signal includes all the 
information available to the agent. However, the agent does not expect to receive any 
information that would facilitate decision making or even all the information regarding 
the environment.  
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Figure 3.6: The basic elements of an RL problem 
An appropriate state signal is one that summarizes past information compactly, 
but also maintains the relevant information parts. The Markov property is fulfilled when 
a state signal retains all relevant information. In this situation, at time step t+1, the 
response of the environment is only dependent on time t. As such, the environmental 
dynamics can be defined as:  
𝑃𝑟{𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠
′, 𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝑟| 𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡},                      (3.21) 
where 𝑃𝑟{. } denotes the probability of its argument; 𝑠 is the state of the environment; 𝑠
′ 
is any state in the system; 𝑟 is the received reward; and 𝑎 denotes the action taken by 
the agent. When the environment contains the Markov property, it is possible to predict 
the next state and rewards based on current states and actions.  
A Markov decision process (MDP) is an RL task with the Markov property. A 
finite MDP has finite states and actions and is further defined by a set of actions and 
states and the dynamics of the environment. The latter is specified by transition 
prospects and how valuable the next reward is expected to be. The transition probability 
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for each probable next state (s’) for any current state (s) and any action (a) can be 
calculated using the equation below:  
𝑃𝑠𝑠′
𝑎 = 𝑃𝑟{𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠
′| 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠, 𝑎𝑡 = 𝑎}.          (3.33) 
Likewise, the expected value of the next rewards for any current action a, state s, 
and next state 𝑠′, is calculated as follows: 
𝑅𝑠𝑠′
𝑎 = 𝐸{𝑟𝑡+1| 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠, 𝑎𝑡 = 𝑎, 𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠
′}         (3.34) 
where 𝐸{·} is the expected value of its argument. The most important factors of a 
dynamic finite MDP are its transition probabilities and expected value of the next 
reward.  
Optimal value functions 
Most RL algorithms search for value functions that assess the benefits of a given 
state available to an agent. As previously stated, the expected accumulated reward 
measures the value of the state 𝑠.  In RL, a state-value function, called 𝑉 (𝑠), is used to 
identify the benefits of obtaining state 𝑠. The value is subject to what states the agent 
has visited, which in turn depends on the what policy has been followed. A policy 
function 𝜋 is a map that shows the connection between states and actions used to govern 
how the agents will behave. In contrast, 𝜋(𝑠, 𝑎) indicates the likelihood of engaging in 
action 𝑎 from state 𝑠. In this case, the value of state 𝑠 following policy 𝜋 is defined as: 
𝑉𝜋(𝑠) = 𝐸𝜋{𝑅𝑡|𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠}  
= 𝐸𝜋{∑ 𝛾
𝑘𝑟𝑡+𝑘+1
∞
𝑘=0 |𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠},                            (3.24) 
where 𝐸𝜋{·} means the expected value under policy 𝜋.  
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Similarly, in RL, the action-value function 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎) qualifies the value of taking 
an action 𝑎 when starting from state 𝑠. If the agent follows policy 𝜋, then it is formally 
expressed as: 
𝑄𝜋(𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝐸𝜋{𝑅𝑡| 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠, 𝑎𝑡 = 𝑎} 
= 𝐸𝜋{∑ 𝛾
𝑘𝑟𝑡+𝑘+1|𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠,
∞
𝑘=0 𝑎𝑡 = 𝑎}.               (3.25) 
Experience can be used to estimate functions 𝑉𝜋 and 𝑄𝜋. A fundamental 
property of these functions is that they meet the requirements of certain recursive 
relationships. In other words, the following condition holds between the value of 𝑠 and 
possible successor states for any policy 𝜋 or any state 𝑠: 
𝑉𝜋(𝑠) = 𝐸𝜋{𝑅𝑡| 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠}  
= 𝐸𝜋{∑ 𝛾
𝑘𝑟𝑡+𝑘+1|𝑠𝑡 = 𝑠
∞
𝑘=0 }  
= ∑ 𝜋𝑎 (𝑠, 𝑎) ∑ 𝑃𝑠𝑠′
𝑎
𝑠′ [𝑅𝑠𝑠′
𝑎 + 𝛾𝐸𝜋{∑ 𝛾
𝑘𝑟𝑡+𝑘+2|𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠
′∞
𝑘=0 }]  
= ∑ 𝜋𝑎 (𝑠, 𝑎) ∑ 𝑃𝑠𝑠′
𝑎 [𝑅𝑠𝑠′
𝑎 + 𝛾𝑉𝜋(𝑠′)]𝑠′ ,     (3.26) 
Equation 3.26 is also called the Bellman equation for 𝑉𝜋. Moreover, the solution 
to this equation is the value function 𝑉𝜋 .  
Finding a good policy that will result in long-term rewards is the same as 
solving an RL problem. An optimal policy always has an expected value greater than 
(or equal to) other policies for all states. Likewise, the best policies have equal state and 
action value functions called 𝑉∗and 𝑄∗ respectively. 𝑉∗is expressed as: 
𝑉∗(𝑠) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜋𝑉
𝜋(𝑠),            (3.27) 
for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 when S represents the set of states. Similarly, 𝑄∗ is described as: 
𝑄∗(𝑠, 𝑎) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜋(𝑠, 𝑎),           (3.28) 
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for every s ϵ S and a ϵA(s), where 𝐴(𝑠) indicates the set of possible actions in state 𝑠. 
Function Q∗ delivers the return expected as a result of an action in state s before it 
follows an optimal policy. This process can be stated in terms of V∗ as demonstrated 
below: 
Q∗(s, a) = E{rt+1 + γV
∗(st+1)|st = s, at = a}.        (3.29) 
The Bellman equation for V∗ can be rewritten without making reference to any 
specific policy. If this happens, it is known as a Bellman optimality equation. Bellman 
optimality equations state that when the best action is taken from a state, its expected 
return is the same as the value of the state under an optimal policy, as shown below:  
𝑉∗(𝑠) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎𝜖𝐴(𝑠)𝑄
𝜋∗(𝑠, 𝑎)  
= 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎𝐸𝜋∗{𝑅𝑡|st = s, at = a}  
= 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎𝐸 {𝑟𝑡+1 + γV
∗(st+1)|st = s, at = a}  
= 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎 ∑ 𝑃𝑠𝑠′
𝑎 [𝑅𝑠𝑠′
𝑎 + 𝛾𝑉𝜋(𝑠′)]𝑠′ .           (3.30) 
The Bellman optimality equation for 𝑄∗ is: 
Q∗(s, a) = E{rt+1 + γ𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎′γ Q
∗(st+1, 𝑎
′)|st = s, at = a} 
= ∑ 𝑃𝑠𝑠′
𝑎 [𝑅𝑠𝑠′
𝑎 + 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑎′Q
∗(s′, 𝑎′)]𝑠′ .          (3.31) 
The Bellman optimality equation is a series of equations where each state is 
represented by its own equation. In other words, 𝑁 equations will represent 𝑁 states 
with 𝑁 variables. In terms of finite MDPs, this means that the solution for the Bellman 
optimality equation is independent of policy. Furthermore, any techniques used to find 
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solutions for systems in non-linear equations can be used in cases where the dynamics 
of an environment (𝑃𝑠𝑠′
𝑎  a or 𝑅𝑠𝑠′ 
𝑎 ) are known. 
Discovering an optimal policy becomes fast and easy once the system of 
equations is solved. When the value of 𝑉∗is known, the best actions in the next step 
become optimal actions and any greedy policy becomes an optimal policy.  
𝑉∗ is significant because it considers the rewards generated from all future 
behaviours. When it is used to assess short-term consequences that result from an 
action, it establishes a greedy policy that is optimal in the long term.  
Alternatively, if the value of 𝑄∗is known, the agent is not required to find the 
actions for the next step. Instead, it only looks for actions that maximizes 𝑄∗ (𝑠, 𝑎). In 
these cases, choosing the best options becomes even easier. In other words, the optimal 
action-value function does not require information about possible successor states and 
values, or the dynamics of an environment to determine optional actions.  
Solving the Bellman optimality equation creates a method of discovering 
optimal polices and solving RL problems. Unfortunately, these solutions are not useful 
without further adjustments. In practice, three assumptions must be made: (a) accurate 
knowledge regarding the dynamics of the environment, (b) sufficient computational 
resources to find solutions, and (c) the Markov property.  
To solve problems in an approximate way, many different decision-making 
methods can be applied, for example heuristic search methods and dynamic 
programming. In this context, many RL methods are clearly viewed as approximate 
means to find solutions for Bellman optimality equations. In such instances, real, 
experienced transitions are employed rather than knowledge about expected transitions.  
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The techniques most commonly employed for solving RL problems are Monte 
Carlo, temporal different methods and dynamic programming. Each class of methods 
has advantages and disadvantages. Dynamic programming methods, which attempt to 
solve Bellman equations, are successful because they are mathematically sound, but 
they require a complete and accurate model of the environment. Monte Carlo methods 
attempt to estimate value functions and discover optimal policies. They are conceptually 
simple and a model is not required, but they do not function for calculations that require 
step-by-step processes because they use averaging sample returns and work best for 
episodic tasks. To overcome this limitation, experiences are divided into episodes. 
When an episode is completed, then the policies and value estimates are modified. 
Finally, temporal-difference methods require complex analysis but are fully incremental 
and a model is not required. These three different method types also vary in terms of 
efficiency and speed of convergence, and they can be combined in order to obtain the 
benefits of each one. 
Q-Learning algorithm 
Mechanisms for determining optimal policies follow generalized policy 
iterations based on alternating policy improvements and evaluations. Policy evaluation 
is used to make value functions resemble current policies. Policy improvements utilize 
new value functions to enhance policies in terms of expected value. This concept is 
illustrated in Figure. 3.7. The result of such an iterative process is that both policy and 
value functions approach optimality. 
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Figure 3.7: Basic scheme of generalized policy iteration 
An action-value function is used instead and is calculated by: 
𝑄(𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡) ← 𝑄(𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡) + 𝜂[𝑟𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑄(𝑠𝑡+1, 𝑎𝑡+1) − 𝑄(𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡)].  (3.33) 
Policy improvement is achieved by selecting actions whose current action-value 
is the greatest in that state, meaning to make the policy greedy by: 
𝑎(𝑠) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘𝑄(𝑠, 𝑘).       (3.34) 
If all state-action pairs can be visited an infinite number of times, the limit of the 
policy becomes greedy and the process converges to the optimal value function and 
policy. 
Watkins et al. (1992) defined Q-learning as a temporal-difference algorithm 
where the learned Q(s,a) is a direct approximation of the optimal Q*(s,a) regardless of 
the policy followed by the agent. In order to calculate the updated action-value function, 
the following equation is used: 
𝑄(𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡) ← 𝑄(𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡) + 𝜂[𝑟𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘𝑄(𝑠𝑡+1, 𝑎) − 𝑄(𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡)].  (3.35) 
where Q is the optimal action function Q* without depending on the policy followed. 
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3.4 Q-Learning Adaptation to FLCs 
Applying RL techniques to an FLC rule base will lead to optimization. A Q-
Learning fuzzy version was developed by Glorennec (1994) to optimize the consequent 
of the fuzzy rules found in an FLC. Q-Learning permits continuous state and action 
spaces when the action-value function is discretized.  The resulting discrete q values are 
stored in a look-up table as a finite set of state-action yards. Another benefit of using 
this method is that the fuzzy rules easily accept prior knowledge and the learning 
process becomes faster. 
The agent is forced to select an action from 𝐽 for rule 𝑖 when the action space is 
discretized. In some situations, the FLC has 𝑁 fuzzy rules and 𝑎[𝑖, 𝑗] forms the 𝑗𝑡ℎ 
possible action for rule 𝑖 and 𝑞[𝑖, 𝑗]. Any associated q-values are kept in the look-up 
table. Ultimately, representations of continuous 𝑄(𝑠, 𝑎) are considered to be the same so 
that the q-value of each rule consequence can be determined before being used in the 
continuous input vector. The steps involved in the fuzzy Q-Learning algorithm are as 
follows: 
1. In the look-up table, initialize the q*values. If no prior knowledge is available, 
use the following equation: 
𝑞[𝑖, 𝑗] = 0, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 𝑎𝑛𝑑 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐽,                (3.36) 
where 𝑞[𝑖, 𝑗] represents the q-value, 𝑁 signifies the number of rules and the number of 
actions for each rule is represented by 𝐽. 
2. Select an action for each activated rule that has a nonzero degree of truth.  
Actions can be selected using one of the following 𝜖 − 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑦 policies: 
𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘 𝑞[𝑖, 𝑘]  with probability 1-𝜖,                 (3.37) 
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Or, 
𝑎𝑖 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚{𝑎𝑘, 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐽}  with probability 𝜖,                   (3,38) 
In Equations 3.37 and 3.38, 𝑎𝑖 represents the consequent of rule 𝑖 and 𝜖 signifies 
the parameter that establishes the trade-off between exploration and exploitation in the 
algorithm. In other words,  𝜖 = 0 indicates that the best action was selected and there 
was no exploration.   
3. Determine the global action suggested by the FLC using the equation 
recommended below: 
𝑎(𝑡) = ∑ 𝛼𝑖(𝑠(𝑡)).
𝑁
𝑖=1  𝑎𝑖(𝑡),                                                                         (3.39) 
where 𝑎(𝑡) denotes the inferred action at time step t, 𝛼𝑖(𝑠(𝑡)) represents the degree of 
truth for rule 𝑖 and  𝑎𝑖(𝑡) indicates the selected action for rule 𝑖. The degree of truth is 
the distance between rule 𝑖 and input state 𝑠(𝑡) and is computed as: 
𝛼𝑖(𝑠(𝑡)) =  ∏𝑗=1
𝐿 𝜇𝑖𝑗 (𝑠𝑗(𝑡)),                                       (3.40) 
where the total amount of FLC inputs is represented by 𝐿 and the membership function 
is represented by 𝜇𝑖𝑗 (𝑠𝑗(𝑡)) for the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ FLC input and rule 𝑖. 
4. The Q-function from the current q*-value and degree of truth for the rules is 
calculated as: 
  Q(s(t), a(t)) = ∑ αi(s(t)). q[i,
N
i=1 αi],                                  (3.41) 
where the value of the Q-function is expressed as 𝑄(𝑠(𝑡), 𝑎(𝑡)) for state 𝑠(𝑡) and action 
𝑎(𝑡) in iteration 𝑡. 
5. The system is allowed to reach the next state, s(t + 1). 
6. After observing the reinforcement signal r(t + 1), find the value of the next 
state labelled Vt(s(t + 1)) using: 
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Vt(s(t + 1)) = ∑ αi(s(t + 1)). maxkq[i,
N
i=1 αk],                                      (3.42) 
7. Calculate the error signal: 
∆𝑄 = 𝑟(𝑡 + 1) + 𝛾. 𝑉𝑡(𝑠(𝑡 + 1)) − 𝑄(𝑠(𝑡), 𝑎(𝑡)),                                        (3.43) 
8. where 𝛾 indicates the discount factor and 𝑟(𝑡 +  1) is the reinforcement signal; 
𝑉𝑡(𝑠(𝑡 + 1)) denotes the value of the new state 𝑄(𝑠(𝑡), 𝑎(𝑡)) signifying the 
value of the Q-function for the previous state and the action performed in that 
previous state. 
9. The q-values are updated using an ordinary descent method described as: 
q[i, ai] ← q[i, ai] + η. ΔQ. αi(s(t)),                                (3.44) 
where 𝜂 indicates the learning rate. 
10. Starting with Step 2, repeat the process to determine the current state. Stop when 
the algorithm reaches convergence. 
When the Q-Learning algorithm is finished, consequents with the highest q-values in 
the look-up table are used to create fuzzy rules. In summary, Algorithm 3.1 briefly 
describes the Fuzzy Q-Learning algorithm steps. 
Finally, as stated in Chapter 2, several works where both non-fuzzy and fuzzy 
Q-Learning algorithms are applied in network optimization problems are available in 
the literature, indicating the effectiveness of combining FLCs and Q-Learning in this 
context.  
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Algorithm 3.1. Fuzzy Q-learning algorithm 
Step 1: Let 𝑡 = 0, 𝑄𝑖
0(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖) = 0 for all 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 
Step 2:  Select an action  for each activated rule ( 𝜀 − 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦): 
𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘 𝑞[𝑖, 𝑘]  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 − 𝜀, 
𝑎𝑖 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 { 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑘 = 1,2, … . , 𝐽}    𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝜀 
Step 3: Calculate the global action: 
𝑎(𝑡) = ∑ αi(s) ∗
N
i=1
(αk) 
Step 4: Approximate the Q-function from the current q-values and the degree of the truth of the rules: 
Q(S(t), a(t)) = ∑ αi(s) ∗
N
i=1 q[i,ai] 
Step 5: Leave the system to evolve to the next state, s(t+1). 
Step 6: Observe the reinforcement signal, r(t+1), and compute the value of the new state denoted by  
Vt(S(t + 1)) = ∑ (s(t + 1)). maxk
N
i=1 Q[S(t),𝑎k] 
Step 7: Calculate the error signal:  
ΔQ=r(t+1)+γ×Vt(s(t+1))-Q(s(t),a), Where γ is a discount factor                                                       
Step 8:  Update New Q-table by an ordinary gradient descent method: 
𝑎[𝑖, 𝑎𝑖] ← 𝑞[𝑖, 𝑎𝑖] ∗ 𝜂ΔQ. 𝑖, 𝛼𝑖(s(t)) 
 
Step 9: Repeat the above-described process starting from step 2 for the new current state until 
convergence is achieved 
Some limitations of this approach are that the optimization process may be 
sensitive to reinforcement signal selection and the fact that the system states must be 
visited a sufficient number of times. However, in favour of the above described 
advantages, the method adopted in this thesis is based on RL.  
As discussed earlier, several studies have examined the effect of using both non-
fuzzy and fuzzy Q-learning algorithms when optimizing networks. These studies 
highlight the benefits of combining FLCs and Q-Learning. However, there are 
limitations as optimization processes are sensitive to reinforcement signals and the 
number of times system states must be visited. Regardless of the limitations, the method 
used in this thesis is based on RL. 
One of the advantages of the reinforcement learning techniques examined in this 
thesis is their ability to enable a single agent to use trial-and-error interactions with the 
environment to learn optimal behaviours. Several RL approaches have been created that 
permit agents to optimize their behaviour in a variety of circumstances. Though 
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traditional approaches are often unsuccessful in situations where multiple learners use 
reinforcement learning in common environments. 
3.5 Adaptation of Multi-agent based Fuzzy Reinforcement learning 
Assumptions are made in multi-agent environments to assure that convergence 
will occur. However, these assumptions are frequently violated. Complexities are 
created even in simple situations where agents share a common, stationary setting and 
are required to only learn a strategy for a single state. In situations where the agents 
have opposing goals there may be no optimal solutions and establishing equilibrium 
between agents becomes the primary goal; essentially, agents are unable to improve 
their payoffs because other agents keep their actions fixed.  
Dynamic environments not only have multiple agents, but they also have 
multiple, sequential decisions that increase their complexity. In these settings, agents 
must coordinate and consider the current state of their dynamic environment with very 
limited information. Typically, agents in dynamic environments cannot observe the 
actions of other agents or see what rewards they obtain as a consequence although the 
actions of the other agents influence their immediate environment along with the 
rewards they can obtain. In very complex environments agents may be unaware that 
other agents are present and may interpret their environment as non-stationary. Similar, 
equally complex environments allow agents to access information, but the state action 
spaces are not conducive to learning because of their complexity and the amount of 
coordination required between agents. Before an effective multi-agent approach can be 
developed, all these challenges must be addressed. A standard multi-agent 
reinforcement learning model is presented in Figure 3.8. 
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Joint state st
Reward rt
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Figure 3.8: Multiple-agents acting in the same environment 
Regardless of learning complexity, the demand for multi-agent systems 
continues to increase. In cases of systems that are decentralized and single, central 
learning methods are impractical. Such systems can be found when data was subjected 
to disruptions caused by multiple, conflicting objectives or if a single centralized 
controller requires too many resources. Multi-robot setups, distributed load balancing, 
decentralized network routing, electronic auctions, and systems designed to control 
traffic are all examples of such system types. 
As a result of the demand for adaptive multi-agent systems and the complexity 
of coping with interacting learners, an increasing number of researchers have worked to 
develop multi-learning reinforcement methods. This field of study uses research on 
reinforcement learning that takes place within AI and the Game Theory. Previous 
studies on the Game Theory concentrated on competitive endeavours, but this field has 
expanded into analysing many different kinds of strategic interactions. Game Theory 
research has attracted the attention of psychologists, economists, biologists, the AI 
community, and computer scientists in general. In this thesis, the Game Theory is used 
to describe how attacks are detected using multi-agent fuzzy reinforcement learning 
techniques and approaches for analysing learning outcomes. 
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The focus of this thesis is on multi-agent systems that contain strategic 
interactions between agents. Agents are seen as autonomous entities with their own 
goals, the ability to make independent decisions, and that are affected by other agents’ 
decisions. These systems are different from systems that use distributed or parallel 
reinforcement learning methods where multiple learners work together to accomplish a 
single objective. These systems can be used in advanced exploration for standard 
reinforcement learning and they rely on the frameworks covered by single agent 
theories, such as the theory described by Tsitsiklis (1994). Examples of distributed or 
parallel systems include methods that divide the learning state space between agents, 
swarm-based methods (Dorigo et al., 2010), and systems where multiple agents work 
together to update policies (Mariano et al., 2001). In distributed and parallel 
reinforcement systems, algorithm convergence is valid if any outdated information will 
be discarded. In other words, the max operator on the right hand side of the Q-learning 
update rule is permitted to use outdated Q values.  
3.6 Game Theory  
The game theory provides a model of strategic interactions based on individuals 
competing against each other in a game. A mathematical object is used to represent the 
game as it outlines the consequences of the interactions between players in terms of the 
rewards to be obtained. AI researchers often rely on extensive game forms where 
players take turns performing an action to model classic minimax algorithms (Russell et 
al., 1995). This chapter concentrates on reinforcement learning with repeated games or 
games in which the players simultaneously perform individual actions. In addition, the 
terminology and concepts used in the Game Theory are also discussed in this chapter.  
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Normal Form Games 
Definition: 
A normal form game can be expressed as (n, A1, . . . , n, R1, . . . , n). In this 
statement, 1, . . . , 𝑛 represents the players, 𝐴𝑘 signifies the finite set of individual actions 
available to player 𝑘, expression 𝑅𝑘 ∶  𝐴1 ×. . .× 𝐴𝑛 → 𝑅 states the individual reward 
function of player 𝑘, and his expected payoff for an action is denoted by 𝒂 ∈  𝐴1 ×. . .×
𝐴𝑛.  
A game begins with each player 𝑘 independently choosing and individual action 
𝒂 from its own private set of actions 𝐴1. The combined actions from all players form a 
joint action or an action profile from a joint actin set 𝐴 = 𝐴1 ×. . .× 𝐴𝑛. The expected 
reward resulting from the joint action is described as ∈ A, 𝑅𝑘(𝑎). 
A payoff matrix can be used to characterize a normal form game. Examples of 
typical 2-player games are shown in Table 3.1. In Table 3.1, the action taken by Player 
1 is represented by a row in the matrix. The actions available to Player 2 are shown in a 
column. The corresponding entry in the matrix identifies the payoffs Player 1 and Player 
2 will receive after they complete their actions. Player 1 is sometimes called the Row 
Player and Player 2 is sometimes known as the Column Player. The use of more 
dimensional matrices in normal form player games can be demonstrated and each entry 
in the matrix records the payoff available to every agent once they complete a series of 
actions.  
Strategy 𝜎𝑘 ∶  𝐴𝑘  → [0,1] is an element of the probability distribution of action 
set 𝐴𝑘 of player 𝑘 described as 𝜇(𝐴𝑘). A pure strategy occurs when 𝜎𝑘(𝑎) = 1 for 
action 𝑎 ∈  𝐴𝑘 and 0 for any other action. If this cannot be shown, the strategy is 
considered mixed. A vector strategy has one strategy for each player and profile 
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𝜎 =  (𝜎1, . . . , 𝜎𝑛). A strategy profile will correspond to a joint action 𝑎 ∈  𝐴 if every 
strategy in 𝜎 is pure. One assumption made in normal form games is that the expected 
payoffs are linear. In other words, the expected reward in strategy profile 𝜎 for player k 
can be expressed as: 
𝑅𝑘(𝜎) = ∑ ∏ 𝜎𝑗(𝑎𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1𝑎∈𝐴  𝑅𝑘(𝑎)      (3.45) 
where 𝑎𝑗  represents the action available to player 𝑗 in the action profile denoted 𝑎.   
Game Types 
The player reward function is used to classify a game. When all players hold a 
reward function in common, the game is classified as an identical payoff of a common 
interest game. A game is a zero-sum game when all the player rewards are equal to 0. In 
zero-sum games, some players win while others experience losses. These games are also 
known as purely competitive games. General sum games refer to games with no special 
restrictions. Examples are given in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Examples of 2-player, 2-action games.  
a1
a2
a1 a2
(1,-1) (-1,1)
(-1,1) (1,-1)
a1
a2
a1 a2
(5,5) (0,10)
(10,0) (1,1)
a1
a2
a1 a2
(5,5) (0,0)
(0,0) (10,10)
a1
a2
a1 a2
(2,1) (0,0)
(0,0) (1,2)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
 
From left to right: (a) Matching pennies, a purely competitive (zero-sum) game; 
(b) The prisoner’s dilemma, a general sum game; (c) The coordination game, a common 
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interest (identical payoff) game; (d) Battle of the sexes, a coordination game where 
agents have different preferences); Pure Nash equilibria are indicated in bold. 
The first game shown in Table 3.2 is also known as the matching pennies game. 
It is an example of a purely competitive game. In the matching pennies game either 
heads or tails is chosen. If both coins are the same Player 1 wins and is rewarded by 
Player 2. If the coins are not the same, Player 2 is the winner and is rewarded by Player 
1. Evidently, a win for one player represents a loss for the other player and meets the 
criteria of a zero-sum game. 
The second game in Table 3.2 is The Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is an example of a 
general sum game. In this game, two criminals are held by the police in separate cells 
after committing a crime. Two possible actions are available to these criminals. They 
can deny mutual participation in the crime (action a1) or they can betray the other 
criminal (action a2). If both criminals take action a1, they will receive a minimal 
sentence (payoff 5). If one criminal implicates the other while the other continues to 
deny involvement in the crime, the cooperative criminal will be released (payoff 10) and 
his partner will be held completely responsible for the crime (payoff 0). The third 
possibility is that both criminals will blame the other and will be incarcerated for several 
years (payoff 1). In this game, the choice of blaming the other criminal dominates and 
could result in the best payoff. This often leads to each criminal betraying the other even 
though they would be better off if they had cooperated. 
In the third game in Table 3.2 each player receives the same payoff if they 
participate in a joint action. Choosing the best joint action leads to the best payoff. A 
suboptimal action results in a less profitable reward and selecting the wrong cooperative 
action means that neither player will receive any reward. This third game is an example 
of a common interest game.  
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The Battle of the Sexes is an instance of the fourth game type illustrated in Table 
3.2. Here, each player will receive their own individual rewards and each prefers 
different outcomes. For example, Player 1 opts for (a1,a1) whereas Player 2 prefers 
(a2,a2). To overcome the coordination challenge presented by their preferences, the 
players must reach a compromise.  
Games are not always limited to two different actions. Table 3.2 shows common 
interest games with three possible actions. A climbing game described by Claus et al. 
(1998) is the first example in Table 3.2. This climbing game illustrates the Nash 
Equilibrium surrounded by severe penalties. In the second game, the penalties are 
shown on the left as parameter k < 0. The harder it is to learn the preferred solution 
((a1,a1) and (a3,a3)), the smaller the value of k will be.  
Table 3.3: Examples of 2-player, 3-action games.  
a1
a2
a3
a1 a2 a3
(11,11) (-30,-30) (0,0)
(7,7)
(0,0) (0,0) (5,5)
(-30,-30) (6,6)
a1
a2
a3
a1 a2 a3
(10,10) (0,0) (k,k)
(2,2)
(k,k) (0,0) (10,10)
(0,0) (0,0)
(a) (b)
 
 
From left to right: (a) Climbing game; (b) Penalty game, where k ≤ 0. Both games are of 
the common interest type. Pure Nash equilibria are indicated in bold. 
Solution Concepts in Games 
It can be difficult to pinpoint the desired outcome of a game because the players 
have different reward functions that are affected by the actions of their competitors. 
Players may not be able to maximize their payoffs as they may not be able to 
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simultaneously reach their goals. The Battle of the Sexes in Table 3.3 is a good example 
of this. 
An important notion behind games represented by The Battle of the Sexes is the 
best response. A best response allows a player to capitalize on their situation in relation 
to the strategies used by their opponents. However, the player will not be able to 
increase the reward if their opponents maintain a fixed strategy. When  𝜎 =
 (𝜎1, . . . , 𝜎𝑛) is the strategy profile, 𝜎−𝑘 represents the same strategy profile without 
strategy 𝜎𝑘 of player k. The best response for strategy 𝜎𝑘
∗ ∈  𝜇(𝐴𝐾) of player k is when:  
𝑅𝑘(𝜎−𝑘 ∪ 𝜎𝑘
∗) ≥  𝑅𝑘(𝜎−𝑘 ∪ 𝜎𝑘
′ ) ∀𝜎𝑘
′ ∈  𝜇(𝐴𝑘)    (3.46) 
where 𝜎−𝑘 ∪ 𝜎𝑘
′  is the strategy profile when all players use the same strategy they used 
in σ except for player k who uses 𝜎𝑘
′ , i.e. (𝜎1, . . . , 𝜎𝑘−1, 𝜎𝑘
′ , 𝜎𝑘+1, … , 𝜎𝑛). 
The Nash equilibrium mentioned above is an instance of a central solution. 
When using the Nash equilibrium, all players act on their mutual, best replies. Every 
normal form game has a minimum of one Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950). The Nash 
equilibrium for each player can be expressed as a strategy profile of  (𝜎1, . . . , 𝜎𝑛) . 
Strategy 𝜎𝑘 represents the best response to the strategies a player’s opponents signified 
by 𝜎−𝑘. No player can enhance their reward or payoff if they deviate from playing the 
Nash equilibrium. As a result, a single player has no motivation to independently 
change their strategy. The only way to escape the Nash equilibrium is for several 
players to change their strategies simultaneously.  
Definition. A strategy profile 𝜎 =  (𝜎1, . . . , 𝜎𝑛)  is called the Nash equilibrium if for 
each player k, strategy 𝜎𝑘 is the best response to the strategies of the other players 𝜎−𝑘. 
Thus, when playing the Nash equilibrium, no player in the game can improve 
their payoff by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium strategy profile. As such, no 
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player has an incentive to change their strategy, and multiple players must change their 
strategies simultaneously in order to escape the Nash equilibrium.  
Justification of the selected technique  
Amongst the techniques explained in the literature review, the game theory-
based RL was selected in this thesis. The main reasons for discarding the other 
alternatives as well as for choosing a game-based RL method is discussed subsequently. 
First, although Neural Networks have been successfully applied in many 
applications, this artificial intelligence technique has some limitations and 
disadvantages. On the one hand, neural networks are especially appropriate for 
prediction, function approximation, classification, pattern recognition, and clustering, 
which are not tackled in this thesis, and they mainly focus on developing control 
techniques. An important drawback is that neural networks require a large diversity of 
training for real-world operation, which can be a severe constraint in complex systems 
such as real-time traffic monitoring in networks. In addition, neural networks cannot be 
trained a second time, in the sense that it is very hard to add new data to an existing 
network. Finally, they require abundant computational resources and high processing 
time for large neural networks.  
Secondly, although genetic algorithms are easily understood and transferred to 
current simulations and models and do not require advanced mathematical skills, they 
also have several important limitations and disadvantages including:  
 There is no solid guarantee that a global optimum will be found by a genetic 
algorithm. Global optimums typically occur with larger populations. 
 Genetic algorithms involve the problem of genetic drift, which is a major 
problem of genetic algorithms. This means that the genetic algorithm may 
quickly lose most of its genetic diversity and the search then occurs in a way that 
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is not beneficial for recombination. This is because the random initial population 
rapidly converges. 
 Genetic algorithms face limitations with control problems that are executed in 
real-time due to convergence and random solutions.  This indicates 
improvements have been made in the entire population but those improvements 
cannot be extrapolated to an individual within the population. As a result, it is 
ineffective and impractical not to test genetic algorithms on simulation models 
prior to using them in on-line control in real systems.  
It is worth mentioning that in the context of this thesis, network operators may 
be reluctant to implement this kind of algorithms since the solutions found by genetic 
algorithms can remain at a certain distance from the optimum with higher probability, 
leading to suboptimal performance in an undetermined amount of time. In addition, the 
slow convergence of this technique can also be an issue in real systems, such as 
networks, even if an off-line control is applied. 
Third, in particle swarm optimization, there are some important limitations 
related to the optimization of an FLC in the context of networks (Gupta et al., 2005). In 
particular, particle swarm optimization involves loss of information in the global cost 
functions, since performance indicators are globally measured in the concerned network 
area. Thus, the situation at sensor nodes cannot be considered. In addition, this 
optimization method has to compare the evolution of many particles, each of which 
represents a different FLC setting. As a result, to assess the position of each particle, the 
corresponding FLC should be evaluated in many sensors, thus requiring exclusive use 
of simulation tools. The lack of flexibility and generality in defining FLC is also a 
constraint for particle swarm optimization. In this sense, when adding new inputs or 
performance indicators to the FLC, the optimization phase must be launched, although 
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certain a priori knowledge can be included at the beginning. Other disadvantages of the 
basic particle swarm optimization algorithm are covered by Gaing (2004) and Shi 
(2001). These disadvantages of the algorithm include slow convergence during the 
refined search stage, ineffective local search capabilities, and possible entrapment in the 
local minimum. Currently, there are no mathematical proofs of the convergence and 
speed of convergence for this algorithm. 
Finally, in Game-based IDPS, the combination of FLCs and fuzzy Q-Learning 
algorithm is highlighted as a powerful mechanism in the context of networks for the 
following reasons: 
 Attacks in networks are complex and variable systems, in which obtaining a 
training data set that is representative of all situations becomes a difficult task. 
Unlike other approaches (e.g. supervised learning in Neural Networks), Fuzzy Q-
learning does not require a training data set. 
 Due to the complexity of network management, operators do not usually have the 
knowledge necessary (i.e. accurate and complete) to take proper action in every 
attack situation. In this case, learning from interaction becomes a suitable solution, 
where a multi agent is able to learn from its own experience to perform the best 
actions. 
 It is possible to perform the optimization at a distributed level, so that many FQL 
agents can learn in parallel. To achieve this, measurements should be taken in the 
area of a network. In addition, the cooperative-based fuzzy Q-Learning method 
provides operators generality to easily introduce, for instance new performance 
indicators in IDPS. 
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3.7 Collaborative-IIDPS Architecture 
To design a Collaborative IIDPS (Co-IIDPS) based on a comprehensive set of 
requirements for networks, the special characteristics of a distributed framework 
structure are scrutinized in this thesis, within Smart Grid networks with Collaborative 
IIDPS as proposed by Patel et al. (2013). Figure 3.9 shows the combination of Network 
and Host-based IDPS (NIDPS, HIDPS) in a fully distributed framework structure in a 
Smart Grid networking environment with Collaborative-IDPS. This formation is readily 
applicable to any network. 
Smart IDPS (SIDPS)
Network-based  IDPS(NIDPS)
Host-based  IDPS (HIDPS)
Collaborative Smart IDPS (CSIDPS)  
Figure 3.9: Combination of NIDPS and HIDPS in a distributed Smart Grid Network (CIDPS) 
The monitored environment of an IDPS is typically specified as:  
 A network-based IDPS monitors network traffic for particular network segments or 
devices, and analyses the network and protocol behaviour to identify suspicious 
activities. 
 A host-based IDPS monitors all or parts of the dynamic behaviour and 
state of a computer system. Unlike NIDPS, which dynamically inspects network 
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packets, HIDPS detects which programs access what resources. HIDPS has the 
advantage of being easier to deploy without affecting existing infrastructure 
compared to NIDS, which detects attacks at the transport protocol layer via quick 
responses. However, a combination of both HIDPS and NIDPS solves the problem 
of assimilation and scalability through collaborative management.  
Due to the IIDPS complexity in a network, this chapter incorporates three newly 
defined concepts of detection management: Fuzzy Reinforcement Learning 
Management (FRLM), Knowledge Management (KM), and Multi-agent Management 
(MA) into the core architectural design of CIDPS (Figure 3.9). Management flows from 
the module of computational intelligence intrusion detection through an intermediate 
section are viewed as a fuzzy reinforcement learner, and knowledge and multi-agent 
managers, and are expected to respond to intrusions in WSN. The correlation flows are 
developed according to the collaborative-IDPS and desired IIDPS characteristics. The 
purpose of the thesis encompasses three concepts, namely fuzzy system, reinforcement 
learning and a multi-agent system. They are intended to design an efficient system that 
meets the Collaborative-IIDPS (Co-IIDPS) requirements. 
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Figure 3.10: Enhanced Collaborative-IIDPS functionality architecture within a network 
Figure 3.10 shows the Co-IIDPS functions. The first layer shows the traditional 
system components that monitor and collect the audit data through the sensors, analyse 
the data and detect intrusions, generate alarms and herald the proper response through 
the actuators. The advanced components seen in layer two are drawn from the four 
proposed concepts. 
The advanced components employ computational intelligence (CI) techniques 
such as soft computing (e.g. neuro-fuzzy systems) and machine learning (e.g. a 
reinforcement learning system) to detect intrusions and feed the obtained results into the 
autonomic solution mode components comprising a self-optimizer, self-learning, and 
self-configuration. Self-learning and self-optimizing are defined in autonomic 
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computing principles in real-time without human intervention. The proposed 
collaborative IIDPS system architecture is illustrated and presented as a workflow 
scenario to show the way it functions in 8 steps as numbered in brackets. The arrows 
point out the information flow between components while the dash arrows indicate the 
logical communications between the components.  
Inputs from Autonomic Wireless Environment Components: 
The processor, memory, RF radio, power source, and actuators constitute the 
wireless network components. The interactions between them generate and prepare the 
input sensor signals from the wireless environment. The signals together with the events 
or latest challenges pass through the intelligent intrusion detection and prevention 
system (IIDPS) components for analysis. The monitoring, detection, alarm generation 
and response utilize computational intelligence methods to mitigate IDPS. 
Latest IIDPS Challenges & Enterprise IIDPS Policies: 
The Intrusion Detection and Response System (IDRS) Policies and Latest 
Challenges to networks fall into the computational intelligence intrusion detection 
module of autonomic network -based IDPS, as mentioned in Step 1. An event entering 
the system is checked to determine whether it is an intrusion. If it is an intrusion, the 
Intrusion Detection Engine (IDE) takes full responsibility for analysing and identifying 
the type of attack. 
Computational Intelligence Intrusion Detection Systems (CIIDS): 
Various CIIDS techniques have been suggested in this architecture. Machine 
learning and soft computing are the main CIIDS methods. Reinforcement learning (RL) 
together with fuzzy sets (FS) serves as a feature extraction selector and classifier of 
machine learning for Co-IIDPS. The results of signal classification for intrusion 
detection are relayed to the inference engine. 
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Inference Engine (IE): 
The IE is a logical, key division of the Co-IIDPS. The IE performs based on the 
latest computational intelligence techniques, fronted and equipped with fuzzy 
reinforcement learning management.  
Fuzzy Reinforcement Learning Management: 
The fuzzy reinforcement learning (FRL) management (FRLM) of this Co-IIDPS 
architecture includes reinforcement learning (RL) and fuzzy sets (FS). Given an 
anomaly incident, FRLM is internally analysed and it updates the Q-value of the 
learner’s agent. If necessary, it automatically updates a newly discovered intrusion 
incident by applying anomaly calculator component-based computational intelligence 
and knowledge management techniques in recursive iteration of its execution cycle. 
 Knowledge Management: 
In order to share knowledge and allow collaboration between other managers 
(i.e. Fuzzy Reinforcement Learning and Multi-agent managers), the knowledge manager 
(KM) uses four types of decision mechanism: policy, ontology, anomaly profile and 
knowledge-based. The knowledge-based component directly connects to CIDPS to store 
the process of training and testing CI algorithms. The purpose of decision ontology 
(DO) is to provide a basis for representing, anomaly modelling and probing the decision 
to identify abnormal behaviour. The policy works as an action selector and uses an 
executer agent. The action policy of the KM mechanism adapts to FRL to cluster the 
incidents according to severity and raise an alarm.  
Multi-agent Management: 
A multi-agent manager prioritizes an anomaly according to a victim’s 
vulnerability. There are three possible scenarios in this state. The first case is pattern 
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collection through the data collector agent (DC). In the second case, if the incident is a 
severe intrusion or low intrusion, the analyser agent (AA) and decision agent (DA) are 
associated to the ontology and knowledge base, which comprise the computational 
intelligence techniques for intrusion identification. The third possible situation is related 
to the executor agent (EA) that is shielded from intrusions before any data loss or 
damage happens. It provides the impetus for the system to self-learn against any attacks, 
as well simultaneously purvey for protection and prevention capabilities further down 
the chain in the autonomic mode of operation. 
Self-optimizing, Self-learning, and Self-response: 
The second case in Step 7 is indicative of some parts having already been 
attacked or even infected. In the case of action selection, the penetration tracks in Co-
IIDPS activate the self-optimizing component to ensure the system protects itself. The 
third situation refers to intrusion blocked prior to any data loss taking place. Here, the 
system automatically enters a self-learning state. In both circumstances, the self-
optimizing state is triggered directly after Knowledge Management and self-learning are 
performed after Fuzzy Reinforcement Learning Management to protect the system by 
either computational intelligence fuzzy methods or reinforcement learning, or a 
combination. These methods are triggered to protect the system by updating the Co-
IIDPS as a whole. Their actions are defined by the Inference Engine component in Co-
IIDPS. Signals are then sent to activate actuators to execute prevention in the network 
environment. 
3.8 Discussion 
The discussion is expanded with the proposal of a new architecture to detect and 
prevent intrusions in a network, by combining computational intelligence and multi-
agent based computational intelligence approaches. A novel collaborative-based IIDPS 
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(Co-IIDPS) architecture was proposed and presented. It demonstrates the impact of a 
Multi-agent system-based computational intelligence (MCI) technique on enhancing 
detection efficiency and false alarm rates. This architecture portrays the clear notion of 
cooperative learning-based detection to satisfy the requirements of IIDPS. The projected 
architecture defines three detection means of management: Fuzzy Reinforcement 
Learning Management, Knowledge Management, and Multi-agent Management. In 
conclusion, the detection management techniques can be improved by minimizing the 
false alarm rates and increasing the detection rates in addition to decreasing energy 
consumption in networks. In the next chapter, with the intent of validating the proposed 
architecture, the aim is to design and develop the aforementioned detection management 
components using game theoretic approaches.  
3.9 Chapter Summary 
In the context of Co-IIDPS, adaptive game theoretic techniques are adequate for 
network parameter optimization due to network complexity and dynamism. The main 
benefits of applying such techniques are cost savings and improved network 
performance. This chapter began with a description of potential network self-tuning 
approaches. In this analysis, the use of a network model was discarded, since 
constructing a network model that is accurate and manageable is usually a complex task 
that may lead to poor performance as well.  
Thus, the schemes adopted in this thesis are based on self-tuning entities that 
interact directly with the network. In such cases, a closed-loop structure is used to find 
the optimal parameter settings. For this reason, the next part of the chapter focused on 
controllers based on the Fuzzy Logic theory, as this discipline provides a mathematical 
framework especially appropriate for designing controllers. Its potential lies in the 
capability to express knowledge in a similar way to human perception and reasoning.  
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The second topic in this chapter was devoted to mathematical approaches that 
can be used to optimize and adapt the behaviour of FLCs. The first technique is Neural 
Networks, which typically requires a training data set that can be a severe constraint in 
networks. In addition, neural networks are more suitable for other kinds of problems 
(e.g. prediction, classification, pattern recognition, and clustering), which differ from 
the control problem addressed in this thesis. Secondly, the main feature of Genetic 
Algorithms was described, showing that their application in control problems performed 
in real-time is limited owing to random solutions and convergence. Third, the basic 
concepts of the Particle Swarm approach were presented, highlighting its application to 
FLC optimization involving some important limitations, such as lack of flexibility and 
generality in defining the FLC. Finally, this chapter was devoted to RL, which is the 
method selected amongst the previously described ones. The main benefit of this 
approach is that RL algorithms learn from interaction, which becomes essential in 
complex systems such as networks. 
The third topic in this chapter dealt with the proposal of game theoretic 
approaches that can be used to optimize and adapt the behaviour of Fuzzy Q-learning. 
The reinforcement learning manager emerged as a result of applying fuzzy techniques to 
Co-IIDPS, leading to robust, fault-tolerant and easy to manage and operate WN 
architectures and deployments. Knowledge management enables the characterization of 
anomaly profile knowledge as a set of related concepts within an anomaly calculator 
domain. The policy aspect of a multi-agent manager is thus utilized to predict anomaly 
behaviour.  In summary, the scalable, fully distributed structure of our system exposes 
the risks of low accuracy detection and difficulty in synchronizing information between 
autonomous agents.  
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Chapter 4 : GAME THEORETIC APPROACH USING FUZZY Q-LEARNING  
The novelty of this study lies in the proposal of a game theoretic framework, 
namely the cooperative Game-based Fuzzy Q-learning (G-FQL) in order to identify 
attackers and appropriately respond to them. The aim is to facilitate an intelligent 
intrusion detection and response mode. Thus, the current evaluation study is significant 
in that the feasibility and suitability of the framework are highlighted. 
In this chapter, the game framework design is first explained in three sub-
sections: the player strategies, the player payoff function, and an analysis of the reward 
function. In addition, a utility function is employed to evaluate the effectiveness and 
performance of the model. A detailed explanation of the fuzzy Q-learning adapted to the 
game theory is also given.  
The game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that deals with the way 
rational entities or agents make decisions in the application of WSNs (Huang et al., 
2013), cognitive radio networks (Elias et al., 2011), and ad hoc networks (Naserian et 
al., 2009). It affords an array of mathematics tools for modelling and analysing the 
interactions among rational groups, whereby rationalism is founded on the profit or 
reward perceived by the entities (Shoham et al., 2009). An anomaly-based wireless 
network in the game-theoretic approach is a tremendously difficult task on account of 
the distributed nature of numerous players in WSNs. A large number of players 
additionally results in difficulty achieving equilibrium in a competitive game. To deal 
with a certain type of attack in wireless networks, Naserian et al. (2009) included an 
assortment of games, for instance non-cooperative, two-player, and non-zero-sum to 
their stratagem. In such game arrangements, better decisions are made according to the 
principles offered by payoff functions. Shen et al. (2011) took into account the 
signalling game to create an IDPS game that exhibits the interaction between an attacker 
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and cluster head in a WSN. The Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) scheme in 
conjunction with the mixed strategy for outstanding detection policies served as the 
basis for their model. Thus, an ideal, fundamental shield tactic to protect WSNs was 
achieved, while the probability of detecting attacks was simultaneously, considerably 
enhanced.  
A multi-agent system utilizes the reputation security mechanism to perform 
dynamic role assignment based on the following three parameters: reputation, bootstrap 
time and energy. The approach evicts highly non-cooperative and malicious nodes from 
the network (Misra et al., 2011). An adaptive learning routing protocol employs a 
learning automata algorithm for efficient malicious node detection (Rolla et al., 2013). 
The multilayer reinforcement learning framework assisted by the Hidden Markov 
Model (HMM) was proposed to solve real-time detection in a complex state space 
(Andersen et al., 2009). The results indicated that the network’s cost function could be 
optimized if the agents collaborated repeatedly. In our proposed scheme, the 
cooperative game is implemented into IDPS to generate the benefits of a fuzzy Q-
learning algorithm with a value function to mitigate the flooding attack issue in a WSN 
with respect to detection and defence accuracy. Resource loss, accuracy of attack 
detection via sensors, and service inaccessibility at critical times are among the 
challenges posed, and in this thesis, an effort is made to confront the security setbacks 
by applying the cooperative game-based fuzzy system and reinforcement learning 
mechanism. 
4.1  Proposed model 
4.1.1 WSN model 
In the present research study, Figure 4.1 illustrates the distributed network with 
hierarchical routing, which consists of Clusters (C), their coordinators, or Cluster Heads 
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(CHs), as well as the member Sensor Nodes (S). In the current scheme, the Cluster Head 
(CH) is assumed to be a Sink Node (SN) in each cluster. The SN monitors the behaviour 
of sensor nodes by collecting data from the member sensor nodes and transmitting the 
critical status -- the attack information of the sensor nodes, to a Base Station (BS). Each 
cluster is mapped into distributed system formation while the set of sensor nodes is 
mapped into each cluster grouping. Although only one BS is shown in Figure 4.1, there 
could practically be several implemented in a real operational WSN. 
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Figure 4.1:A distributed hierarchical system perspective of a WSN  
The route from a sensor node (S) to a base station (BS) is deemed a distributed-
hierarchical path that creates a hierarchical system with numerous routes, which is the 
main feature of cluster-based WSNs. Sensor nodes function independently to avoid the 
collapse of all sensor nodes (SNs) in case one fails. The sensor node redundancy 
approach increases the overall reliability in distributed hierarchical systems. Figure 4.1 
illustrates how SNs send data gathered from a sink node to a BS via other adjacent SNs, 
and the BS receives data only if all SNs within the routing formation are actively 
functioning. Hence, a set of clusters on a route is counted as a set of independent 
distributed-connected elements. Attacks in this scenario can target the WSN in multiple 
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ways, with DDoS attacks potentially originating either from the Internet or 
neighbouring wireless sensor sources. 
4.1.2 Methodologies and Techniques Used 
Game-based detection and the defence mechanism operate to detect DDoS 
attacks, where the sink node and base station adapt to select the best strategy of 
detecting an immediate attack and responding to it. Regardless of whether attacks are 
carried out on a regular or irregular basis, the IDPS can adjust its learning parameters 
through fuzzy Q-learning to identify future attacks. The architecture of the proposed 
game-based FQL is dual, in that it has two phases (Figure 4.2). 
Phase 1: In the primary game scenario stage, player 1 (the sink node) utilizes the 
fuzzy Q-Learning algorithm to identify the level of disruption caused by the attacking 
player to the victim node, leading to anomalies such as low access or damage. For 
attacker player detection, the sink player adopts three strategies: catch, missed, and low 
catch, as elaborated in player strategies applied to the sink node. Finally, the sink node 
transmits an alarm event that contains malicious node information to the base station 
(player 3) via an adjacent link connected to the base station (Figure 4.2). The malicious 
information is pre-processed by the sink node to travel from phase 1 to 2 based on the 
alarm event beyond the default value threshold, in order to prepare a countermeasure 
strategy against the attacker through a defence mechanism.  
Phase 2: In the second phase of the game scenario, player 2 (the base station) 
employs the fuzzy Q-learning algorithm to confirm the malicious node’s behaviour. It 
checks the memory of player 1 or looks it up in a table and compares it with its memory 
in order to defend against the attacker. The detection player (sink node) and defence 
player (base station) coordinate their defence with each other to shield the wireless 
sensor nodes against the attacker player (attack/intrusion). 
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Figure 4.2: Model of a Cooperative Game-based IDPS and an attacker 
To highlight the proposed game-based FQL, the sink node and the base station 
are allocated a corresponding reward/incentive functional value, which is retained by 
the Fuzzy Q-learning IDPS. As such, a node’s evolving fuzzy state may be recorded and 
quantified through the fuzzy reward utility function as discussed in the player payoff 
function. When a node encounters an attack or receives an anonymous message, the 
sink node sends the related severity alarm event evidence and messages to the BS, who 
then analyses the critical data to adjust the FQL parameters. Based on the sink node 
information, the base station decides which nodes are under attack or at risk and elects 
whether to safeguard them or not. The BS previously set a severity alarm event 
threshold rate, v. Once the severity alarm value acquired by a node exceeds v, the FQL 
IDPS deems the node under attack or at risk and strengthens its defences to secure the 
cluster area in which the node is detected at the associated base station. 
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4.1.3 Possible attack categories 
In this thesis, the Open System Interconnect (OSI) model is classified into five 
layers (Akyildiz et al., 2002): Physical layer, Link/MAC layer, Network layer, 
Transport layer, and Application layer. The attacks in each layer are analysed by 
focusing on the flooding attack and its potential defences. In the proposed scheme, a 
specific kind of DDoS attack is created with respect to a flooding attack that affects 
cluster heads. The generated attack sends flooding UDP packets to diminish the cluster 
head’s energy.  
Table 4.1: Classification of Denial-of-Service attacks and defence at each protocol layer 
Protocol Layer Attack Defense Mechanism 
Application Layer Overwhelming (McGregory, 2013) Sensor tuning 
Data aggregation 
Path-based DoS (B. Li et al., 2009) Authentication and anti-
replay protection 
Deluge (reprogramming) attack Authentication and anti-
replay protection 
Authentication streams 
Transport Layer SYN (synchronize) flood (Bicakci et al., 2009) SYN cookies 
De-synchronization attack (Xing et al., 2010) Packet authentication 
Network Layer Spoofing, replaying, or altering routing control 
traffic or clustering message (Qazi et al., 2013) 
“Authentication and anti-
replay protection secure 
cluster formation” 
Hello floods (Khalil et al., 2010) “Pairwise authentication” 
“Geographic routing” 
Homing, black-hole attack (Khalil et al., 2012) Header encryption 
Dummy packets 
Link/MAC (medium 
access control) 
Jamming (Law et al., 2005) Authentication and anti-
replay protection 
Denial of sleep (Law et al., 2009) Authentication and anti-
replay protection 
Detect and sleep 
Broadcast attack 
protection 
Physical Layer Jamming (Z. Li et al., 2012) Detect and sleep 
Route around jammed 
regions 
Node tampering or destruction (Xing et al., 2010) Hide or camouflage 
nodes 
Tamper-proof packaging 
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Table 4.1 indicates the impact of such attacks on WSN layers as well as the 
defence mechanism. In this thesis, a type of DDoS attack is considered. It is 
characterized by the presence of an attacker, and is known as a UDP flooding attack. In 
the proposed model, a UDP flooding attack occurs based on a random function to 
compromise the CH in each cluster. This kind of DDoS attack is aimed at exhausting 
CH energy by sending flooding packets in a fraction of time (Ghosal et al., 2013).  
4.2 The architecture of cooperative game-based FQL IDPS 
The proposed game-based defence strategy is primarily a combination of the 
cooperative game theory and fuzzy Q-learning algorithm. The game-based detection 
and defence mechanism work to detect DDoS attacks, where the sink node and base 
station adapt to select the ideal strategy of detecting an immediate attack and respond to 
it. Regardless of whether the attacks are carried out on a regular or irregular basis, the 
IDPS can adjust its learning parameters through fuzzy Q-learning to identify future 
attacks. A comprehensive description of the theoretical and practical operation of the 
game theory and Q-learning modes, mainly concerning Fuzzy Q-learning, is provided 
later. Cooperative game-based architecture in a wireless network is proposed as well 
(Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: Game-based defense system architecture 
 
In the primary stage of the game scenario, player 1 (the sink node) utilizes the 
FQL algorithm to evaluate the contents of the attacker player’s level of access (i.e. low 
access, or damage). With regard to detection, the sink node player assumes three 
strategies, namely catch, missed or low catch. Upon completing the first stage, the sink 
node transmits an alarm to the base station (player 3) when the attacker assaults the 
sensor node. In the second phase of the game scenario, player 3 (the base station) 
employs the FQL algorithm to evaluate the attack records in order to defend against the 
attacker. The detection player (the sink node) and defence player (the base station) 
participate in a game via a 3D game interface to shield the wireless sensor nodes against 
the attacker player (the attack). 
4.2.1 Game Design 
In the proposed game theory method, it is assumed that the sink node can 
identify abnormalities in view of IDS1. Accordingly, in computer-generated WSNs, the 
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sink player or cluster head diffuses the alarm to the base station (IDS2) upon perceiving 
an anomaly. When the IDS1 receives an anomaly message, it acquaints itself with this 
sort of attack using the FQL detection algorithm and archives the information in its 
attack record database. The IDS2 attempts to respond to these attack records. The 
fundamental concepts of the proposed game theory, player strategies and player payoff 
function are introduced next.  
Player strategies 
The interactions between the G-FQL and attackers are split into two main 
categories (Tables 4.2 and 4.3 respectively). The first category represents a game 
between an attacker and sink node players, while the second type denotes a game 
between an attacker and base station player. The game play strategy between a sink 
node and an attacker with respect to IDS1 comprises:  
 
1) Best choice for sink: The sink node chooses to identify the attacker, and the 
invader opts to attack. 
2) False negative: The sink node chooses not to identify the attacker, and the 
attacker strikes.  
3) Medium choice: The sink node chooses to identify the attacker with low catch, 
and the attacker attacks. 
4) False positive: The sink node elects to detect the attacker, and the attacker 
chooses not to attack. 
5) Least damage: The sink node chooses not to identify the attacker, and the 
attacker chooses not to attack. 
6) False positive: The sink node chooses to identify the attacker with low catch, 
and the attacker chooses not to attack.  
 
Table 4.2: Game play between a sink node (IDS1) and an attacker 
Game play between sink node 
and attacker 
Sink 
Catch Missed Low Catch 
Attacker 
Attack 
(a11,b11) = Best 
choice for sink 
(a12,b12) = False 
Negative 
(a13,b13) = Medium 
choice for sink node 
No attack 
(a21,b21) = False 
Positive 
(a22,b22) = Least 
Damage 
(a23,b23) = False positive 
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The game strategy between a base station and an attacker concerning IDS2 is defined 
as:  
1) Best choice for base station: BS elects to defend and the attacker decides to 
attack;  
2) False positive: BS elects to defend, and the attacker chooses not to attack; 
3) False negative: BS elects not to defend, and the attacker attacks; 
4) Least damage: BS elects not to defend, and the attacker chooses not to attack. 
Table 4.3: Game play between a base station (IDS2) and an attacker 
Game play between base station and 
attacker 
Base station 
Defend Do not defend 
Attacker 
Attack (a11,c11) = Best choice for sink (a12,c12) = False Negative 
No attack (a21,c21) = False Positive (a22,c22) = Least Damage 
 
The player payoff function 
In this thesis, a payoff value is defined as a player reward function if it protects 
the WSN. In other words, when the IDPS fails to defend the WSN in case an invader 
attacks, the player’s payoff would be different. The three player payoffs are expressed 
as A, B, and C, where 𝑎𝑖𝑗, 𝑏𝑖𝑗, and 𝑐𝑖𝑗 denote the sink node, attack and base station 
payoff, respectively. Table 4 displays the payoff matrix, utility function as well as a 
description of the utility function. 
Table 4.4: The payoff matrix and utility functions 
Payoff 
function 
Payoff 
matrix 
Utility function Description of Utility function 
Attacker’s 
payoff 
function 
A =
[𝑎𝑖𝑗]2∗3 
𝑎𝑖𝑗
= 𝐼𝑅
− 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔  
𝐼𝑅 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 
Sink 
Node’s 
payoff 
function 
B =
[𝑏𝑖𝑗]2∗3 
𝑏𝑖𝑗
= 𝑃𝑑
− 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡  
𝑃𝑑= (
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
) 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡
= 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑘’𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 
Base 
station’s 
payoff 
function 
C =
[𝑐𝑖𝑗]2∗2 
𝐶𝑖𝑗
= 𝑃𝑘 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑  
𝑃𝑘 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑
= 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 
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Attacker’s payoff function 
The attacker’s payoff matrix A = [𝑎𝑖𝑗]2∗3 is defined as follows: 
𝐴𝑖𝑗= [
𝑎11 𝑎12 𝑎13
𝑎21 𝑎22 𝑎23
]
𝑖∗𝑗
 
where  a11 = IR − Costprocessing represents (
Number of malicious attacks
Total malicious attacks sent
) −
 ( processing time for attack), which is when an attacker and the sink node choose the 
same sensor nodes to attack and detect, respectively (AS1, SS1). The attacker’s original 
utility value of U(t) will be deducted from the cost of attacks. a12 = IR − Costprocessing 
represents an instance when the attacker attacks and the sink node does not detect it 
correctly. However, a13 = IR − Costprocessing, means that an attacker hits and the sink 
node detects a compromised node with a low rate of detection.  a21 = Costprocessing, 
signifies that an attacker does not attack at all, but the sink node falsely detects the 
attacker. By subtracting IR =  (
Number of malicious attacks
Total malicious attacks sent
) from the original utility 
function, a22 = Costprocessing signifies that the attacker and sink node choose two 
different strategies, neither of which causes an attack nor detects an attack correctly, 
respectively. In this case, the cost of attacking one node from the original utility is 
ignored. When a23 = Costprocessing, it signifies that the attacker does not attack and the 
sink node detects the attack with low probability/performance.  
Sink node payoff function 
By denoting the sink node’s payoff with matrix 𝐵 = [𝑏𝑖𝑗]2∗3we get: 
𝐵𝑖𝑗= 
[
𝑏11 = 𝑃𝑑 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏12 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏13 = 𝑃𝑑 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡
𝑏21 = 𝑃𝑑 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏22 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑏23 = 𝑃𝑑 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡
]
𝑖∗𝑗
 
where: 
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𝑃𝑑 = (
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
) 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡:  is the cost of attack detection during sink processing 
Base station payoff function 
By describing the base station’s payoff function with matrix C= [𝑐𝑖𝑗]2∗2, it is defined 
as: 𝐶𝑖𝑗= [
𝐶11 𝐶12
𝐶21 𝐶22
]
2∗2
 
where 𝐶11 = 𝑃𝑘 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑 denotes 
(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠) − (𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘), which is 
when a base station and attacker opt for the same sensor nodes to attack and defend, 
respectively. 
Reward function analysis 
According to a three-player game, two constant reward values are defined as: R1 
for the gain of the IDS1 when the sink node identifies the WSN, and reward value R2, 
or positive reward, as the gain of the IDS2 when the base station protects the WSN. If 
the sink node does not identify the WSN during the attack, the IDS1 reward would be –
R1 (a negative reward). Likewise, if the base station fails to defend the WSN during an 
attack, the IDS2 payoff would be –R2. An explanation of the correlated 
reward/incentive functions of a sensor node and base station is provided in Table 4.5. 
To detect a potential, future DDoS attack on a sensor node, Fuzzy Q-learning is applied 
to enhance the self-learning ability of the IDS1 and IDS2 processes. The Fuzzy Q-
learning supplies the IDPS with a learning mechanism, but the self-learning ability of 
the Q-learning IDS can evolve during the learning process, something that takes 
learning time, especially at the beginning. Through such self-iterative learning, IDSs are 
capable of protecting sensor nodes from recognizable potential attacks in ongoing, 
active WSNs. 
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Table 4.5: Notations associated with the reward functions of a sink node and base station 
T T = {0, 1, …, k −1} denotes the set of time in a Markov process 
S The fuzzy state space of a sensor node, where the initial state is S0, and the next state of si is 
si+1 for I ∈ T 
D1, 
D2 
The set of detection strategies  
-R1,-
R2 
The payoff incurred at a false negative incident 
Fuzzy Q-learning is a discrete-time fuzzy-based Markovian procedure. When the 
process is at time t and fuzzy state FSt, the Decision Maker may choose to perform a 
fuzzy action. The process responds with a corresponding fuzzy reward for the decision 
maker at time (t+1) and moves to fuzzy state Fst+1. The interaction details and 
information are as follows. Based on the Fuzzy Q-learning concept, a function fx(1): 
FS1 → FD1 × FA1 is defined to demonstrate the detection and attack strategies for node 
x at a specific interval in IDS1. For instance, fx(state 1) = (d1, a1) depicts (d1, a1), 
which is a combination of the detection and attack strategies when the sink node transits 
from state st to st+1, and the reward established by x is defined as R1(fx(st)), which is 
given in (Eq. 4.1): 
𝑅1(𝑓𝑥(𝑆𝑡))
= {
0          (𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑑 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑅 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤)
 𝑅1      (𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑑 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑅 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤)
−𝑅1        ( 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑑 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ)𝑜𝑟  (𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑅 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤)
(4.1)  
In the first case of Eq.4, no detection and no attack are defined. Accordingly, the 
reward is fixed at 0. The second case is when the sink node detects an attack with high 
accuracy, and its reward is R1. In the last case, 
(𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑑 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ) 𝑜𝑟 (𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑅 =
𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤), where the sink node employs strategy 𝑃𝑑 with low 
processing cost and high detection accuracy to identify attack strategy IR with low 
attack and low processing cost, the reward is –R1. The first term, (𝑃𝑑), represents the 
gain of employing the sink node’s strategy to detect attack strategy ai, 
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and (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ) represents the cost of using the strategy. The second term, (𝐼𝑅), 
represents the gain of utilizing the attack strategy with the processing cost for the 
attacker. 
In the IDS2 scenario, the reward function incorporates the shield policy and 
attack strategy when the BS transits from state st to st+1, and the reward received by the 
base station is defined as R2(fx(st)), as given in (Eq. 4.2): 
𝑅2(𝑓𝑥(𝑆𝑡))
= {
0       ( 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑘 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤) 𝑜𝑟  (𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑅 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤)
 𝑅2   (𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑘 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤)𝑜𝑟  (𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑅 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤)
−𝑅2       (𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑘 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ)𝑜𝑟  (𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑅 = ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑙𝑜𝑤)
     (4.2)  
In Eq. 4.2, the first case signifies no defence and no attack. Therefore, the 
reward is set to 0. In case two, when the base station defends against an attack with high 
defence strategy, its reward is R2. The last case indicates that the base station uses 
strategy 𝑃𝑘 with high processing cost and low cost of defending against an attack 
strategy, therefore the reward is –R2. The first term (𝑃𝑘) represents the base station’s 
gain of using the strategy to eradicate attack strategy ai, and (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 ) signifies 
the cost of using the strategy. The second term (𝐼𝑅) denotes the gain of applying the 
attack strategy with the processing cost for the attacker. 
It is assumed that the state of node x is s0 at t = 0. If the defence and detection 
strategies d1, d2 are taken against an attack strategy a, the state of node x evolves from 
s0 to s1, and node x (with respect to the sink node and base station) receives a reward R 
(fx(s0)) and so on (Eq.6). In Q-learning, the state of node x transits from s0 to s1 and 
eventually to sp where 1 ≪p≪k −1, where k signifies the efficiency of IDS1 using the di 
strategy in detecting and defending against an aj attack strategy. Thus, the accumulated 
reward received by x is: 
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𝑅𝑥
𝑝 = ∑ 𝛾𝑝 𝑝𝑡=0 𝑅 (𝑓𝑥(𝑠𝑝))                                       (4.3)
 where γ∈  [0, 1) is the discount rate parameter. An attack strategy, and the 
objective of IDS2, is to select a suitable defence policy against an assault to accumulate 
rewards. It is worth noting that Rx
p
 will be calculated as two sub-rewards, such as R1 for 
the base station and R2 for the sink node. An instance of the reward function given to 
the cluster head (sink node) and attacker is the total amount of positive reward signals 
received when no attack has occurred and no alarm is raised (True Negative), and the 
number of correct invasion cases detected by the system (True Positive). The game 
theory phases include: 
• Phase 1: The sink node monitors message attacks through the game-based FQL 
operation as the first step defined by IDS1 (see Table 4.2), after which it 
conveys the message to the base station for the second step function defined by 
IDS2 (Table 4.3). 
• Phase 2: Upon receiving an abnormal signal from the sink node, IDS2 applies 
its detection fitness test in conjunction with the knowledge database to assess 
attack patterns and severity. This evaluation permits IDS2 to regulate the overall 
defence strategy in order to mitigate the DDoS attack. The IDS2 function uses 
the fuzzy game theory principle to select an appropriate defence tactic to shield 
the message-consuming sensor node. The IDS2 also informs the affected sink 
node that it needs to protect itself against the offending attack pattern. 
• Phase 3: The sink node verifies the current state of IDS play with the sensor 
node. If the sink node still detects an irregularity, it is likely that the IDS2 
operation opted for the wrong defence strategy, and consequently, the sink node 
advises the IDS2 to revise its detection strategy. If the attack pattern alert count 
at the sensor node decreases in number, the sink node systematically endeavours 
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to confirm the current state of IDS play with the sensor node until the attack 
condition is resolved and returns to the correct defence strategy state. 
• Phase 4: The sink node notifies IDS2 that the attack at the sensor node has been 
successfully counteracted and the attack has ceased. 
• Phase 5: The IDS2 thus concludes defending the sensor node. 
Utility function 
To appraise the efficacy of the links determined by G-FQL and to determine the 
rule applicability at every point in time, Eq.(4.4) was utilized in this thesis, as suggested 
by Liao et al. (Huang et al., 2013). In Table 4.6 the utility function parameters are 
described. 
U = ρ ∗ SP − β ∗ FN − θ ∗ FP                                (4.4) 
Table 4.6: Utility function parameters 
Parameters Explanation 
𝑈 Is a utility 
𝜌 Symbolizes the weight of effective prediction, q = 
0.75 
𝑆𝑃 Characterizes the true confidence rate of attack 
patterns. 
𝛽 Signifies the weight of failed estimates (attack but no 
defense), b = 1 
𝐹𝑁 Represents false negative of attack patterns - there are 
attacks but no defense 
𝜃 Denotes the weight of failed predictions (defense but 
no attack), h = 1 
𝐹𝑃 Represents false positive of attack patterns - there is 
defense but no attack 
The game principle approach entails detection accuracy with low time 
complexity, which only subsequently begins to formulate a shield policy. The major 
weakness of the game theory is that if attacks recur over a short period, a considerable 
amount of time is consumed in the detection phase, something that deteriorates the 
defence. It can be said that the detection precision is low while the false alert rate is 
high. This problem is a worst-case scenario, but it can be addressed using the 
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Cooperative-FQL. Its principal contribution is identifying the probability of future 
attacks aimed at a wireless sensor node. For frequent attacks occurring over a short 
time, multi agent-based FQL was adopted to handle the excessive time spent on 
detection. The aim of the proposed FQL is to obtain high detection accuracy with a low 
false alarm rate.  
4.2.2 Fuzzy Q-learning algorithm 
To overcome the required complex detection and defence time as well as 
detection precision issues in our game theory method, the FQL algorithm is applied in 
this thesis to detect probable future points of attack beforehand. To optimize Q-learning 
algorithm performance from the action selection method and reward function 
perspectives, fuzzy min-max methods are employed. In the proposed scheme, the fuzzy 
min-max action selection and reward function with conventional Q-learning are 
evaluated. High detection accuracy performance was revealed. For this reason, FQL is 
employed to reinforce a system’s learning capability. 
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Figure 4.4:  Block diagram of the FQL optimization system 
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The FLC inputs are provided in two scenarios through the switching process. In 
the first scenario, which is a game between a sink node and attacker, we 
have 𝑃𝑑=(
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
), the cost of attack detection during sink 
processing (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡) as per the sink node utility function and 𝐼𝑅 =
 (
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
) as well as 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 
with respect to the attacker utility function. These correspond to the fuzzy state of 
network S1 (t) from the first scenario 𝑆1(𝑡) = [𝑃𝑑, 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝐼𝑅]. In the second 
scenario, the game between the base station and an attacker, 
𝑃𝑘 = 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘, Cost defend = 
𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 adapts as a base station utility function 
while 𝐼𝑅 = (
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
)  and 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘, 
regarding the attacker utility function, correspond to the fuzzy state of network S2(t) 
from the first scenario: 𝑆2(𝑡) = [𝑃𝑘, 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑, 𝐼𝑅]. 
The FLC output is given by the increment in states and represents the action of 
the sink node and the base station A(t). The reward signal, R (t), is built from FLC and 
is measured in both modes of adjacency to test if the sensors experience attacks in 
detection mode and the base station correctly defends against attacks. The linguistic 
variables Pd, Cost_ Process, and IR act as inputs for the first scenario, while the 
linguistic variables Pk, Cost_defend, and IR serve as inputs for the second scenario. 
The Detect Confidence (DC1) behaves as output for the first scenario and the 
Defend Confidence (DC2) acts as output for the second scenario. They are both applied 
in the experiments (Table 4.7). 
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Table 4.7: Linguistic variables for fuzzy set input and output 
Type of Scenario Variable Attribute Membership function 
Attacker and sink node 
Input 
Pd Low Med High 
Cost process Low Med High 
IR Low Med High 
Output Detection Confidence (DC1) Low Med High 
Attacker and base station 
Input 
Pk Low Med High 
Cost defence Low Med High 
IR Low Med High 
Output Defence Confidence (DC2) Low Med High 
Two fuzzy sets are identified in all inputs and outputs, whose linguistic terms are 
‘Low’ (L) and ‘High’ (H). The fuzzy reward was elaborated in Section 4.1.3. Hence, the 
objective is to determine the total reward value over time. If the defence and detect 
strategy di is used against attack strategy aj at time p and the state of node x transits 
from St to Sp+1, the Q-learning function for IDS1 is Q: S×D×A→R as in: 
 
𝑄(𝑆𝑝, 𝑑𝑖, 𝑎𝑗) ← 𝑄(𝑆𝑝, 𝑑𝑖, 𝑎𝑗) +  𝛼 [𝑅 (𝑓𝑥(𝑠𝑝)) + 𝛾𝑅𝑥
𝑝+1 − 𝑄(𝑆𝑝, 𝑑𝑖, 𝑎𝑗)]                (4.5) 
where α ∈  (0, 1] is the learning rate factor. In this scheme, the Q-function is 
applied in dual situations, such as IDS1 and IDS2. In each state, the reward function 
rewards the cluster head (sink node) using the Q-learning method and the base station 
also obtains the reward. G-FQL attains the final reward value of each player. A learning 
rate of zero means the system no longer learns anything new, but a value of 1 would 
prompt the system to adjust its accuracy strategy as it self-learns from new attacks and 
to update the information in its knowledge base. If the reward value is below the 
threshold v, FQL IDS1 deems node x secure; otherwise, it considers the node insecure 
and takes suitable detection action against the attack. Coinciding with this evaluation, 
FQL IDS2 takes appropriate defensive action against any potential attacks.  
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4.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the interaction between attackers, sink nodes and the base station 
was studied, after which a novel, Game-based FQL, cooperative game theoretic defence 
mechanism was proposed. This system combines the cooperative-based game theory 
with fuzzy Q-learning algorithmic elements. As such, the collaboration between the 
detection sink node player and response base station players is reinforced to defend 
against an incoming DDoS attack that may cause congestion and downtime in network 
communication due to flooding packets. The Game-FQL model is a triple-player game 
strategy construed as two-player, providing double defence against a single attacker. It 
adds confidence and establishes a reputation as extremely apt in tracking attackers and 
defending the system. This strategy-based cooperative game adapts to continuous self-
learning from past attacks and the fuzzy Q-learning decision making process behaviour 
to defeat attackers. By defining incentives for cooperation and disincentives for 
fraudulent behaviour, it has been determined that repeated interaction sustains 
cooperation, builds confidence and enhances reputation, another benefit of Game-FQL. 
Game theory-based Fuzzy Q-learning (Game-FQL), a mechanism in IDPS, is an 
invaluable tool for progressively securing next-generation complex heterogeneous 
computing and networking environments against sophisticated attacks and attackers, 
beyond what is encountered today. A future initiative could be to extend the proposed 
Game-FQL mechanism by incorporating data from various attack types and sources to 
further enhance its decision making capabilities in order to impede existing or new 
attacks.  
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Chapter 5 : FRAMEWORK EVALUATION 
This chapter reports on the data collection method for the evaluation of proposed 
Game based IDPS framework. It explains the tools used for testing the proposed 
framework, data generating technique and the statistical method used for the processing 
of data.  
The chapter is organized into nine sections. Section 5.2 explains the 
experimental setup and programming tools used for the implementation and testing of 
the proposed Game based FQL- IDPS framework and the statistical method used for the 
compilation of empirical data. Section 5.3 presents the data generation and analysing the 
flood attack strategy in evaluating the execution of IIDPS on network. Section 5.4 
summarizes data analysis of the game based FQL in evaluating IIDPS in terms of 
detection accuracy. 
Section 5.5 presents the analysis of game based FQL for testing the defense rate 
of G-FQL framework. Section 5.6 presents the analysis for number of live nodes during 
detection and prevention. Section 5.7 evaluates the energy consumption over time and 
Section 5.8 analyses the energy consumed by different deployed nodes in G-FQL IDPS. 
Finally, Section 5.9 extracts conclusive remarks.  
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5.1  Simulation and analysis 
5.1.1 General tools 
To carry out the experiments in the different evaluation stages, this study used 
open source simulation software, namely network simulator version 2 (NS2). The 
reason for utilising the applications was their openness and public availability, as well 
as being free to use. The descriptions of the applications are briefly explained as 
follows: 
In 1996-97, network simulator version 2 (NS2) was initiated based on a 
refactoring by Steve McCanne(Group, 2004). Use of Tcl was replaced by MIT's Object 
Tcl (OTcl), an object-oriented language of Tcl. The core of ns-2 is also written in C++, 
but the C++ simulation objects are linked to shadow objects in OTcl and variables can 
be linked between both language realms. Simulation scripts are written in the OTcl 
language, an extension of the Tcl scripting language. Presently, ns-2 consists of over 
300,000 lines of source code, and there is probably a comparable amount of contributed 
code that is not integrated directly into the main distribution (many forks of ns-2 exist, 
both maintained and unmaintained). It runs on GNU/Linux, FreeBSD, Solaris, Mac OS 
X and Windows versions that support Cygwin. It is licensed for use under version 2 of 
the GNU General Public License. 
5.1.2 Design Assumptions  
To facilitate and conduct experiments in this thesis, along with the specific 
security model in the proposed framework, specifically, given the lack of specific 
information on resources, some assumptions had to be made to the attack and game 
players’ scenario. 
The first assumption is given for players in our scenario. In this scheme, we 
assigned the player one as a base station, player two as a sink node, and player three as 
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an attacker (See Chapter 4). The second assumption is to create a routing protocol. In 
this thesis, a LEACH protocol was adopted and the agents or nodes communicate 
through this protocol. Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack is considered as a 
third assumption. Due to lack of real dataset, in this thesis, a generator function is 
defined to create flooding attacks during a period of time.  
5.1.3 Simulation Setup 
The Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) protocol was utilized 
in the simulation, as it most closely reflects WSN in practice and it is also capable of 
dealing with energy consumption concerns in WSNs. The simulations were run for 
1000s with LEACH as the routing protocol, the initial access point energy was 100 
joules, the effective transmission range of the wireless radio for the access point was 
100m, the sink node transmission range was 100m, the common node transmission 
range was 50m and the transport protocol is given in Figure 5.1. In addition, the 
cooperative game-based IDPS with fuzzy Q-learning was employed to hasten the 
simulation. 
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Figure 5.1: Simulated WSN environment 
Table 5.1 presents the WSN configuration along with the set of parameters 
applied in NS-2. However, in practical WSN security operation, minimizing energy 
usage to conserve energy and maximize detection accuracy as much as possible is vital 
when designing and running G-FQL IDPS. The results obtained from the proposed 
algorithm are compared with those from Fuzzy Logic Controller, Q-learning, and Fuzzy 
Q-learning as well as the Markovian Game  (Huang et al., 2013) . 
Table 5.1: Wireless sensor network parameters in NS-2 
Wireless Sensor Network Parameters  Values 
Access Point 1 
Common Nodes 200 
Sink Node in each Cluster 1 
Routing Protocol LEACH 
Scenario Size 100*100 
Simulation Time 1000s 
Transport Protocol UDP 
Access Point Initial Energy 100 joules 
Access Point Transmission Range 100 meters 
Sink Node Initial Energy 10 joules 
Sink Node Transmission Range 70 meters 
Common Node Initial Energy 10 joules 
Common Node Transmission Range  50 meters 
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5.1.4 Generating and analysing the flood attack strategy 
The purpose of this section is to analyse the quantitative behaviour of attacks in 
the UDP protocol layer. In the present experiments, normal UDP traffic was initially 
considered, after which the attack intensity under flood attacks with UDP traffic was 
explored. Subsequently, the total energy consumed before and after attack was 
examined. The accuracy of detection and defense as a result of executing the G-FQL 
algorithm was finally assessed. To generate an attack, a random function was employed, 
which selected subject nodes from each cluster to attack. The selected nodes adjusted 
their functions to send flooding packets to the cluster head. Algorithm 5.1 displays the 
attack strategy. 
Algorithm 5.1: Attack strategy 
1. Start 
2. Min(r)=0 %% Initial round simulation (Max(r)=n) 
3. While (r<>n) 
4. Decide r round's cluster head randomly 
5. Cluster head advertises schedule time to all its common nodes 
6. Generate attack node randomly 
7. Attack node receives schedule time message from its cluster head 
8. Attack node starts to compromise victims 
8.1. Attack node sends flooding packets to its cluster head in this round 
8.2. Victim (cluster head) receives data more quickly than normal state, so its energy will decrease rapidly 
9. End. 
 
In the experiment, an attack with UDP attack intensity was implemented. Figure 
5.2 indicates flooding attack intensity per packet length. Greater attack intensity 
percentage obviously occurred between 200 and 300s, at which time packet length also 
reached elevated values. In Figure 5.3 it appears that UDP attack intensity affected the 
WSN energy, besides the fact that energy was consumed in proportion to attack 
intensity. For example, for attack intensity between 100 and 150s, the most energy was 
consumed.  
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Figure 5.2: Effects of UDP attack intensity on packet size 
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Figure 5.3: Victim node’s energy level over time 
In the present research work, three sets of experiments were conducted to 
examine the effects of attack detection accuracy and defense rate against attacks based 
on the Fuzzy Logic Controller, Q-learning algorithm, Fuzzy Q-learning and Game 
theory-based Fuzzy Q-learning algorithms. The cost function was calculated according 
to Eq. 4.7.  
5.1.5 Analysis of the game-based FQL IDPS in terms of detection accuracy 
The proposed game-based Fuzzy Q-learning (G-FQL) algorithm with the cost 
function 𝑈 = 𝜌 ∗ 𝑆𝑃 − 𝛽 ∗ 𝐹𝑁 − 𝜃 ∗ 𝐹𝑃 was compared with existing soft computing 
methods (Fuzzy Logic Controller, Q-learning, and Fuzzy Q-learning) with respect to the 
attack detection precision of modeled Denial-of-Service attacks. A comparison between 
the average utility function and G-FQL with cost maximization indicates that the latter 
yielded an improvement of 3.29% with 1.86 standard deviation as opposed to the FQL 
algorithm with 0.83 (Table 5.2).    
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Table 5.2: Simulation results of the detection algorithm for DDoS attacks 
Percenta
ge of 
Attack 
(%) 
FLC Q-learning FQL Game-based FQL 
SP 
% 
FP 
% 
FN 
% 
Utility 
Function 
SP 
% 
FP 
% 
FN 
% 
Utility 
Function 
S 
P 
% 
FP  
% 
FN 
% 
Utility 
Function 
SP  
% 
FP 
% 
FN 
% 
Utility 
Function 
1 49.50 1.90 2.40 56.38 76.00 1.40 1.20 54.40 80.10 1.20 1.10 57.78 83.20 1.20 1.10 60.10 
5 49.80 1.98 2.80 56.07 76.70 1.60 1.40 54.53 81.20 1.40 1.30 58.20 83.40 1.30 1.20 60.05 
10 50.01 2.00 3.20 55.71 76.90 1.90 1.70 54.08 82.50 1.90 1.70 58.28 84.30 1.50 1.60 60.13 
15 51.20 2.04 3.60 56.56 77.80 2.10 2.00 54.25 83.70 2.10 2.00 58.68 85.60 1.70 1.80 60.70 
20 50.90 2.40 3.90 55.38 78.00 2.40 2.20 53.90 83.90 2.40 2.20 58.33 87.90 1.90 2.00 62.03 
25 51.90 2.80 4.10 55.93 78.90 3.10 2.70 53.38 84.20 2.60 2.30 58.25 88.30 2.10 2.30 61.83 
30 52.70 2.90 4.20 56.68 80.20 3.40 3.00 53.75 85.80 2.80 2.60 58.95 89.70 2.40 2.50 62.38 
35 49.40 3.00 4.70 51.70 82.80 3.90 3.20 55.00 86.40 2.90 2.70 59.30 90.50 2.60 2.70 62.58 
40 49.50 3.01 5.00 51.37 82.90 4.20 3.80 54.18 87.70 3.20 3.00 59.58 91.70 3.10 3.00 62.68 
45 50.02 3.20 5.30 51.38 83.70 4.90 4.10 53.78 88.50 3.40 3.20 59.78 92.40 3.20 3.40 62.70 
50 51.04 3.50 5.60 51.90 83.90 5.20 4.80 52.93 89.60 3.90 3.50 59.80 94.20 3.30 3.70 63.65 
55 50.30 3.70 5.80 50.48 84.90 5.60 5.10 52.98 90.40 4.10 4.00 59.70 96.50 3.50 3.80 65.08 
60 49.30 3.70 5.90 49.08 85.00 5.80 5.70 52.25 92.40 4.50 4.30 60.50 98.20 3.70 3.90 66.05 
Average 51.20 2.78 4.35 53.74 80.59 3.50 3.15 53.80 85.88 2.80 2.60 59.01 89.68 2.42 2.54 62.30 
Std. Dev.  1.03 0.66 1.15   2.76   3.37 1.50 1.47   0.75   3.71 1.01 0.98   0.83   4.86 0.87 0.98   1.86 
It is evident that G-FQL with a cooperative mechanism attained the utmost detection accuracy gain. It can also be inferred from Figure 5.4 that 
detection accuracy per percentage of attack is higher with the G-FQL algorithm than the other methods. 
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Figure 5.4: Comparison of detection accuracy values 
In Figure 5.4, the X-axis shows the percentage of malicious nodes in an attack, 
and the Y-axis indicates the accuracy rate. At higher attack frequencies, the proposed 
method (Game-based FQL) displays greater accuracy scores. 
5.1.6 Analysis of game-based FQL IDPS in terms of Defense Rate  
The proposed Game-FQL method was weighed against that of Huang et al.  
(Huang et al., 2013), who used the game theory and Markovian IDS with an attack-
pattern-mining algorithm. According to Huang et al.’s  (Huang et al., 2013)  empirical 
results, the defense rate effectiveness of non-cooperative-based Markovian IDS with an 
attack-pattern mining algorithm for 60% of malicious nodes in a network and two sink 
nodes ranged between 72% and 97% (Figure 4.9). With the proposed game-based FQL 
IDPS, the successful defense rate was between 79% and 98%, as per Figure 5.5 as well. 
It can be concluded that integrating the game theory with the Fuzzy Q-learning 
algorithm outperforms individual defense schemes. 
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Figure 5.5: Game-based FQL in terms of accuracy of defense rate under attack trends 
Figure 5.5 points out that the successful defense rate values for Huang et al.’s 
model  (Huang et al., 2013) and the proposed methods decreased from 100% to 87% 
when the anomaly percentage increased. However, the proposed method gained the 
advantage of a successful defense rate due to the higher percentage of malicious nodes 
detected compared to Huang’s lower success rate. It can thus be deduced that by 
integrating the game theory with the Fuzzy Q-training method, performance surpasses 
that of any other individual defense approach. 
5.1.7 Analysis of game-based FQL IDPS in terms of number of live nodes 
This experiment was conducted to evaluate the performance of the Game-FQL 
algorithm in terms of number of live nodes during the simulation runtime. In the current 
scheme, the number of sensor nodes was 200. Figure 5.6 displays the number of live 
nodes for different algorithms throughout simulation runtime. The simulation outcomes 
indicate the number of live nodes at the end of the simulation time (1000s), according to 
which, the number of live sensor nodes in the proposed Game-FQL method is 
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significantly greater than existing algorithms. Game-FQL maintains 50 live nodes 
against an attack in comparison to 42, 32, and 21 live nodes for FQL, QL, and FLC, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 5.6: Number of live sensor nodes during simulation runtime (ms) 
 
The procedure of adjusting rules according to FLC-based DDoS attacks is more 
time-consuming, and the attacker defeats a high number of nodes during FLC detection 
(Baig et al., 2010). Q-learning-based DDoS attack detection is capable of handling 
minor-class DDoS attacks, but the multi objective procedure or major features of a 
DDoS attack consume maximum resources, especially in a real-time environment (Liu, 
2008). Fuzzy Q-learning-based DDoS attack detection utilized the min-max fuzzy 
method to enhance the classification scheme. The min-max fuzzy classifiers perform 
well with a reduced dataset, but inaccurately when the high volume of traffic increases 
further and the fuzzy IDPS may crash. In addition, prior knowledge of data distribution 
is required for the FQL algorithm. In the Fuzzy Q-learning algorithm, observation is 
limited by one single classifier. Therefore, this algorithm fails due to high volumes of 
real-time traffic. In the currently proposed method, the cooperative policy evaluates the 
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proficiency of an agent to optimize the cost function based on weight assignment 
mechanisms for real-time DDoS attack detection. The countermeasure mechanisms 
result as modules to be applied in Game-FQL architecture and system implementation 
to accelerate the detection and defense learning process in a fraction of the usual time. 
Thus, the Game-FQL preserves a greater number of sensor nodes during simulation.   
5.1.8 Analysis of game-based FQL IDPS in terms of energy consumption over time 
In this experiment, the energy consumed by the Game-FQL algorithm during 
DDoS attacks on sensor nodes in comparison to FLC, QL, and FQL is studied. Figure 
5.7 provides the comparison between the mentioned algorithms in terms of total energy 
consumed by sensor nodes. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Total energy consumption versus number of sensor nodes under malicious attack 
In existing detection, the players (sink node and base station) partake in 
activities such as local sensing and data reporting, which consume additional energy. 
The overhead of energy consumption may be considerable if the number of cooperating 
players or the amount of sensing results in the report is very large. Thus, energy 
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efficiency needs to be considered in cooperative sensing schemes. To address this issue, 
the cooperative game-based FQL method enhances energy efficiency via optimization.  
5.1.9 Analysis of the energy consumed by different deployed nodes in the game-FQL  
The impact of number of deployed sensor nodes on energy consumption is 
shown in Figure 5.8. It is observed that with an increasing percentage of deployed 
nodes, the proposed Game-FQL is able to consume the total amount of energy in 
comparison with FQL, QL, and FLC.  
 
Figure 5.8:Total energy consumption versus number of sensors deployed in a network 
Finally, Figure 5.8 depicts the total energy consumed with varying numbers of 
sensor nodes deployed in the network.  The experiment was run for 40, 80, 120, 160, 
and 200 nodes. As expected, when more nodes are present in the network, the energy 
consumption rate is lower than other comparable methods. This is attributed to the fact 
that the proposed Game-based FQL agents prefer to maximize their own utility function 
by means of cooperating learning algorithm to avoid the energy consumption by sensors 
from each cluster.  However, it would be interesting for the cooperative Game-FQL 
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solution to be implemented, for instance, to “BEE-C: A bio-inspired energy efficient 
cluster-based algorithm for data continuous dissemination in Wireless Sensor 
Networks” (da Silva Rego et al., 2012), to verify the energy consumption for intrusion 
detection and prevention. 
5.1.10  Analysis of the computational time in the game-FQL  
Preprocessing time includes the time spent in feature extraction and 
normalization. The training time depends on the number of times the classifier needs 
training which in turn depends on the mean square error between iterations reaching 
goal minimum. Testing time includes the time spent in testing the unlabeled instances 
by weighted mean. Table 5.3 shows the performance comparison of the G-FQL in terms 
of consuming time obtained during the experiments. From Table 5.3, it can be realized 
that the training time of G-FQL is similar to FQL, but it consumes more testing time 
than the FLC, Q-learning, and FQL. Also, the computational time was calculated on 
Intel 3.10 GHz, Core i-5 Processor, 4 GB RAM computer. 
Table 5.3 : Performance comparison of G-FQL in terms of consuming time 
Dataset Algorithms Training time (seconds) Testing time 
(seconds) 
Real 
data 
Fuzzy Logic Controller 3.10 1.30 
Q-learning  3.14 1.36 
Fuzzy Q-learning  3.22 1.40 
G -FQL 3.22 1.42 
Testing time of the proposed G-FQL method is a little high due to the ensemble 
output combination methods such as fuzzy Q-learning and weight strategy sharing 
algorithm, but more detection accuracy was achieved in G-FQL. The speedup of G-FQL 
can be improved when a hybrid classifier is executed in parallel processors. Thus, all the 
modules can be processed in parallel by different engines in order to reduce the overall 
processing time considerably.  
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5.2 Chapter Summary 
The first stage of the evaluation study has shown the statistical analysis of 
flooding attack with generate attack algorithm. The attack model was introduced as a 
means to estimate the damage of flooding attack. Likelihood of attack intensity per 
packet length and attack intensity affected the energy. With a combination of the fuzzy 
reinforcement algorithm and the aid of game theory, the detection for attack is 
improved. 
The second stage aims to investigate the effectiveness of proposed model as a 
strategy in detection. One of the criteria to support the detection system is to consider 
the ability of agents in order to share their knowledge to identify attacks. For instance, 
intelligent detector identifies a DDoS attack with a fast ability of detection in order to 
minimise its impact. This intelligent and fast detection process is crucial to the proposed 
framework, as a good detection strategy increase the ability of model in facilitation a 
cooperative based intelligent mode. Therefore, in order to satisfy such claims, this stage 
investigates the ability of proposed frameworks to response strategy model. 
The third stage also investigates the relationship between attacked and their 
classification (e.g. accuracy of detection/ false alarm rate). With the implementation of 
collaborative security strategy in attack detection and response, some improvements 
have been made. In practical, a better cost functions for attack detection can be 
produced compared to the cost function used in the traditional methods. In addition, 
there is a reduction in terms of false alarm rate of attacks that need to be marked by 
fuzzy labelling. This fuzzy labelling allows security experts to classify number of 
attacks and type of damage of attacks in order to response only to an appreciate attacks; 
hence it could save time and responses. 
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Chapter 6 : CONCLUSION 
This chapter summarizes the major finding of the study by reviewing the 
achievements of the research. In particular, the first section of this chapter highlights its 
most important findings, as well as its limitations. The next section dedicates the main 
contributions of this thesis and how the objectives have been achieved. Finally, this 
chapter concludes with a description of possible future work in the topics covered and 
showing how the proposed framework could be enhanced in the future. 
6.1  Achievements of the study 
This thesis launched with an investigation into the different types of intelligent 
intrusion detection and response systems, exploring issues related to the IIDPSs and Co-
IIDPS in networks. The study proposed a novel collaborative game based IDPS 
framework in order to identify the distributed denial of service attacks and to show the 
ability of multi agent based computational intelligence methods in terms of 
collaborative IIDPS. The proposed model was compared with existing soft computing 
methods (fuzzy logic controller, Q-learning, and fuzzy Q-learning) with respect to the 
attack detection precision of modeled denial-of-service attacks. Several analyses were 
explored and their capabilities evaluated in order to satisfy the aims of this thesis.  
The overall goal of this thesis is to establish a novel approach to identify 
distributed denial of service attacks and response to attackers in network environments. 
Within the proposed framework, which included experiments, this thesis has been 
successful. Details are as follows:  
 A collaborative model for Intelligent Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems.  
This thesis introduced three classes of IIDPS detection methodologies, 
approaches and technologies. Each technique has its advantages and limitations. The 
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TAI-based IDPS is straightforward to implement and very effective in inspecting known 
attacks. Still, the approach hardly identifies unknown attacks, attacks concealed by 
evasion techniques and several variants of known attacks. A number of fuzzy rule-based 
approaches to detect unknown attacks were also proposed. Such techniques may 
unnecessarily result in issues with excessive computing time consumption and rapid 
updating of the knowledge base, hindering attack effectiveness. 
A more accurate and simplified approach is still required to increase efficiency 
and effectiveness further. Computational intelligence-based approaches such as 
Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithm have the merit of possessing with no prior 
knowledge of attacks. They do not work well in real-time applications due to the high 
computational complexity. A multi agent-based CI (MCI) not only mitigates high 
computational complexity such as time consumption and updating knowledge, but also 
enhances detection performance (See Chapter 2). 
Thus, the collaborative management using the multi agent system-based 
computational intelligence portrays the ability to mitigate detection problems. In other 
words, the individual or single capabilities in terms of self-cooperative techniques 
(without using CI methods) consider all the features addressed in their systems. These 
inefficiencies are evidence of the lack of cooperative knowledge regarding suitable CI 
methods to identify intrusion prior to initiating any development. 
All new solutions to developing multi agent-based CI methods consider the 
requirements (detection and false alarm rate) as being able to overcome Cooperative-
IIDPS complexities and meet the real operational goals of networks. 
A novel collaborative-based IIDPS (Co-IIDPS) architecture is proposed and 
presented. It demonstrates the impact of a Multi Agent System-based computational 
intelligence (MCI) technique on enhancing the efficiency of detection and false alarm 
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rates. In other words, incorporating a multi- agent system (MAS) to computational 
intelligence (MCI) in terms of Co-IIDPS allows monitoring intrusion activity. Fuzzy 
system (FS) with reinforcement learning (RL) in terms of fuzzy reinforcement learning 
manager (FRLM) has merged into Co-IIDPS, resulting in high true positive and low 
false alarm rates. The policy aspect of MAS-based FRLM applies a negotiation method 
to improving the detection accuracy. The developed Co-IIDPS architecture around 
MAS-based FRLM satisfies the detection performance (See Chapter 3).  This 
architecture portrays the clear notion of cooperative learning-based detection to satisfy 
the requirements of IIDPS. In conclusion, the detection management techniques can be 
improved by minimizing the false alarm rates and increasing the detection rates in 
addition to decreasing energy consumption in networks.  
In the context of Co-IIDPS, adaptive game theoretic techniques are adequate for 
network parameter optimization due to the complexity and dynamism of networks. The 
main benefits of applying such techniques are cost savings and improved network 
performance. The model helps the proposed framework to identify different types of 
DDoS attacks, each of which has its own unique characteristics (see Chapter 4). The 
interaction between attackers, sink nodes and the base station was studied, after which a 
novel Game-based FQL, cooperative game theoretic defense mechanism was proposed. 
This system combines the cooperative-based game theory with fuzzy Q-learning 
algorithmic elements. As such, the cooperation between the detection sink node player 
and response base station players is reinforced to defend against an incoming DDoS 
attack that may cause congestion and downtime in network communication as a result 
of flooding packets.  
The Game-FQL model is a triple-player game strategy construed as two-player, 
providing double defense against a single attacker. It adds confidence and establishes a 
reputation as extremely apt in tracking an attacker and defending the system. This 
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strategy-based cooperative game adapts to continuous self-learning of past attacks and 
the behaviour in the fuzzy Q-learning decision making process to overcome the 
attacker. By defining incentives for cooperation and disincentives for fraudulent 
behaviour, it has been determined that repeated interaction sustains cooperation, builds 
confidence and enhances reputation, something additionally offered by Game-FQL. In 
conclusion, Game theory-based Fuzzy Q-learning (Game-FQL), as a mechanism in 
IDPS, is an invaluable tool for increasingly securing next-generation complex 
heterogeneous computing and networking environments against sophisticated attacks 
and attackers, beyond what is encountered today. 
 Issues in Collaborative IDPS studies.  
In Chapter 4, this thesis established a critical analysis of different perspectives 
when addressing the significant problems of the DDoS attack detection and response, as 
well as its challenges. With an aim to establish a IIDPS framework to DDoS attacks, 
several issues were exposed. By presenting the strengths and weaknesses of these 
issues, several intelligent IDPS and cooperative-IIDPS were identified which address 
the limitations of the previous approaches, by enhancing the cooperative game based 
learning techniques; it is more systematic in the detection and response process.  
 Comprehensive evaluation stages for the proposed framework.  
In addressing the distributed denial of service attacks detection and response in 
WSNs, the proposed framework outlined several models and strategies. The objective of 
the evaluation is to examine the proposed framework and to decide whether it is 
sufficiently applicable to facilitate the detection and response action in a traffic network.  
The evaluation presented as follows:  
The first stage of the evaluation study has shown the statistical analysis of 
flooding attack with generate attack algorithm. The attack model was introduced as a 
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means to estimate the damage of flooding attack. Likelihood of attack intensity per 
packet length and attack intensity affected the energy. With a combination of the fuzzy 
reinforcement algorithm and the aid of game theory, the detection for attack is 
improved.  
The second stage aims to investigate the effectiveness of proposed model as a 
strategy in detection. One of the criteria to support the detection system is to consider 
the ability of agents in order to share their knowledge to identify attacks. For instance, 
intelligent detector identifies a DDoS attack with a fast ability of detection in order to 
minimise its impact. This intelligent and fast detection process is crucial to the proposed 
framework, as a good detection strategy increase the ability of model in facilitation a 
cooperative based intelligent mode. Therefore, in order to satisfy such claims, this stage 
investigates the ability of proposed frameworks to response strategy model. 
The third stage also investigates the relationship between attacked and their 
classification (e.g. accuracy of detection/ false alarm rate). With the implementation of 
collaborative security strategy in attack detection and response, some improvements 
have been made. In practical, a better cost functions for attack detection can be 
produced compared to the cost function used in the traditional methods. In addition, 
there is a reduction in terms of false alarm rate of attacks that need to be marked by 
fuzzy labelling. This fuzzy labelling allows security experts to classify number of 
attacks and type of damage of attacks in order to response only to an appreciate attacks; 
hence it could save time and responses. 
In conclusion, the proposed framework was analysed in terms of its detection 
accuracy and defence rate. The evaluation stage satisfied the number of live nodes, in 
particular the ability of the proposed game based IDPS to operate with reasonable 
response time and reduce false alarm response. Beside the effectiveness and 
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performances of proposed method, the energy consummation over time is evaluated. 
Finally, the percentage of energy consumed by different deployed nodes is evaluated to 
show the performance of proposed framework. 
 Simulation of the proposed framework.  
To appraise the performance and check the connection between G-FQL and the 
routing protocol, NS-2 is simulated. In this thesis only the Distributed Denial-of-Service 
(DDoS) attack is considered. DDoS is characterized by the presence of an attacker and 
is called a flooding attack, and it causes noise in wireless communication by sending 
flooding packets as well as exhausts energy.  
6.2  Limitations of the study 
The considerations of the previous chapters have revealed that this thesis has 
adequately achieved its aims and objectives: the establishment of a novel cooperative 
IIDPS to use when DDoS attack in a wireless environment. However, a number of 
limitations and challenges were encountered during the study and they are listed here 
for future reference: 
 We define a model for generating DDoS attack based upon the poison 
distribution function. This is due to lack of real DDoS attack dataset in wireless 
sensor network. The purpose of this section is to analyse the quantitative 
behaviour of attacks in the UDP protocol layer. To generate an attack, a random 
function was employed, which selected subject nodes from each cluster to 
attack. The selected nodes adjusted their functions to send flooding packets to 
the cluster head displays the attack strategy (See Algorithm 4.1). 
 The hybrid machine learning algorithm cannot be used to cope with fast network 
changes as well as attack’s behaviour fluctuations. However, as a remarkable 
advantage, the use of long-term statistical data leads to more robust methods. In 
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addition, as the temporary limitation is given by the measurement periods, there 
is plenty of time to apply complex optimization methods, which can further 
improve wireless sensor network performance. Thus, the term that refers to this 
kind of tasks is off-line tuning methods. 
 A particular agent can be nominated the task of perceiving abnormal traffic flow 
in the network. Though, the single agent’s action suffers from some weaknesses. 
The disadvantages are: 1) the attackers may be exterior the observation range of 
the detector node; 2) a large set of normal and abnormal patterns will have to be 
stored and processed by the detector node, for individually victim node of the 
network; 3) the lack of multiple decision making strategy on the detector node 
implies that the attack traffic flow may overwhelm the detector node itself, and 
thus disrupt the entire detection process. 
6.3  Future Work 
The set of compromised nodes participating in attacks may designate to send 
requests to the victim nodes at regular intervals of time by staying well below the attack 
detection threshold in WSN. In reality, the intensity of attack traffic may be constituted 
of malicious packets intending to cause damage to target nodes over a longer period of 
time. This type of an attack will lead to a gradual decline in resources of the target 
nodes in WSN. We can refer to this attack as a slow poisoning attack. A future direction 
of work can involve detection of such attacks in addition to detection of high traffic 
intensity attacks, addressed in this thesis. 
The proposed attack detection scheme does detection of attacks that culminate 
from higher orders of incoming traffic within a single time epoch (See Section 5.2.5), 
without correlating traffic behaviour from previous time epochs. This work can be 
extended to incorporate correlation between time epochs, for attack detection purposes. 
146 
 
In addition, the length of the time epoch is static post-initialization. Variable time epoch 
lengths, based on analysis of real-time network traffic, are another possible future 
direction of research. 
By defining incentives for cooperation and disincentives for fraudulent 
behaviour, it has been determined that repeated interaction sustains cooperation, builds 
confidence and enhances reputation, something additionally offered by Game-FQL. 
Game theory-based Fuzzy Q-learning (Game-FQL), as a mechanism in IDPS, is an 
invaluable tool for increasingly securing next-generation complex heterogeneous 
computing and networking environments against sophisticated attacks and attackers, 
beyond what is encountered today. A future initiative is to extend the proposed Game-
FQL mechanism by incorporating data from various attack types and sources to further 
enhance its decision making capabilities in order to thwart existing or new attacks. Also 
as part of future research work on complementing Game-FQL, studying a network 
evolutionary algorithm, such as the imperialist competitive algorithm, is considered of 
utmost importance.  
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Appendix 
 
#include"QLearning.h" 
#include <time.h> 
#include <string.h> 
#include <math.h> 
#include <windows.h> 
int Total = 0; 
int temp[10000][10000]; 
*********************** FUNCTION   Name:  Get Node Details**************************** 
int get_node_count() { 
 printf("get_node_count( )"); 
 int node_cnt; 
 printf("\n\n"); 
 printf("==================================================\n"); 
 printf(">>>>>>>>>>>>     Get the Node Details <<<<<<<<<<< \n"); 
 printf("==================================================\n"); 
 printf("\n\nEnter the Total No of Node to be Created :"); 
 scanf("%d", &node_cnt); 
 printf("\n\nEnter the Selfish Node Count      :"); 
 scanf("%d", &snode_cnt); 
 printf("\n\n"); 
 printf("==================================================\n"); 
 return node_cnt; 
} 
******************************FUNCTION   Name:  splitstr***************************** 
splitstr(char * full_str, char arr[][64], char * str) { 
 char *record = NULL; 
 int count = 0; 
 // Take the Records and store into the Array 
 record = strtok(full_str, str); 
 while (record != NULL) { 
  //fmt_str[count] = malloc( strlen( record ) + 1 ); 
  strcpy(arr[count++], record); 
  record = strtok(NULL, str); 
 } 
 return count; 
} 
*****************************         Name:  validateip ***************************** 
validateip(char * ip, char ipset[][10]) { 
 char *record = NULL; 
 int count = 0; 
 // Take the Records and store into the Array 
 record = strtok(ip, "."); 
 while (record != NULL) { 
  //fmt_str[count] = malloc( strlen( record ) + 1 ); 
  if (strcmp(record, "XXX") == 0) 
   strcpy(ipset[count++], "-1"); 
  else 
   strcpy(ipset[count++], record); 
  record = strtok(NULL, "."); 
 } 
 if (count == 4) 
  return TRUE; 
 return FALSE; 
} 
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*****************************FUNCTION        Name:  is_star***************************** 
int is_star(char * str) { 
 if (strcmp(str, "*") == 0 || strcmp(str, "XXX") == 0) 
  return -1; 
 else 
  return atoi(str); 
} 
*****************************Name:  validate_split_ip***************************** 
int validate_split_ip(char * ip, struct IP_Set * ipaddr) { 
 char arr[10][64]; 
 
 if (splitstr(ip, arr, ".") == 4) { 
  printf(" ARR : %s - %s - %s - %s \n ", arr[0], arr[1], arr[2], arr[3]); 
  ipaddr->Ip1 = is_star(arr[0]); 
  ipaddr->Ip2 = is_star(arr[1]); 
  ipaddr->Ip3 = is_star(arr[2]); 
  ipaddr->Ip4 = is_star(arr[0]); 
  return TRUE; 
 } 
 return FALSE; 
} 
*****************************FUNCTION  Name:  get_rules ***************************** 
int get_rules() { 
 printf("\n\n"); 
 /* printf( "==================================================\n"); 
 printf( ">>>>>>>>>>>>  Define the Rules        <<<<<<<<<<< \n"); 
 printf( "==================================================\n");*/ 
 printf("1.Reading the KDD dataset...."); 
 printf("\n2.Initializing Expert system....\n"); 
 // Validate TCP or UDP  
 do { 
  printf(" Enter the Protocal ( 1. TCP , 2.UDP ) : "); 
  scanf("%d", &ql_rules.protocal); 
  if (ql_rules.protocal > 0 && ql_rules.protocal < 3) 
   break; 
  else 
   printf("Error : Sorry Enter the Valid protocal\n"); 
 } while (TRUE); 
sinknode_cnt = 1; 
printf("Initializing Qstates ... "); 
} 
*****************************FUNCTION       Name:  
print_nodes***************************** 
int print_nodes() { 
 int i, j; 
 char node_type[25]; 
 int randval; 
 printf("\n\n"); 
 printf("Total No of Packets : %d \n", noofnode); 
 Total = noofnode; 
 printf("Total No of Abnormal Packets : %d \n", snode_cnt); 
  for (i = 0; i < noofnode; i++) { 
     if (node_details[i].node_type == 1) { 
    strcpy(node_type, "Normal"); 
  } else { 
   strcpy(node_type, "Selfish"); 
   randval = random_in_range(0, sinknode_cnt); 
   sink_node_vals[randval].ids[sink_node_vals[randval].count++] = i; 
  } 
 
  if ((strcmp(node_type, "Normal") == 0) 
    && ((strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d8") == 0) 
      || (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d9") == 0) 
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      || (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d10") == 0))) { 
   true_pos++; 
  } 
  if ((strcmp(node_type, "Normal") == 0) 
    && ((strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d8") != 0) 
      && (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d9") != 0) 
      && (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d10") != 0))) { 
   true_neg++; 
  } 
  if ((strcmp(node_type, "Selfish") == 0) 
    && ((strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d8") != 0) 
      && (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d9") != 0) 
      && (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d10") != 0))) { 
   false_neg++; 
  } 
  if ((strcmp(node_type, "Selfish") == 0) 
    && ((strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d8") == 0) 
      || (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d9") == 0) 
      || (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d10") == 0))) { 
   false_pos++; 
  } 
  printf( "Node Number : %d Type : %s  IP Address : %03d.%03d.%03d.%03d  Bytes 
Transfered : %d Count : %d State : %s \n" , node_details[i].Node_id , node_type , 
node_details[i].ipaddr.Ip1 ,  node_details[i].ipaddr.Ip2 ,  node_details[i].ipaddr.Ip3 ,  
node_details[i].ipaddr.Ip4  , node_details[i].src_bytes , node_details[i].count ,node_details[i].state);}*/ 
 } 
int val; 
for (i = 0; i < sinknode_cnt; i++) { 
  for (j = 0; j < sink_node_vals[i].count; j++) { 
   val = sink_node_vals[i].ids[j]; 
Transfered : %d Count : %d \n" , node_details[val].Node_id , node_type , node_details[val].ipaddr.Ip1 ,  
node_details[val].ipaddr.Ip2 ,  node_details[val].ipaddr.Ip3 ,  node_details[val].ipaddr.Ip4  , 
node_details[val].src_bytes , node_details[val].count ); 
 (strcmp(node_details[i].state,"d9")==0) || (strcmp(node_details[i].state,"d10")==0)){ 
  printf( "Node Number : %d    count_Level : %s    Buffer_level : %s     Level : %s   State : %s\n" 
, node_details[val].Node_id ,   node_details[val].count_level, 
node_details[val].buffer_level,node_details[val].level, node_details[val].state);} 
 } 
} 
int print_selfish_node() { 
 printf("3.Anomaly nodes detected ..."); 
 int val; 
 int i, j; 
 for (i = 0; i < sinknode_cnt; i++) { 
  printf("Sink Node index : %d \n", i); 
  for (j = 0; j < sink_node_vals[i].count; j++) { 
   val = sink_node_vals[i].ids[j]; 
   printf("Node Number : %d   Level : %s \n", 
     node_details[val].Node_id, node_details[val].level); 
  } 
 
 } 
 
} 
* *****************************        Name:  setipaddr ***************************** 
int setipaddr(struct IP_Set *ipaddr) { 
 ipaddr->Ip1 = random_in_range(0, 255); 
 ipaddr->Ip2 = random_in_range(0, 255); 
 ipaddr->Ip3 = random_in_range(0, 255); 
 ipaddr->Ip4 = random_in_range(0, 255); 
 return TRUE; 
} 
*****************************Name:  create_rule_ip***************************** 
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int create_rule_ip(struct IP_Set *ipaddr) { 
 //printf( " %d=%d=%d=%d \n", ql_rules.ipaddr.Ip1 , ql_rules.ipaddr.Ip2 , ql_rules.ipaddr.Ip3 , 
ql_rules.ipaddr.Ip4 ) ; 
 ipaddr->Ip2 = random_in_range(0, 255); 
 ipaddr->Ip3 = random_in_range(0, 255); 
 ipaddr->Ip4 = random_in_range(0, 255); 
 return TRUE; 
} 
*****************************Name:  create_nodes***************************** 
int create_nodes() { 
 int i; 
 printf("\n\n"); 
 /* printf( "==================================================\n"); 
  printf( ">>>>>  Going to generate the Random Details <<<<<< \n"); 
  printf( "==================================================\n");*/ 
 for (i = 0; i < noofnode; i++) { 
  node_details[i].Node_id = i; 
  create_rule_ip(&node_details[i].ipaddr); 
   
 } 
 int nodenum; 
 for (i = 0; i < snode_cnt; i++) { 
  nodenum = random_in_range(0, noofnode); 
  setipaddr(&node_details[nodenum].ipaddr); 
 } 
 
} 
*****************************Name:  random_in_range***************************** 
int random_in_range(unsigned int min, unsigned int max) { 
 int base_random = rand(); 
 if (RAND_MAX == base_random) 
  return random_in_range(min, max); 
 if (base_random < RAND_MAX - remainder) { 
  return min + base_random / bucket; 
 } else { 
  return random_in_range(min, max); 
 } 
} 
*****************************Name:  display***************************** 
display(int start, int end) { 
 int i, j; 
 for (i = start; i <= end; i++) { 
  for (j = start; j <= end; j++) 
   printf("%4d", adj[i][j]); 
    printf("\n"); 
 } 
 
} 
display_con(int start, int end) { 
 int i, j; 
 printf("Displaying connection matrix\n"); 
 for (i = start; i < end; i++) { 
  for (j = start; j < end; j++) 
   printf("%4d", con_mat[i][j]); 
  printf("\n"); 
 } 
 
} 
*****************************Name:  formated_display***************************** 
formated_display() { 
 int i, j; 
 for (i = 0; i <= n; i++) { 
  if (i == 0) { 
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   puts(""); 
   for (j = 0; j <= n; j++) 
    (j == 0) ? printf("     |") : printf(" %3d |", j); 
   puts(""); 
   while (j--) 
    printf("-----+"); 
  } else 
   for (j = 0; j <= n; j++) { 
    if (j == 0) 
     printf(" %3d |", i); 
    else 
     printf(" %3d |", adj[i][j]); 
   } 
  printf("\n"); 
 } 
 
} 
*****************************Name:  findpath***************************** 
int findpath(int s, int d, int path[MAX], int *sdist) { 
 struct node state[MAX]; 
 int i, min, count = 0, current, newdist, u, v; 
 *sdist = 0; 
 for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) { 
  state[i].predecessor = 0; 
  state[i].dist = infinity; 
  state[i].status = TEMP; 
 } 
 state[s].predecessor = 0; 
 state[s].dist = 0; 
 state[s].status = PERM; 
 current = s; 
 while (current != d) { 
  for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) { 
   if (adj[current][i] > 0 && state[i].status == TEMP) { 
    newdist = state[current].dist + adj[current][i]; 
    if (newdist < state[i].dist) { 
     state[i].predecessor = current; 
     state[i].dist = newdist; 
    } 
   } 
  } 
  min = infinity; 
  current = 0; 
  for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) { 
   if (state[i].status == TEMP && state[i].dist < min) { 
    min = state[i].dist; 
    current = i; 
   } 
  } 
  if (current == 0) 
   return 0; 
  state[current].status = PERM; 
 } 
 while (current != 0) { 
  count++; 
  path[count] = current; 
  current = state[current].predecessor; 
 } 
 for (i = count; i > 1; i--) { 
  u = path[i]; 
  v = path[i - 1]; 
  *sdist += adj[u][v]; 
 } 
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 return (count); 
} 
node_split() //Splits packets into nodes 
{ 
 int i, j, k, l, split_node[100], packet_node[100]; 
 for (i = 0; i < 10000; i++) { 
  node_sp[i].node_id = 0; 
 } 
 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { 
  if (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d1") == 0) { 
   node_sp[1].node_id++; 
   strcpy(node_sp[1].node_state1, "d1"); 
  } 
  if (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d2") == 0) { 
   node_sp[2].node_id++; 
   strcpy(node_sp[2].node_state1, "d2"); 
  } 
  if (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d3") == 0) { 
   node_sp[3].node_id++; 
   strcpy(node_sp[3].node_state1, "d3"); 
  } 
  if (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d4") == 0) { 
   node_sp[4].node_id++; 
   strcpy(node_sp[4].node_state1, "d4"); 
  } 
  if (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d5") == 0) { 
   node_sp[5].node_id++; 
   strcpy(node_sp[5].node_state1, "d5"); 
  } 
  if (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d6") == 0) { 
   node_sp[6].node_id++; 
   strcpy(node_sp[6].node_state1, "d6"); 
  } 
  if (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d7") == 0) { 
   node_sp[7].node_id++; 
   strcpy(node_sp[7].node_state1, "d7"); 
  } 
  if (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d8") == 0) { 
   node_sp[8].node_id++; 
   strcpy(node_sp[8].node_state1, "d8"); 
  } 
  if (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d9") == 0) { 
   node_sp[9].node_id++; 
   strcpy(node_sp[9].node_state1, "d9"); 
  } 
  if (strcmp(node_details[i].state, "d10") == 0) { 
   node_sp[10].node_id++; 
   strcpy(node_sp[10].node_state1, "d10"); 
  } 
 } 
 k = 0; 
 total_noofpack = 0; 
 goal_node_number = 0; 
 for (i = 1; i <= 10; i++) { 
 
  if (node_sp[i].node_id < 30) { 
   split_node[i] = 1; 
   k = k + 1; 
   strcpy(node_sp[k].node_state, node_sp[i].node_state1); 
  
    if (((i == 8) || (i == 9) || (i == 10)) ){total_noofpack = 
total_noofpack+1; 
    goal_node_index[goal_node_number] = i; 
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    goal_node_number = goal_node_number+1;  
   } 
  } else if (node_sp[i].node_id >= 30 && node_sp[i].node_id < 50) { 
   split_node[i] = 2; 
   k = k + 2; 
   strcpy(node_sp[k-1].node_state, node_sp[i].node_state1); 
   strcpy(node_sp[k].node_state, node_sp[i].node_state1); 
  
   if (((i == 8) || (i == 9) || (i == 10)) ){total_noofpack = total_noofpack+1; 
    goal_node_index[goal_node_number] = k-1; 
    goal_node_number = goal_node_number+1;  
    goal_node_index[goal_node_number] = k; 
    goal_node_number = goal_node_number+1;  
   } 
  } else { 
   split_node[i] = ceil(node_sp[i].node_id / 50); 
   for (l = k+1; l<=(k+split_node[i]);l++) 
   { 
    strcpy(node_sp[l].node_state, node_sp[i].node_state1); 
    if (((i == 8) || (i == 9) || (i == 10)) ){ 
    goal_node_index[goal_node_number] = l; 
    goal_node_number = goal_node_number+1; } 
   } 
   k = k + split_node[i]; 
   if (((i == 8) || (i == 9) || (i == 10)) ){total_noofpack = total_noofpack+1;} 
  } 
 
 } 
 noofpack = k; 
 for (i =1 ; i<=10; i++){ 
 printf("Printing node state \n n%d = %s ==> nodecount = 
%d\n",i,node_sp[i].node_state1,node_sp[i].node_id); 
} printf("Total No of Node Count : %d \n", noofpack); 
} 
*****************************      Name:  create_graph ***************************** 
create_graph() { 
 int i, j, max_edges, origin, destin, wt; 
 // Define Rules 
 get_rules(); 
 
 //  Read Data From Kdd set 
 find_minmax(); 
 n = read_kdd_dataset(); 
 noofnode = n; 
  print_nodes(); 
 create_nodes(); 
 max_edges = n * (n - 1); 
 node_split(); 
 for (i = 0; i < noofpack; i++) { 
  for (j = 0; j < noofpack; j++) { 
    con_mat[i][j] = (rand() % (2 - 0)) + 0; 
  } 
 } 
 for (i = 0; i < noofpack; i++) 
  for (j = 0; j < noofpack; j++) { 
   origin = i; 
   destin = j; 
   if ((i==j) || (con_mat[i][j] == 1)) 
   {if ((strcmp(node_sp[j+1].node_state1,"d8")==0) || 
(strcmp(node_sp[j+1].node_state1,"d9")==0) || (strcmp(node_sp[j+1].node_state1,"d10")==0)) 
     { 
      wt = 100; 
     } 
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     else if ((i != j) || (con_mat[i][j] == 1)) 
     { 
      wt = 0; 
     } 
     else 
     { 
      wt = -1; 
     } 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    wt = -1; 
   } 
  
 if (origin > noofpack || destin > noofpack || origin < 0 || destin < 0) { 
  printf("\nInvalid edge!\n"); 
  i--; 
 } else 
  adj[origin][destin] = wt; 
} 
} 
*****************************         Name:  find_minmax ***************************** 
find_minmax() { 
FILE *fp; 
char *filename = "kddset.data"; 
fp = fopen(filename, "r"); 
char *line; 
line = (char *) malloc(1024); 
if (fp == NULL) { 
 perror("Error : Opening kdd data set file"); 
 return 0; 
} 
char arr[1000][64]; 
while (fgets(line, 1024, fp)) { 
 splitstr(line, arr, ","); 
 if (time_min > atoi(arr[0])) 
  time_min = atoi(arr[0]); 
 if (time_max < atoi(arr[0])) 
  time_max = atoi(arr[0]); 
 if (bs_min > atoi(arr[5])) 
  bs_min = atoi(arr[5]); 
 if (bs_max < atoi(arr[5])) 
  bs_max = atoi(arr[5]); 
 if (count_min > atoi(arr[22])) 
  count_min = atoi(arr[22]); 
 if (count_max < atoi(arr[22])) 
  count_max = atoi(arr[22]); 
} 
time_avg = (time_max - (time_min)) / 3; 
bs_avg = (bs_max - (bs_min)) / 3; 
count_avg = (count_max - (count_min)) / 3; 
} 
*****************************       Name:  read_kdd_dataset ***************************** 
int read_kdd_dataset() { 
FILE *fp; 
char *filename = "kddset.data"; 
fp = fopen(filename, "r"); 
char *line; 
int count = 0; 
snode_cnt = 0; 
line = (char *) malloc(1024); 
if (fp == NULL) { 
 perror("Error : Opening kdd data set file"); 
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 return 0; 
} 
char arr[50][64]; 
while (fgets(line, 1024, fp)) { 
 splitstr(line, arr, ","); 
 node_details[count].protocal = (strcmp(arr[1], "tcp") == 0) ? 1 : 2; 
 // Check the node details 
 if (ql_rules.protocal == node_details[count].protocal) { 
  create_rule_ip(&node_details[count].ipaddr); 
  node_details[count].node_type = 1; 
 } else { 
  setipaddr(&node_details[count].ipaddr); 
  node_details[count].node_type = 2; 
  snode_cnt++; 
 } 
 node_details[count].Node_id = count; 
 node_details[count].src_bytes = atoi(arr[4]); 
 node_details[count].dst_bytes = atoi(arr[5]); 
 node_details[count].count = atoi(arr[22]); 
 node_details[count].time = atoi(arr[0]); 
 if (atoi(arr[0]) >= 0 && atoi(arr[0]) <= (time_min+time_avg)) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].level, "Low"); 
 else if (atoi(arr[0]) > time_avg && atoi(arr[0]) <= ((time_min)+(2 * time_avg))) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].level, "Medium"); 
 else if (atoi(arr[0]) > ((time_min)+(2 * time_avg))) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].level, "High"); 
 else 
  strcpy(node_details[count].level, "High"); 
 
 if (atoi(arr[22]) >= 0 && atoi(arr[22]) <= (count_min+count_avg)) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].count_level, "Low"); 
 else if (atoi(arr[22]) > count_avg && atoi(arr[22]) <= ((count_min)+(2 * count_avg))) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].count_level, "Medium"); 
 else if (atoi(arr[22]) > ((count_min)+(2 * count_avg))) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].count_level, "High"); 
 else 
  strcpy(node_details[count].count_level, "High"); 
 
 if (atoi(arr[5]) >= 0 && atoi(arr[5]) <= (bs_min+bs_avg)) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Low"); 
 else if (atoi(arr[5]) > bs_avg && atoi(arr[5]) <= ((bs_min)+(2 * bs_avg))) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Medium"); 
 else if (atoi(arr[5]) > ((bs_min)+(2 * bs_avg))) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].buffer_level, "High"); 
 else 
  strcpy(node_details[count].buffer_level, "High"); 
 if ((strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Low") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Medium") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "High") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Low") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "High") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Low") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Low") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "High") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Medium") == 0)) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].state, "d1"); 
 else if ((strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Low") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Medium") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Low") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Low") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Medium") == 
0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Medium") == 0) 
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   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Low") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Low") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "High") == 0)) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].state, "d2"); 
 else if ((strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Medium") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "High") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Low") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Medium") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "High") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Medium") == 0)) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].state, "d3"); 
 else if ((strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Low") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Low") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Medium") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Low") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Low") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Low") == 0)) 
   
  strcpy(node_details[count].state, "d4"); 
 else if ((strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Medium") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Low") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Medium") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Medium") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Low") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Low") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Medium") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Low") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "High") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Medium") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Medium") == 
0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Low") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Medium") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Medium") == 
0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Medium") == 0)) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].state, "d5"); 
 else if ((strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "High") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Medium") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Medium") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "High") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Low") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Low") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "High") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Low") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Medium") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "High") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Medium") == 
0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Low") == 0)) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].state, "d6"); 
 else if (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Medium") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Medium") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "High") == 0) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].state, "d7"); 
 else if ((strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "High") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "High") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Low") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Low") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "High") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "High") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "High") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Low") == 0 
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     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "High") == 0)) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].state, "d8"); 
 else if ((strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "Medium") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "High") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "High") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "High") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "Medium") == 
0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "High") == 0) 
   || (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "High") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "High") == 0 
     && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "Medium") == 0)) 
  strcpy(node_details[count].state, "d9"); 
 else if (strcmp(node_details[count].count_level, "High") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].buffer_level, "High") == 0 
   && strcmp(node_details[count].level, "High") == 0)    
  strcpy(node_details[count].state, "d10"); 
 
 count++; 
} 
fclose(fp); 
return count; 
} 
int isGoal(int node) { 
char myState[10]; 
strcpy(myState, node_details[node].state); 
if (strcmp(myState, "d8") == 0 || strcmp(myState, "d9") == 0 
  || strcmp(myState, "d10") == 0) 
 return 1; 
else 
 return 0; 
} 
int isGoal_1(int i,int j) { 
 
if (adj[i][j]==100) 
 return 1; 
else 
 return 0; 
} 
***************************** Name:  main ***************************** 
void d1(int start, int end) { 
int i, j; 
printf("\n"); 
for (i = start; i <= end; i++) { 
 for (j = start; j <= end; j++) 
  printf("%d\t", cur[i][j]); 
 printf("\n"); 
} 
} 
Ql(int start, int end, int sink1) { 
int sink_no, i, j, k, l, max = 0, cur_state = 2, next_state = 0, loop = 0, ini = 1, 
  isnxt_state = 1, epoc = 0, check_last,goal_count = 0,goal_check = 1,goal_node, 
 
 ac_i,ac_j,ac_reach,ac_start,ac_col,ac_find[noofpack],ac_i1,ac_notreach,ac_new,ac_oreach; 
double divide; 
int m,n,acc_count,acc_total; 
int total_acc=0; 
sink_no = sink1; 
time_t now; 
time_t now1; 
int *second_array = (int*) malloc(noofpack*sizeof(int)); 
int *goal_array = (int*) malloc(noofpack*sizeof(int)); 
int state_count = 0, initial_state = -1, second_state = -1; 
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for (i = 0; i<noofpack;i++) 
{ 
 second_array[i] = -1; 
 ac_find[i] = 0; 
}  
  { 
  for (j=1;j<=n;j++) 
 { 
 adj[i][j] = -1; 
 cur[i][j] = 0; } } 
 adj[1][5]=0; adj[2][4]=0; adj[2][6]=100; adj[3][4]=0; adj[4][2]=0; adj[4][3]=0; adj[4][5]=0; adj[5][1]=0; 
adj[5][4]=0; adj[5][6]=100; adj[6][2]=0; adj[6][5]=0; adj[6][6]=100; 
printf("\n"); 
 
if (sink_no == -1) { 
 time(&now); 
 printf(" ql starts %s\n", ctime(&now)); 
 sink_no = sinknode_cnt + 1; 
} 
FILE *f1, *f2, *f3; 
f1 = fopen("Expertness.txt", "wt"); 
//fprintf(f1, "%s,%s\n", "Epoch_number", "Expertness"); 
f2 = fopen("Accuracy.txt", "wt"); 
f3 = fopen("Time.txt", "wt"); 
//fprintf(f2, "%s,%s\n", "Epoch_number", "Accuracy"); 
fclose(f2); 
fclose(f3); 
fclose(f1); 
// initializing Q matrix(cur) 
for (i = 0; i<noofpack;i++){ 
 for (j = 0; j < noofpack; j++){ 
  cur[i][j] =0;}} 
  display_con(0, noofpack);  
printf("\nDisplaying Reward matrix\n"); 
display(0,noofpack-1); 
  if (loop = 1)  d1(0, noofpack-1);  
 for (m = 0 ; m < noofpack ; m++) 
  { 
   for (n = 0 ; n < noofpack ; n++) 
   { 
    temp[m][n]  = 0;   }   } 
 
// Epoc for starts...  
 ac_oreach = 0; 
for (loop = 1; loop < 500; loop++) { 
 goal_node = 0; 
 goal_count = 0; 
 goal_check = 1; 
 time(&now); 
  
 // Node for loop starts.... 
 for(j=0 ; j< noofpack; j++) 
 { 
  initial_state = j; 
  state_count = 0; 
  // second state for loop starts 
  for (k = 0; k < noofpack; k++) 
  { 
   //printf("j = %d \n k = %d \n con_mat[][] = %d\n",j,k,con_mat[j][k]); 
   //getch(); 
   if (con_mat[j][k] > 0) 
   { 
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    second_array[state_count] = k; 
    //printf("second array: %d\t",second_array[state_count]); 
    state_count++; 
   } 
  // if connection not available 
  if (state_count == 0) 
   continue; 
   int index = (rand() % ((state_count+1) - 0)) + 0; 
   second_state =  second_array[index]; 
   // Q Function loop starts 
   max = 0; 
   for ( l = 0 ; l < noofpack ; l++) 
   { if ( con_mat[k][l] > 0 ) 
    { 
     goal_check = 1; 
     if (cur[k][l] > max) 
     { 
     max = cur[k][l];   }  
 } 
   } 
   goal_check = 1; 
   if (adj[initial_state][second_state] == 100) 
   { 
       for (goal_node =0 ; goal_node<goal_count;goal_node++) 
    { 
    if (goal_array[goal_node] == second_state) 
    { 
     goal_check = goal_check + 1; 
    } 
   } 
   if (goal_check == 1) 
   { 
    goal_array[goal_count] = second_state; 
    goal_count++; 
   } 
  } 
   
  if (((adj[initial_state][second_state] % 2) == 1) || (adj[initial_state][second_state] == -
1)){ 
  cur[initial_state][second_state] = adj[initial_state][second_state] + (0.8 * max)+1;
 } 
  else{ 
  } 
 } 
 if (epoc != -1) { 
  expert_agent.sum_rewards[sink_no] = 0; 
  expert_agent.total_rewards[sink_no] = 0; 
  expert_agent.expertness[sink_no] = 0; 
  for (i = start; i <= end; i++) { 
   for (j = start; j <= end; j++) { 
    expert_agent.sum_rewards[sink_no] = 
      expert_agent.sum_rewards[sink_no] + cur[i][j]; 
     if (expert_agent.sum_rewards[sink_no] < 0) { 
     } 
    expert_agent.total_rewards[sink_no]++; 
   } 
  } 
  expert_agent.expertness[sink_no] = expert_agent.sum_rewards[sink_no] 
 total_acc = 0; 
 for (m = 0 ; m < noofpack ; m++) 
 { 
  for (n = 0 ; n < noofpack ; n++) 
  { 
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   if (temp[m][n] != cur[m][n]) 
   { 
    total_acc = total_acc+1;   } }  
 }  
for (m = 0 ; m < noofpack ; m++) 
 { 
  for (n = 0 ; n < noofpack ; n++) 
  { 
   temp[m][n] = cur[m][n]; }  
 }  
    ac_reach = 0; 
 ac_notreach = 0; 
 ac_start = -1; 
void main() { 
int i, j; int source, dest; int path[MAX];int energy[MAX]; int shortdist, count;int total_energy = 
0; 
double weight_sink = 0;  
create_graph(); 
int enery_val[MAX]; 
int total_time; 
printf("\n"); 
printf("3.Q Learning starts....\n"); 
printf("****** Complete QLearning ******\n"); 
Ql(1, noofpack, -1); 
int split = Total / sinknode_cnt; 
expert_agent.total_expert = 0; 
while (1) { 
 scanf("%d", &source); 
 printf("\nEnter destination node(0 to quit) : "); 
 scanf("%d", &dest);} 
 
